But a tenancy from year to year, or at will, can only be terminated on the part of the landlord by a notice to quit. This notice might at common law be by parol; Doe v. Kightley, 7 Term 63; Thamm v. Hamberg, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 528; but it is frequently regulated by statute; it must be explicit, and require the tenant to remove from the premises ; Steward v. Harding, 2 Gray (Mass.) 335; Dougl. 175; 5 Ad. & E. 350; it must be served upon the tenant, and not upon an under tenant; it must run In the name of the landlord, and not of his agent; Jackson v. Baker, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 270. But personal service of the notice on the tenant is not absolutely essential, and it is sufficient if the notice be left at the tenant's usual residence with his wife or servant.; 4 Term 464; L. R. 5 H. L. 134; Walker v. Sharpe, 103 Mass. 154. An estate at will must be mutual ; if one party can terminate the lease at any time, so can the other; Cow an v. Iron Cod, 83 Va. 547, 3 S. E. 120. Such a tenancy is terminated by the aliena tion of the premises, without notice to the tenant; Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536, 38 Atl. 540. Whether a tenant from year to year is in any event bound to give notice to determine the tenancy seems doubtful. See the authorities collected in Cooke v. Neilson, Bright. Pa. 463. At common law this no tice was required to be one of half a year, ending with the period of the year at which the tenancy commenced; 1 W. Bla. 596; 7 Q. B. 638; and this rule prevails in some states, while in others a notice required to ter minate the tenancy from year to year varies and the statutes must be consulted with respect to any particular state, or case. See NOTICE TO QUIT.
In case of such a tenancy, in default of no tice, the landlord has no right of entry until the term granted has terminated by legal notice, and in default of such notice, the tenant may hold over; Thomas v. Black, 8 Houst. (Del.) 507, 18 Atl. 771. The subject is in general governed by statutory rules too numerous and complicated to set forth. Where a lease provides for the termination of a tenancy upon the tenant's ceasing to work for, the landlord and the tenant volun tarily ceases so to work, no notice of the termination of the lease to the tenant is nec essary ; Hackett v. Marmet Co., 52 Fed. 268, 3 C. C. A. 76, 8 U. S. App. 149.
The relation of landlord and tenant will also, be dissolved when the tenant incurs a forfeiture of his lease by the breach of some covenant or condition therein contained. At common law a forfeiture was incurred if the tenant did any act which was inconsist ent with his relation to his landlord; as if he impugned the title of his lessor by affirm ing by matter of record the fee to be in a stranger, claimed a greater estate than he was entitled to, or undertook to alienate the estate in fee; Co. Litt. 251 b, 252 a; 12 East 444. But these causes of forfeiture, founded upon strict feudal principles, have been gen erally abolished in the United States; and a forfeiture of a term of years now only oc curs in consequence of a breach of some express stipulation contained in the lease, as for the commission of waste, nonpayment of rent, or the like; Baxter v. Lansing, 7 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 350 ; 5 B. & C. 855 ; Chap
man v. Wright, 20 111. 125. In order to work a forfeiture for non-payment of rent, a de mand must be made for the rent, though such demand may be in the form of a notice to quit; Haynes v. Inv. Co., 35 Neb. 766, 53 N. W. 979; Henderson v. Coke Co., 140 U. S. 25, 11 Sup. Ct. 691, 35 L. Ed. 332. A de lay of a few days in declaring a lease for feited for non-payment of rent does not con stitute a waiver of the right of forfeiture; Williams v. Vanderbilt, 145 Ill. 238, 34 N. E. 476, 21 L. R. A. 489, 36 Am. St. Rep. 486. A provision of a lease that failure of the lessee to make a payment when due should render the lease null and void, and not bind ing on either party, does not make the lease void, except at the option of the lessor ; Cochran v. Pew, 159 Pa. 184, 28 Atl. 219. A forfeiture may be waived by an acceptanCe of, or distraining for, rent which became due after a breach committed by the tenant, or by giving a notice to quit, or by any other act which acknowledges the continuance of the tenancy ; Newman v. Rutter, 8 Watts (Pa.) 51; Coon v. Brickett, 2 N. H. 163; Gomber v. Hackett, 6 Wis. 323, 70 Am. Dec. 467; L. R. 7 Q. B. 344; Garnhart v. Finney, 40 Mo. 449, 93 Am. Dec. 303; Jones v. Dur rer, 96 Cal. 95, 30 Pac. 1027 ; Michel v. O'Brien, 6 Misc. 408, 27 N. Y. Supp. 173; and will be relieved against by the courts in all cases where it happened accidentally, or where the injury is capable of compensation, the damages on equitable principles being a mere matter of computation ; 12 Ves. Ch. 475; 2 Price 206; Story, Eq. § 1314 ; Giles v. Austin, 62 N. Y. 486 ; Hagar v. Buck, 44 Vt. 285, 8 Am. Rep. 368; and it is always at the election of the lessor to avail himself of his right of re-entry for conditions broken or not as he pleases ; 6 B. & C. 519 ; and side Davis v. Moss, 38 Pa. 346 ; Bowman v. Foot, 29 Conn. 331; Dermott v. Wallach, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 64, 17 L. Ed. 680.
Another means of dissolving a tenancy is by an operation of law, termed a merger,— which happens where a tenant purchases the fee of the reversion, or the fee descends to him as heir at law, the lease becoming thereby merged in the inheritance, the less er estate being absorbed in the greater. To produce this result, however, it is necessary that the two estates should meet in the same person and in the same right; for if he who has the reversion in fee marries the tenant for years, or if a tenant makes the landlord his executor, the term of years is in neither case merged, because in either case he holds the fee for his own benefit, while the term of years is taken in one case for his wife's use, and in the other for the bene fit of the estate he represents as executor ; Woodf. L. & T. 1188; Co. Litt. 288 b; 1 Washb. R. P. 354;. Charnley v. Hansbury, 13 Pa. 16 ; Sheldon v. Edwards, 35 N. Y. 279. See Pickett v. Ferguson, 86 Tenn. 642, 8 S. W. 386. But the universal current of opinion now sets against the operation of the doc trine of merger wherever a result will be produced contrary to the intentions of the parties or prejudicial to the interests of third parties ; Bascom v. Smith, 34 N. Y. 320; Buffum v. Deane, 4 Gray (Mass.) 385 ; 4 De G. M. & G. 474.