"It is to be observed, then, that such a contract changes entirely the relation of counsel to the cause. It reduces him from his high position of an officer of the court and a minister of justice, to that of a party litigating his own claim. Having now a deep personal interest in the event of the controversy, he will cease to consider himself sub ject to the ordinary rules Of professional conduct. He is tempted to make success, at all hazards and by all means, the sole end of his exertions. He becomes blind to the merits of the case, and would find it difficult to persuade himself no matter what state of facts might be developed in the progress of the proceedings, as to the true character of the transaction, that it was his duty to retire from it." "He has now an interest, which gives him a right to speak as principal, not merely to advise as to the law, and abide by instructions. It is either unfair to him or unfair to the client. If he thinks the result doubtful, he throws all his time, learning, and skill away upon what, in his estimation, is an uncertain chance. He cannot work with the prop er spirit in such a case. If he believes'that the re sult will be success, he secures in this way a higher compensation than he is justly entitled to receive. "It is an undue encouragement to litigation. Men, who would not think of entering on a lawsuit, if they knew that they must compensate their lawyers whether they win or lose, are ready upon such a contingent agreement to try their chances with any kind of a claim. It makes the law more of a lot tery than it is.
"The worst consequence is yet to be told,—its ef fect upon professional character. It turns lawyers into bigglers with their clients. Of course it is not meant that these are always its actual results ; but they are its inevitable tendencies, in many instances its practical working. To drive a favorable bar gain with the suitor in the first place, the difficulties of the case are magnified and multiplied, and ad vantage taken of that very confidence which led him to intrust his interests to the protection of the advocate. The parties are necessarily not on an equal footing in making such a bargain. A high sense of honor may prevent counsel from abusing his position and knowledge ; but all have not such high and nice sense of honor. If our example goes towards making the 'practice of agreements for con tingent fees general, we assist in placing such temptations in the way of our professional brethren of all degrees—the young, the inexperienced, and the unwary, as well as those whose age and expe rience have taught them that a lawyer's honor is his brightest jewel, and to be guarded from being sullied, Oven by the breath of suspicion, with the most seduldus care." On the same subject Mr. Eli K. Price, in an essay on Limitations and Liens, thus expresses his opin ion: "And further permit me to advise and earnest ly to admonish you, for the preservation of profes sional honor and integrity, to avoid the temptation for bargaining for fees or shares of any estate or other claim, contingent upon a successful recovery.
The practice directly leads to a disturbance of the peace of society, and to an infidelity to the profes sional obligation promised to the court, in which is implied an absence of desire or effort of one in the of the temple of justice, to obtain a suc cess that is not just as well as lawful. It is true, as a just equivalent' for many cases honorably ad vocated and incompetently paid by the poor, a com pensation may and will be received, the more liheral because of the ability produced by success ; but let it be the result of no bargain, exacted as a price before the service is rendered, but rather the grateful return for benefits already conferred. If rigid in your terms, in protection of the right of the profession to a just and honorable compensation, let it rather be in the amount of the required re tainer, when it will have its proper influence in the discouragement of litigation." See CHAMPERTY. "The boundaries of professional privilege and professional obligation are clearly defined and in no way doubtful. Counsel represents the prisoner to defend his rights. In so doing he is bound to exercise competent learning, and to be faithful, vigilant, resolute. But he is at the same time an officer of the court, part of the system which the law provides for the preservation of individual rights in the administration of justice, and bound by his official oath to fidelity as well to the court as to the client. It was well said by the Chief Justice in Com. v. Jongrass, 181 Pa. 172, 37 Atl. 207: 'There is no code of professional ethics which is peculiar to the criminal courts. There are no meth ods of practice to be tolerated there that are not equally entitled to recognition in the civil courts.' The duty of the counsel is to see that his client is tried with proper observance of his legal rights, and not convicted except in strict accordance with law. His duty to .his client requires him to do this much, his duty to the court forbids him to do more. An independent and fearless bar is a necessary part of the heritage of a people free by the standards of Anglo-Saxon freedom, and courts must allow a large latitude to the individual judgment of counsel in determining his action, but it must never be lost sight of that there is a corresponding obligation to the court, which is violated by excessive zeal or perverted ingenuity that seeks to delay or evade the due course of legal justice." Corn. v. Hill, 185 Pa. 387, 39 Atl. 1056, per Mitchell, J.