Both in civil and criminal cases the bur den rests upon the party who contends for a lucid interval to prove it, since a person once insane is presumed so until it is shown that he had a lucid interval or has recovered ; Co. Litt. 185, n.; 3 Bro. Ch. 441; Turner v. Cheesman, 15 N. J. hq. 243 ; Emery v. Hoyt, 46 Ill. 258 ; 8 Can. S. C. 335. This presump tion may be rebutted by proof of a change of mental condition and a lucid interval at the time ; 41 Miss. 291; and it arises only where habitual insanity is shown, and in cases of temporary or recurrent insanity, no burden is thrown upon the party seeking to take ad vantage of the lucid interval ; Ford v. State, 73 Miss. 734, 19 South. 665, 35 L. R. A. 118 ; People v. Montgomery, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 207; Armstrong v. State, 30 Fla. 170, 11 South. 618, 17 L. R. A. 484; State v. Schaef fer, 116 Mo. 96, 22 S. W. 447 ; Corn. v. Winne more, 1 Brews. (Pa.) 356.
A contract made during a lucid interval is valid; Norman v. Trust Co., 92 Ga. 295, 18 S. E. 27; Wright v. Wright, 139 Mass. 177, 29 N. E. 380. And the same is true of deeds, wills, and of the performances of any civil act. But where a lucid interval is relied upon, it must appear to have been of such a character as to enable the person to compre hend intelligently the nature and character of the transaction ; Pike v. Pike, 104 Ala. 642, 16 South. 689. Proof of a lucid inter val, where it is required, must be made to the satisfaction of the jury ; Vance v. Up son, 66 Tex. 476, 1 S. W. 179. There is no presumption of continuance of a lucid inter val; it is temporary in its nature; Pike v. Pike, 104 Ala. 642, 16 South. 689.
Insane persons, during a lucid interval, are competent witnesses, but the question of their competency is for the court to deter mine when the witness is produced to be sworn; People v. N. Y. Hospital, 3 Abb. N. C. (N.. Y.) 229 ; which see for a note on the practice in such cases.
The general rule "is that a lunatic, or per son affected with insanity, is admissible as a witness, if he have sufficient understanding to apprehend the obligation of an oath, and to be capable of giving a correct account of the matters which he has seen or heard in reference to the questions at issue ; and whether he have that understanding is a question to be determined by the court upon examination of the party himself, and any competent witnesses who can speak to the nature and extent of his insanity." District of Columbia v. Armes, 107 U. S. 519, 2 Sup. Ct. 840, 27 L. Ed. 618 ; Kendall v. May, 10 Allen (Mass.) 64 ; Tucker v. Shaw, 158 I11. j 326, 41 N. E. 914 ; L. R. 11 Eq. 420; Walker v. State, 97 Ala. 85, 12 South. 83 ; Coleman v. Com., 25 Gratt. (Va.) 865, 18 Am. Rep. 711; Holcomb v. Holcomb, 28 Conn. 177; Hiett v. Shull, 36 W. Va. 563, 15 S. E. 146. In State v. Brown, 2 Marv. (Del.) 380, 36 Atl. 458, the witness was an inmate of an insane asylum and was admitted by an equally divided court to testify in a. case of homicide in the asylum. The modern doctrine is that fact of insanity goes to the credibility rather than to the competency of the witness'. 5 Eng. L. & Eq. 547 ; 2 Den. C. C. 254 ; 5 Cox, C. C. 259; McCutchen v. Pigue, 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 565. See Clevenger, Med. Jur. of In san. 607.
See 35 L. R. A. 117, n.; INSANITY.