Liquor Laws

license, city, county, pac, ga, commissioners and ann

Page: 1 2 3 4 5

A license court may not bargain with an applicant and exact a promise as a condi tion; nor refuse a license to one because "he made a promise last year not to apply for a license this year"; Donoghue's License, 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 1.

A statute authorizing city councils to create excise boards, which, when created, shall be vested with certain well defined powers, is not a delegation of powers, as such powers are vested by the statute in the board to be created; Riley v. Trenton, N. J. L. 498, 18 Atl-116, 5 L. R. A. 352; but when the licensing power is expressly conferred upon the council, it cannot be delegated to the mayor by ordinance; City of Kinmundy v. Mahan, 72 Ill. 462; nor can county commissioners with statutory author ity to license a saloon, confer that power on a county attorney ; County Com'rs of Hennepin County v. Robinson, 16 Minn. 381 (Gil. 340) ; or upon the clerk of the board ; Mayson v. City of Atlanta, 77 Ga. 662.

A state act vesting in judges in the respec tive counties jurisdiction over licenses to sell liquor does not contravene the 14th amend ment (privileges and immunities) ; State v. Durein, 70 Kan. 13, 80 t'ac. 987, affirmed Durein v. State, 208 U. S. 613, 28 Sup. Ct. 567, 52 L. Ed. 645. The right to sell liquor is not protected by that amendment; id. Jacobs Pharmacy v. City of Atlanta, 89 Fed. 244; Jordan v. Evansville, 163 Ind. 512, 72 N. E. 544, 67 L. R. A. 613, 2 Ann. Cas. 96; City of Hoboken v. Goodman, 68 N. J. L. 217, 51 AU. 1092; State v. Richardson, 48 Or. 309, 85 Pac. 225, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 362 ; or any other constitutional provision; State v. Cal loway, 11 Idaho, 719, 84 Pac. 27, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 109, 114 Am. St. Rep. 285.

When the performance of an act rests, by statute, on the discretion of a person or depends on the exercise of personal judg ment, mandamus will not lie to compel its performance; Post v. Township Board, 64 Mich. 597, 31 N. W. 535 ; Eve v. Simon, 78 Ga. 120; and where there is no ordinance rendering it a legal obligation to grant a li cense, a mandamus will not lie to compel its issuance ; Village of Crotty v. People, 3 Ill.

App. 465; see Deehan v. Johnson, 141 Mass. 23, 6 N. E. 240 (distinguishing Braconier v. Packard, 136 Mass. 50) ; State v. Weeks, 93

Mo. 499, 6 S. W. 266; State v. Cass County, 12 Neb. 54, 10 N. W. 571; Ex parte Persons, 1 H111 (N. Y.) 65n; Commissioners of Max ton v. Commissioners of Robeson County, 107 N. C. 335, 12 S. E. 92 ; Schlaudecker v. Mar shall, 72 Pa. 200; a court will not review on certiorari the refusal of a board of excise commissioners to grant a license, where its action was not upon illegal grounds ; People v. Bennett, 4 Misc. 10, 23 N. Y. Supp. 695.

A license to sell liquors is a privilege and not property, and the forfeiture of a license does not deprive the licensee of property without due process of law; Sprayberry v. City of Atlanta, 87 Ga. 120, 13 S. E. 197 ; it cannot be levied upon by the sheriff and sold ; Ulrich's License, 6 Dist. Rep. (Pa.) 408 ; nor can the liquor ; Nichols v. Valentine, 36 Me. 322; Ingalls v. Baker, 13 Allen (Mass.) 449; Hines v. Stahl, 79 Kau. 88, 99 Pac. 273, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1118, 131 Am. St. Rep. 280, 17 Ann. Cas. 298 ; contra, Wildermuth v. Cole, 77 Mich. 483, 43 N. W. 889; Nutt v. Wheeler, 30 Vt. 436, 73 Am. Dec. 316; nor can it be transferred unless such transfer is approved by the authorities empowered to grant licenses ; Blumenthal's Petition, 125 Pa. 412, 18 Atl. 395. A license, which under the terms of the statute is transferable and therefore has fi money value, is an asset of the estate of the licensee, to which a receiver for the benefit of creditors is entitled; Deg gender v. Malting Co., 41 Wash. 385, 83 Pac. 898, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 626: A license to operate a saloon in a certain building does not authorize the operation of two saloons in different rooms in it ; Malkan v. City of Chicago, 217 Ill. 471, 75 N. E. 548, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 488, 3 Ann. Cas. 1104.

Where, after payment of a license fee, the business either has not been entered upon, or has been abandoned voluntarily, or because the license turns out to be improperly issued, or prohibition has been adopted, generally there is a right to a return of the unearned license fee ; Allsman v. Oklahoma City, 21 Okl. 142, 95 Pac. 468, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 511, 17 Ann. Cas. 184; City of Fitzgerald v. Witchard, 130 Ga. 552, 61 S. E. 227, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 519.

Page: 1 2 3 4 5