The possession of the tenant is likewise the possession of his landlord, aud cannot be adverse unless he distinctly renounce his landlord's title; 2 Campb. 11; Willison v. Watkins, 3 Pet, (U. S.) 43, 7 L. Ed. 596; Shepley v. Lytle, 6 Watts (Pa.) 500; Alder son v. Marshall, 7 Mont. 288, 16 Pac. 576; Brunson v. Morgan, 84 Ala. 598, 4 South. 589 ; Bedlow v. Dry-Dock Co., 112 N. Y. 263, 19 N. E. 800, 2 L. R. A. 629 ; Parish Board of School Directors v. Edriugton, 40 La. Ann. 633, 4 South. 574.
Mere non-payment of rent during the time limited, there having been no demand, does not prejudice the landlord's right to enter and demand it, even though the lease contains a clause giving the right of re entry in case of non-payment of rent ; Jack son v. Davis, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 123, 15 Am. Dec. 451; 7 East 299 ; and payment of rent is conclusive evidence that the occupation of the party paying was permissive and not ad verse; 3 B. & C. 135. The defendant in execution after a sale is a quasi tenant at will to the purchaser ; and his possession is not therefore adverse; Jackson. v. Stern bergh, 1 Johns. Cas. (N. 1) 153. And a mere holding over after the expiration of a lease does not change the character of the possessibh; Gwynn v. Jones' Lessee,. 2 Gill & J. (Md.) 173; nor does the assignment of the lease, or a sub-letting. The assignee and sub-lessees are still tenants, so far as the ti tle by adverse possession is concerned ; Graham v. Moore, 4 S. & R. (Pa.) 467; Wil lison v. Watkins, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 43, 7 L. Ed. 596; Jackson v. Miller, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 751.
If the tenant convey the premises, as we have before seen, the landlord may treat the grantee as a disseisor by election ; but the grantee cannot set up the act as the basis of a title by adverse possession ; Jackson v. Davis, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 123, 15 Am. Dec. 451; unless in the case where the relation of land lord and tenant subsists by operation of law; as where one makes a grant and by the omis sion of the word "heirs" an estate for life only passes. In such case, after the death of the tenant for life au adverse possession may commence ; Jackson v. Harsen, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 323, 17 Am. Dec. 517. So in case the tenant has attorned to a third person and the landlord has assented to the attornment ; Zeller v. Eckert, 4 How. (U. S.) 289, 11 L. Ed. 979; Rabe v. Tyler, 10 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 440, 48 Am. Dec. 763; Rigg v. Cook, 4 Gilm. (Ill.) 336, 46 Am. Dec. 462. But a mere parol disclaimer, by the lessor, of the existence of the relationship, and of all right in the premises, is not equivalent to an at tornment. To admit such disclaimer would lead to fraud and perjury, and is in direct violation of the principles of the statute of frauds ; Jackson v. Johnson, 5 Cow. (N. Y.)
74, 15 Am. Dec. 433; but see Satterlee v. Matthewson, 13 S. & R. (Pa.) 133.
The possession of one's agent is, within the purview of the statute of limitation, the possession of his principal ; Lantry v. Par ker, 37 Neb. 353, 55 N. W. 962. See Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, 13 Sup.. Ct. 418, 37 L. Ed. 259.
The possession of the niortgagor is not ad verse to the mortgagee (the relation being in many respects analogous to that of land lord and tenant) ; Willison v. Watkins, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 43, 7 L. Ed. 596;- Perkins v. Pitts, 11 Mass. 125 ; Martin v. Jackson, 27 Pa. 504, 67 Am. Dec. 489 ; not even if the possession be under an absolute deed, if intended as a mortgage ; Babcock v. Wyman, 19 How. (U. S.) 289, 15 L. Ed. 644. The relation of mort gagor and mortgagee is very peculiar and sui generis. It is sometimes like a tenancy for years ; Cro. Jac. 659 ; sometimes like a tenancy at will; Dougl. 275 ; and sometimes like a tenancy on sufferance; 1 Salk. 245; but, whatever it may be like, it is always presumed to be py permission of the mort gagee until the contrary be shown. The as signee of the mortgagor, with notice, is in the same predicament as the mortgagor; but if he purchase without notice, and particularly if the mortgage be forfeited at the date of his purchase, his possession will be adverse; Martin v. Bowker, 19 Vt. 526; Field v. Wil son, 6 B. Monr. (Ky.) 479; McNair v. Lot, 34 Mo. 285, 84 Am. Dec. 78 ; Babcock v. Wyman, 19 How. (U. S.) 289, 15 L. Ed. 644.
But, although the possession of the mort gagor be not adverse so as to give title under the statute against the mortgagee, the courts have nevertheless practically abrogated this rule, by holding that where the mortgagor has held during the statutory limit, and has meantime paid no interest nor otherwise rec ognized the rights of the mortgagee, this raises a presumption that the debt has been paid, and is a good defence in an action to foreclose ; Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 497, 6 L. Ed. 142; Bacon v. McIntire, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 87. And the reasons for so holding seem to be equally cogent with those upon which rests the well-settled rule that, with certain exceptions, the mortgagee's pos session for the time limited bars the mort gagor's right to redeem; 2 J. & W. 434; Moore v. Cable, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. L) 385; Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 489, 6 L. Ed,. 142 ; Lamar v. Jones, 3 Harr. & Mel. (Md.) 328; Phillips v. Sinclair, 20 Me. 269.