OPERATION AND EFFECTS. The judgment of a court of general jurisdiction is presumed to have been rendered in the due exercise of that jurisdiction over person and subject matter, unless the contrary be shown ; Cal houn v. Ross, 60 Ill. App. 309 ; and after twenty years the presumption of due notice to the parties becomes conclusive ; Nickrans v. Wilk, 161 Ill. 76, 43 N. E. 741.
Final judgments are commonly said to con clude the parties ; and this is true in general, but does not apply to judgments for defend ant on non suit, as in case of non suit, by nolle prosequi, and the like, which are final judgments in one sense, because they put an end to all proceedings in the suit, but which nevertheless do not debar the plaintiff from instituting another suit for the same cause. With this qualification, the rule as to the effect of a judgment is as follows: The judg ment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction di rectly upon the point is, as a plea, a bar, or, as evidefice, conclusive, between the same parties upon the same matter directly in question in another court. The judgment of a court of exclusive jurisdiction directly up on the point is in like manner conclusiye up on the same matter, between the same par ties, coming incidentally in question in an other court for a different purpose. But neither the judgment of a concurrent nor ex clusive jurisdiction is evidence of any mat ter which came collaterally in question, though within their jurisdiction, nor of any matter incidentally cognizable, nor of any matter to be inferred by argument from the judgment. Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 Howell, St. Tr. 538 ; 2 Smith, L. C. 424; Harr. Cont. 295.
The rule above given relates to the effect of a judgment upon proceedings in another court ; if the court is the same, of course the rule holds a fortiori. Moreover, all persons who are represented by the parties, and claim under them or in privity with them, are equally concluded by the proceedings. All privies whatever in estate, in blood, or in law, are, therefore, etopped from litigating that which is conclusive upon him with whom they are in privity ; 1 Greenl. Ey. §§ 523, 536.
A decree or judgment on a matter outside of the issue raised by the pleading is a nullity ; Jones v. Davenport, 45 N. J. Eq. 77, 17 Atl. 570 ; and so is the judgment of a court which is without jurisdiction ; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 8 Sup. Ct. 482, 31 L. Ed. 402.
A further rule as to the conclusiveness of judgments is sometimes stated thus : "A judgment of a court of competent jurisdic tion cannot be impeached or set aside in . any collateral proceeding except on the ground of fraud." See, generally, 1 Green]. Ey. pt. 3, ch. 5 ; Derr v. Wilson, 84 Ky. 14; Robertson v. Winchester, 85 Tenn. 171, 1 S. W. 781; Hilton v. Bachman, 24 Neb. 490, 39 N. W. 419 ; Sachse v. Clingingsmith, 97 Mo. 406, 11 S. W. 69; Huling v. Improvement Co., 130 U. S. 565, 9 Sup. Ct. 603, 32 L. Ed. 1045. A judgment of a court having juris diction both of the subject-matter and the parties, however erroneous it may be, is a valid, binding, and conclusive judgment, as to the matter in controversy, upon the par ties thereto and those claiming under them; Adams v. Franklin, 82 Ga. 168, 8 S. E. 44; Cheatham v. Whitman, 86 Ky. 614, 6 S. W. 595 ; Bateman v. Miller, 118 Ind. 345, 21 N. E. 292 ; Allan v. Hoffman, 83 Va. 129, 2 S. D. 602 ; McCoy v. McCoy, 29 W. Va. 794, 2 S. E. 809 ; Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U. S. 327, 14 Sup. Ct. 611, 38 L. Ed. 463.
This does not prevent a judgment from being attacked directly by. writ of error or other proceeding in the nature of an ap peal; and its validity may be impeached in other direct proceedings, as by motion to open or set it aside, and in contests be tween creditors in regard to the validity of their respective judgments; in this latter class of cases • the court will sometimes award a feigned issue to try questions of fact affecting the validity of the judgment.