The nature of the interest in the land of another which might be created by a parol license is thus stated by Bates, Ch., in Jack son & Sharp Co. v. P. W. & B. R. Co., 4 Del. Ch. 180: "It must be admitted that a license or permission to exercise some privilege on the land of the licensor can create no es tate or interest in the land, such as binds the land and is transmissible from the li censee, the utmost effect of a license being to confer a personal privilege, which is not assignable or and is revocable at the licensor's pleasure. Nor does it matter whether the license be oral or in writing, so long as it remains a mere license, not con verted int() a conveyance, grant, or contract; nor rendered irrevocable by estoppel, as un der some circumstances . . '. it may be in equity though not at law: Few points have undergone more discussion, and have at length come to be better settled, than the in sufficiency of a license at law to create or transfer an 'interest In land." It was also said that "at law a license can under no cir cumstances become irrevocable by estoppel when the effect would be to create an inter est in land," there not having been "such conduct as would render the assertion of the legal right a fraud." See note to this case, 4 Del. Ch. 195-198. See also Nunnelly v. Southern R. Co., 94 Tenn. 397, 29 S. W. 361, 28 L. R. A. 421; where it was held that the privilege to discharge water from an ore wash into a stream, given without words of grant by a lower proprietor to an iron com pany, with an agreement to accept a certain sum as the full amount of damages done by such water, is a license, not an easement, and does not extend to the grantees of the iron company.
The revocation of a license will not be permitted where such a revocation will amount to a fraud upon the licensee; Bald win v. Taylor, 166 Pa. 507, 31 Atl. 250; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Bullard, 67 Vt. 272, 31 AU. 286 ; Garrett v. Bishop, 27 Or. 349, 41 Pac. 10 ; but revocation may be presumed from a long period of non-user ; Tatum v. City of St. Louis, 125 Mo. 647, 28 S. W. 1002. Courts of equity will interfere to restrain the exercise of a legal right to re voke a license on the ground of preventing fraud; Jackson v. Sharp Co. v. R. Co., 4 Del. Ch. 180; and will do 'so on no other ground; id.; but in such case they will con strue the license as an agreement to give the right and compel specific performance by deed; Veghte v. Water Power Co., 19 N. J. Eq. 153; Williamston & T. R. Co. v. Bat tle, 66 N. C. 546 ; but this does not give the licensee an unqualified right to treat the li cense as unrevoked ; 1 H. & C. 593; 23 Ex. 87. An occupancy of land under a contract void as against public policy, cannot be treated as a possession under a license for the purpose of obtaining relief in equity ; Carley v. Gitchell, 105 Mich. 38, 62 N. W. 1003, 55 Am. St. Rep. 428. An executed li cense which destroys an easement enjoyed by the licensor in the licensee's land cannot be created without deed ; 5 B. & C. 221; and
the rule that an executed license cannot be revoked; Addison v. Hack, 2 Gill (Md.) 221, 41 Am. Dec. 421; 7 Bingh. 682 ; Saucer v. Keller, 129 Ind. 475, 28 N. E. 1117 ; is not applicable to licenses which, if given by deed, would create an easement, but to those which, if so given, would extinguish or mod ify an easement; Morse v. Copeland, 2 Gray (Mass.) 302. A license must be established by proof and is not to be inferred by equivo cal declarations of a land owner ; Pennsyl vania, P. & B. R. Co. v. Trimmer (N. J.) 31 Atl. 310.
The effect of an executed license, although revoked, is to excuse the licensee from lia bility for acts done properly in pursuance thereof and their consequences; Syron v. Blakeman, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 336; Morse v. Copeland, 2 Gray (Mass.) 302; Prince v. Case, 10 Conn. 378, 27 Am. Dec. 675; Samp son v. Burnside, 13 N. H. 264 ; 7 Taunt. 374 ; 5 B. & C. 221.
In Contracts. A permission to do some act which, If lawful, would otherwise be a trespass or tort; the evidence of such per mission when it is in writing.
A covenant not within the statute of frauds may be released or discharged wholly or in part by a parol license; 10 Ad. & E. 65 ; 2 Add. Cont. [1218].
A license by a debtor to a creditor to seize and sell a specific chattel in discharge of a debt not paid at maturity is what is termed in civil law imperfect hypothecation. Such license is confined to the parties and is ter minated when rights of third parties inter vene; and it is not assignable. It gives no title to the chattel until gxecuted, but pos session taken under the license clothes the creditor with the ownership. It is annulled by bankruptcy ; 2 Add. Cont., 8th Am. ed.
[637]. • See HYPOTHECATION.
Where a lease gave a license to the lessor to enter and eject the lessee, he was author ized as between themselves to eject the ten ant by main force, and the license was a good plea in bar of an action of trespass; 7 Man. & G. 316 ; 7 Sc. N. R. 1025.
In International Law. Permission granted by a belligerent state to its own subjects, or 'to the subjects of the •enemy, or to neu trals to carry on a trade interdicted by war. 2 Halleck, Int. Law 343.
Licenses operate as a dispensation of the rules of war, so far as their provisions ex tend. They are stricti juris, but are not to be construed with pedantic accuracy. 2 Hal leck, Int. Law 343; 1 Kent 163, n.; 4 C. Rob. 8. They can be granted only by the sover eign authority, or by those delegated for the purpose by special commission; 1 Dods. 226; Stew. Adm. 367; 8 Term 548; 1 C. Rob. 196; and they must be granted or assented to by both belligerents; Snow. Int. L. xxxi. The Act of Congress of July 13, 1861, authoriz ing the president to license certain commer cial intercourse with the states in rebellion, did not contemplate the exercise of that au thority by subordinate officers of the execu tive department without the express order of the president; The Sea Lion, 5 Wall. (II. S.) 630, 18 L. Ed. 618.