LYNCH LAW. A common phrase used to express the vengeance of a mob inflicting an injury and committing an outrage upon a person suspected of some offence. In Eng land this is called Lidford Law; in Scot land, Cowper Law, Jedburgh. Justice.
The Ohio act (see infra) defines lynching and mob as follows: "That any collection of individuals, assembled for any unlawful purposes intending to do damage or injury to any one, or pretending to exercise cor rectional power over persons by violence, and without authority of law, shall for the purposes of this act be regarded as a 'mob,' and any act of violence exercised by them upon the body of any person, shall consti tute a 'lynching.'" 92 Ohio Laws 136.
There are various theories as to the person from whom lynch law derived its name. That most gen erally accepted credits it to Col. James Lynch, a Virginian, who, in 1780, administered such law to the extent of whipping hut not the death penalty against Tory conspirators. For the protection of himself and his associates an act of amnesty was passed by the Virginia legislature in October, 1782; in which their action was described as "not strictly warranted by law, although justified by the immi nence of the danger." Another person mentioned in this connection- was the founder of the town of Lynchburg, Virginia, and another, an Englishman, sent out in the seventeenth century under a com mission to suppress pirates whom he summarily ex ecuted without trial. Another account ascribes the term to James Fitz-Stevens Lynch, mayor of Galway in 1493, who tried his son for murder and when pre vented from publicly executing him, hanged him from the window of his own house. See Int. Cyc.; 5 Green Bag 116; 4 ed. 661; 2 Inter-Coll. L. J. 163.
All who consent to the infliction of capital punishment by lynch law are guilty of mur der in the first degree when not executed in hot blood. The act strikingly combines the distinctive features of deliberation and in tent to take life.
Lynch law differs from mob law in disre garding the forms of ordinary law, while intending to maintain its substance; while mob law disregards both.
In Ohio the act for—the suppression of mob violence (supra) provided that any per son assaulted by a mob and suffering lynch ing should be entitled to recover from the county $500; or, if the injury was serious, $1,000; or if it resulted in permanent disa bility of earning a livelihood $5,000. It also gave the county the right of recovering the amount of any judgment rendered against it from any of the parties composing the mob. This provision was held unconstitu
tional iq specifying a definite recovery re gardless of the actual damages suffered, be ing an encroachment of the legislature upon the judicial power, and so far as the dam ages awarded exceeded the actual damages suffered, it taxed the county for private in terests; Caldwell v. Cuyahoga County Com'rs, 15 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 167, affirming 4 Ohio N. P. 249. This decision was followed in an other county ; 39 Wkly. L. Bul. 103.
It is the sworn duty of the governor and the sheriff to see to it that the constitution al guaranty that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due Pro cess of law, does not become a dead letter. Constitutional and statutory provisions have been enacted providing for the removal of any sheriff who through neglect, connivance, or other grave fault permits a prisoner to be taken away from his custody and killed or grievously harmed in body ; Ala. Const.
1901; Md. Acts, 1905; So. Cr. Code, 1896. In some states there is legislation to the ef fect that in all cases of lynching, the county where it takes place shall, without regard to the conduct of the officer, be liable in dam ages to the estate of the deceased; Brown v. Orangeburg County, 55 S. C. 45, 32 S. E. 764, 44 L. R. A. 734; Board of Com'rs of Champaign County v. Church, 62 Ohio St. 318, 57 N. E. 50, 48 L. R. A. 738, 78 Am. St. Rep. 718. Such acts are held constitu tional against the contention that it violates the right of a trial by jury or takes property without due process of law. A sheriff was held guilty of contempt for allowing the lynching of a federal prisoner ; U. S. v. Shipp, 214 U. S. 386, 29 Sup. Ct. 637, 53 L. Ed. 1041.
The Alabama constitution provides that, when a prisoner is taken from a jail and killed, the sheriff may be impeached ; in State v. Cazalas, 162 Ala. 210, 50 South. 296, 19 Ann. Cas. 886, it was held that, where a negro was quietly taken from the jail and lynched by a few armed men, the sheriff should be removed from office.
See Lynch Law, by J. E. Cutler.
LYT/f. In Old Roman Law. A name giv en to students of civil law in the fourth year of their course. Tayl. Civ. L. 39.
M. The thirteenth letter of the alpha bet.
Persons convicted of manslaughter, in England, were formerly marked with this letter on the brawn of the thumb.
This letter was sometimes put on the face of treasury notes of the United States, and signifies that the treasury note bears inter est at the rate of one mill per dollar, and not one per centum interest.