By the levy of an attachment upon per sonalty, the officer acquires a special prop erty therein, which continues so long as he remains liable therefor, either to have it forthcoming to satisfy the plaintiff's demand, or to return it to the owner upon the attach ment being dissolved, but no longer; Barker v. Miller, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 195 ; Gates v. Gates, 15 Mass. 310; Poole v. Symonds, 1 N. H. 289, 8 Am. Dec. 71; Nichols v. Valen tine, 36 Me. 322 ; Braley v. French, 28 Vt. 546; Foulks v. Pegg, 6 Nev. 136; Stiles v.
Davis, 1 Black (U. S.) 101, 17 L. Ed. 33; Holt v. Burbank, 47 N. H. 164 ; Wentworth v. Sawyer, 76 Me. 434; Rochester Lumber Co. v. Locke, 72 N. H. 22, 54 Atl. 705. For any violation of his possession, while his Ha bil* for the property continues, he may maintain trover, trespass, and replevin; Lud den v. Leavitt, 9 Mass. 104, 6 Am. Dec. 45; Lathrop v. Blake, 23 N. H. 46; Walker v. Foxcroft, 2 Greenl. (Me.) 270; 3 Foster 46; Carroll v. Frank, 28 Mo. App. 69 ; Whitney v. Ladd, 10 Vt. 165.
As it would often subject an officer to great inconvenience to keep attached proper ty in his possession, he is allowed in the New England states and New York to deliver it over, during the pendency of the suit, to some responsible person, who will give an accountable receipt for it, and whb is usually styled a receipter or bailee, and whose pos session is regarded as that of the officer, and, therefore, as not discharging the lien of the attachment. This practice is not authorized by statute, but has been so long in vogue in the states where it prevails as to have be come a part of their systems ; Drake, Att. § 344.
In many states provisions exist, authoriz ing the defendant to retain possession of the attached property by executing a bond with sureties for the delivery thereof, either to satisfy the execution which the plaintiff may obtain in the cause, or when and where the court may direct. This bond, like the bailment of attached property, does not dis charge the lien of the attachment; Gray v. Perkins, 12 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 622 ; Rives v. Wilborne, 6 Ala. 45; Evans v. King, 7 Mo. 411; People v. Cameron, 2 Gilman (Ill.) 468 ; Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 400, 9 L. Ed. 470; Boyd v. Buckingham, 10 Humphr. (Tenn.) 434. Property thus bonded cannot be seized under another attachment, or un der a junior execution; Rives v. Wilborne, 6 Ala. 45; Kane v. Pitcher, 7 B. Monr. (Ky.) 651; Gordon v. Johnston, 4 La. 304.
Provisions also exist in many states for the dissolution of an attachment by the de fendant's giving bond and security for the payment of such judgment as the plaintiff may recover. This is, in effect, merely Spe cial Bail. From the time it is given, the cause ceases to be one of attachment, and proceeds as if it had been instituted by summons ; Harper v. Bell, 2 Bibb (Ky.) 221; People v. Cameron, 2 Gilman (Ill.) 468 ; Fife
v. Clarke, 3 McCord (S. C.) 347; Reynolds v., Jordan, 19 Ga. 436 ; Drake, Att. § 312.
One bolding property by virtue of a forth coming bond may sue for its destruction ; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Brinkerhoff, 119 Ala. 006, 24 South. 892. The execution of the bond does not discharge the attachment or levy, but the property is still in contempla tion of law in the possession of the court; Hobson & Co. v. Hall, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 635.
An attachment is dissolved by a final judg ment for the defendant ; Suydam v. Hugge ford, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 465; Johnson v. Ed son, 2 Aik. (Vt.) 299 ; Brown v. Harris, 2 G. Greene (Ia.) 505, 52 Am. Dec. 535; it may be dissolved, on motion, on account of defects in the plaintiff's proceedings, appar ent on their face ; but not for defects which are not so apparent; Baldwin v. Conger, Smedes & M. (Miss.) 516. Every such mo tion must precede a plea to the merits,;" Oar. mon v. Barringer, 19 N. C. 502 ; Young v. Gray, Harp. (S. C.) 38; Stoney v. McNeill, Harp. (S. C.) 156 ; Watson v. McAllister, 7 Mart. 0. S. (La.) 368; Symons v. Northern, 49 N. C. 241; Drakford v. Turk, 75 Ala. 339; Memphis, C. & L. R. Co. v. Wilcox, 48 Pa, 161. The death of the defendant pendente lite is held in some states to dissolve the attachment; Sweringen v. Eberius' Adm'r, 7 Mo. 421, 38 Am. Dec. 463 ; Vaughn v, Sturte vant, 7 R. I. 372; Phillips v. Ash's Heirs and Adm'rs, 63 Ala. 414 (but not after judgment; Fitch v. Ross, 4 S. & R. [Pa.] 557). And so the civil death of a corporation; Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Little, 8 W. & S. (Pa.) 207, 42 Am. Dec. 293 ; Paschall v. Whitsett, 11 Ala. 472. Not so, however, the bankrupt. cy of the defendant ; Downer v. Brackett, 21 Vt. 599, Fed. Cas. No. 4,043; President, etc., of Franklin Bank v. Bachelder, 23 Me. 60, 39 Am. Dec. 601; Kittredge v. Warren, 14 N. H. 509; Davenport v. Tilton, 10 Metc. (Mass.) 320; Vreeland v. Bruen, z1 N. J. L 214; Wells v. Brander, 10 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 348; Hill v. Harding, 93 III. 77.
In those states where under a summons property may be attached if the plaintiff so directs, the defendant has no means of de feating the attachment except by defeating the action ; but in some states, where an attachment does not issue except upon stated grounds, provision is made for the defend ant's contesting the validity of the alleged grounds; while in other states it is held that he may do so, as a matter of right, without statutory authority ; Morgan v. Avery, 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 656; Campbell v. Morris, 3 Harr. & McH. (Md.) 535; Havis v. Trapp, 2 Nott & McC. S. C.) •130; Harris v. Taylor, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 536, 67 Am. Dec. 576; Voor hees v. Hoagland. 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 232.
As to the attachment of property or indebt edness held by or owing from a third person, see GARNISHMENT.