The possession of land is notice to all the world of the possessor's rights thereunder ; Lipp v. Lapd Syndicate, 24 Neb. 692, 40 N. W. 129; Buck v. Holt, 74 Ia. 294, 37 N. W. 377; Brooke v. Bordner, 125 Pa. 470, 17 Atl. 467; Daniel v. Hester, 29 S. C. 147, 7 S. E. 65; Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U. S. 417, 12 Sup. CC 239, 35 L. Ed. 1063.
Notice to an agent in the same transac tion is, in general, notice to the principal; Farmers & C. Bk. v. Payne, 25 Conn. 444, 68 Am. Dec. 362; Pritchett v. Sessions, 10 Rich (S. C.) 293; Baker v. Bliss, 39 N. Y. 70; Armstrong v. Abbott, 11 Colo. 223, 17 Pac. 517. A principal imposing confidence in an agent, and therefore neglecting some source of knowledge which he might have sought, is not chargeable with what he might have found out upon inquiry aroused by suspicion; Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U. S. 505, 9 Sup. Ct. 594, 32 L. Ed. 1005. No tice to the trustees is notice to the beneficia ries in a deed of trust; Peters v. Bain, 133 U. S. 670, 10 Sup. Ct. 354, 33 L. Ed. 696 ; Crunalish v. R. Co., 32 W. Va. 244, 9 S. E. 180.
A principal is not bound by his agent's knowledge where it is not the duty of the agent to communicate it ; Hummel v. Bank, 75 Ia. 689, 37 N. W. 954. Notice to an agent must be on the very business on hand; Al ger v. Keith, 105 Fed. 105, 44 C. C. A. 371. So of knowledge incidentally acquired by a corporate officer when not acting in his offi cial. capacity; Caffee v. Berkley, 141 Ia. 344, 118 N. W. 267. If the agent is acting ad versely to the principal his knowledge is not imputed to the principal; Central C. & C. Co. v. Good & Co., 120 Fed. 793, 57 C. C. A. 161; Gunster v. Power Co., 181 Pa. 327, 37 Atl. 550, 59 Am. St. Rep. 650. Where it is in the private interest of the officer of a bank to conceal knowledge from his bank, the law does not, by a fiction, charge the bank with such knowledge; American N. Bk. v. Miller, 229 U. S. 517, 33 Sup. Ct. 883, 57 L. Ed. 1310.
Notice to the president and some directors of a corporation is sufficient to bind it; Paul S. S. Co. v: Paul, 129 Fed. 757; but where the president, acting in his private capacity, acquires knowledge of a particular fact, it does not affect the corporation in a later transaction unless he participated therein ; Smith v. Carmack (Tenn.) 64 S. W. 372; Teagarden v. Lumber Co., 105 Tex. 616, 154 S. W. 973. Notice to one who acts as local representative, advisor, secretary and treas urer, is notice to his association; Dennis v.
Loan Ass'n, 136 Fed. 539, 69 C. C. A. 315; but where one is secretary of two companies, it must be shown that when notice was given to him, it was his duty to communicate it to the proper company, even though he was act- ing at the time for the other company ; [1902] 1 Ch. 507.
The giving notice in certain cases is in the nature of a condition precedent to the right to call on the other party for the per formance of his engagement, whether his contract were express or implied. Thus, in the familiar instance of bills of exchange and promissory notes, the implied contract of an indorser is that he will pay the bill or note, provided it be not paid, on presentment at maturity, by the acceptor or maker (be ing the party primarily liable), and provided that he (the indorser), has due notice of the dishonor, and without which he is dis charged from all liability: consequently, it is essential for the holder to be prepared to prove affirmatively that such notice was giv en, or some facts dispensing with such no tice; 1 Chitty, Pr. 496; 1 Pars. Notes & B. 516.
Whenever the defendant's liability to per form an act depends on another occurrence which is best known to the plaintiff, and of which the defendant is not legally bound to take notice, the plaintiff must prove that due notice was in fact given. So, in cases of insurances on ships, a notice of abandon ment is frequently necessary to enable the assured plaintiff to proceed as for a total loss when something remains to be saved, in relation to which, upon notice, the insurers might themselves take their own measures.
Notice may be written or oral, in many cases, at the option of the party required to give It ; but written notice is generally, pref erable, both as avoiding doubt and ambigui ty in its terms, and as admitting more easy and exact proof of delivery ; 2 Dan. Neg. Inst. 972.
Immediate notice of a fire means reason able notice ; Solomon v. Ins. Co., 160 N. Y. 595, 55 N. E. 279, 46 L. Et, A. 682, 73 Am. St. Rep. 707.
Acknowledging service of notice does not preclude showing it was too late; Shearouse v. Morgan, 111 Ga. 858, 36 S. E. 927.
Personal service does not include service at the last known residence; Dalton v. R. Co., 113 Mo. App. 71, 87 S. W. 610.
See KNOWLEDGE; RECORD.