As to the character in which parties con tract. They may act independently or sev erally, jointly, or jointly and severally. The decision of the question of the kind of lia bility incurred depends on the terms of the contract, if they are express, or, if not ex press, upon the intention of the parties as gathered from the circumstances of the case. Whenever, however, the obligation is under taken by two or more, or a right given to two or more, it is a general presumption of law that it is a joint obligation or right; words of joinder are not necessary for this purpose ; but, on the other hand, there should be words of severance in order to produce a several responsibility or a several right; 13 M. & W. 499; Ehle v. Purdy, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 629; Elliott v. Bell, 37 W. Va. 834, 17 S. E. 399. It may be doubted, however, whether anything less than express words can raise at once a joint and several liability. No joint liability exists upon sep arate individual contracts, though for the same subject-matter ; Fischer v. Spang, 43 Ill. App. 378. Parties may act as the repre sentatives of others, as agents, factors, or brokers, attorneys, ewecutors, or administra tors, and guardians. They may also act in a collective capacity, as corporations, joint stock companies, or as partnerships. See these titles.
New parties may be made to contracts al ready in existence, by novation, assignment, and indorsement, which titles see.
To Suits in Equity. The person who seeks a remedy in chancery by suit, commonly called the plaintiff, or complainant, and the person against whom the remedy is sought, usually denominated the defendant, or re spondent, are the parties to a suit in equity.
In equity all persons materially interested, either legally or beneficially, in the subject matter of a suit, are to be made parties to it, either as plaintiffs or defendants, so that there may be a complete decree which shall bind them all; Christian v. R..Co., 133 U. S. 233, 10 Sup. Ct. 260, 33 L. Ed. 589 ; Gregory v. Stetson, 133 U. S. 579; it is not indis pensable that all the parties should have an interest in all the matters contained in the suit, but it is sufficient if each party has an interest in some material matter in the suit, and it is connected with the others ; Brown v. Safe Deposit Co., 128 U. S. 403, 9 Sup. Ct.
127, 32 L. Ed. 468. In the absence of par ties, and without their having an opportuni ty to be heard, a court is without jurisdic tion to make an adjudication affecting them; New Orleans W. W. Co. v. New Orleans, 164 U. S. 471, 17 Sup. Ct. 161, 41 L. Ed. 518.
Active parties are those who are so in volved in the subject-matter in controversy that no' can be made without their being in court. Passive parties are those whose interests are involved in granting complete relief to those who ask it. Joy v. Wirtz, 1 Wash. C. C. 517, Fed. Cas. No. 7, 554. See Logan v. Barclay, 3 Ala. 361.
Passive parties are those to whom com plete relief can be afforded without affecting the rights of those omitted; Appeal of Cole map, 75 Pa. 459.
They consist of : 1. Formal parties; 2. Persons having an interest and who ought to be made parties, in order that the court may adjust all rights involved ; these are com monly termed necessary parties, but if their interests are separable from those of the other parties so that complete justice can be done without affecting those not before the court, the latter are not indispensable par ties ; 3. Persons who have an interest such that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. Minnesota v. Securities Co., 184 U. S. 199, 22 Sup. Ct. 308, 46 L. Ed. 499. Where granting the re lief prayed would injuriously affect persons who are materially interested who are not parties, the court will dismiss the bill sua sponte, though the question be not raised by the pleadings or by counsel ; Minnesota v. Se curities Co., 184 U. S. 199, 22 Sup. Ct. 308, 46 L. Ed. 499.