All prior negotiations are presumed to be merged in the written contract, and the poli cy itself, in the absence of fraud, duress, or mistake, must be looked to to ascertain the intent of the parties; Higginson v. Doll, 13 Mass. 96. Where the form of the policy is not prescribed by statute, it should contain, either by itself, or by reference to other pa pers, the exact agreement between the par ties, set forth therein in clear, precise, and unambiguous terms, and should embody all the requirements of a valid insurance con tract. Where the terms are plain and unam biguous, parol evidence is inadmissible to vary or control them ; Keim v. Ins. Co., 42 Mo. 38, 97 Am. Dec. 291; Walton v. Ins. Co., 116 N. Y. 317, 22 N. E. 443, 5 L. R. A. 677; but if it is ambiguous, extrinsic evi dence is admissible, not to contradict or change the contract, but to develop and ex plain its true meaning; Tesson v. Ins. Co., 40 Mo. 33, 93 Am. Dec. 293. Conversations had between the parties at the time have been held admissible; Gray v. Harper, 1 Sto. 574, Fed. Cas. No. 5,716; when parties have, by certain acts of their own, placed a con struction on doubtful terms of the contract, this construction will be adopted by the court against them.
The language of the policy must be con strued with reference to the subject-matter and the nature of the property to which it is applied, and with a view to the objects and Intentions of the parties, as the same may be gathered from the whole instruments; Al legre's Adm'rs v. Ins. Co., 2 Gill & J. (Md.) 136, 20 Am. Dec. 424; Ripley v. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. 136, 86 Am. Dec. 362; De Graff v. Ins. Co., 38 Minn. 501, 38 N. W. 696, 8 Am. St. Rep. 685; and the whole policy with all its parts should be construed together as one entire contract; Chrisman v. Ins. Co., 16 Or. 283, 18 Pac. 466. A special clause in a poli cy which creates an exception to a general clause governs the latter; Bowman v. Ins. Co., 27 Mo. 152. When susceptible of more than one interpretation, the contract should be construed in favor of the assured; Kratz enstein v. Assur. Co., 116 N. Y. 54, 22 N. E.‘ 221, 5 L. R. A. 799 ; Northwestern M. L. Ins. Co. v. Hazelett, 105 Ind. 212, 4 N. B. 582, 55 Am. Rep. 192 ; Healey v. Acc. Ass'n, 133 Ill. 556, 25 N. E. 52; 9 L. R. A. 371, 23 Am. St. Rep. 637; De Graft v. Ins. Co., 38 Minn. 501, 38 N. W. 696, 8 Am. St. Rep. 685; Water town F. Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 84 Va. 72, 3 S. E. 876; Western & A. P. L. v. Ins. Co., 145 Pa. 346, 22 Atl. 665, 27 Am. St. Rep. 703; Imperial F. Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U. S. 452, 14 Sup. Ct. 379, 38 L. Ed. 231.
The written part of the policy controls that part which is printed; 4 East 136; Plinsky v. Ins. Co., 32 Fed. 47; Benedict v. Ins. • Co., 31 N. Y: 389. A special indorse ment exempting from liability for partial loss will control; Chadsey v. Guion, 97 N. Y. 333.
In respect to forfeiture, that construction of a policy which will sustain rather than forfeit the contract is applicable; McMaster v. Ins. Co., 183 U. S. 25, 22 Sup. Ct. 10, 46
L. Ed. 64.
A stipulation that, if any representations made by the applicant are untrue, the policy shall be void is reasonable; Deming I. Co. v. Ins. Co., 16 Okl. 1, 83 Pac. 918, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 607. Incontestable clauses are good al though the insured was not in good health when the policy was delivered, against an ex press condition in the policy ; Mutual R. F. L. Ass'n v. Austin, 142 Fed. 398, 73 0. C. A. 498, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1064; but they do not prevent the defence of lack of insurable interest ; Bromley's Adm'r v. Ins. Co., 122 Ky. 402, 92 S. W. 17, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 747, 121 Am. St. Rep. 467, 12 Ann. Cas. 685; or of fraud in procuring the policy ; Reagan v. Ins. Co., 189 Mass. 555, 76 N. E. 217, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 821, 109 Am. St. Rep. 659, 4 Ann. Cas. 362.
Although a fire is raging in an adjacent building and at the time of expiration of the policy a loss is inevitable, if in fact no fire breaks out at such expiration, there can be no recovery ; Rochester G. Ins. Co. v. Peas lee-G. Co., 120 Ky. 752, 87 S. W. 1115, 27 Ky. L. R. 1155, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 364, 9 Ann. Cas. 324. But if the fire has already begun in the building, insurance for the loss of merchandise may be recovered, although the fire did not actually reach the merchandise within the life of the policy ; Rochester G. Ins. Co. v. Peaslee-G. Co., 120 Ky. 752, 89 S. W. 3, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 130, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 364, 9 Ann. Cas. 324.
A policy may take effect on actual or con structive delivery; New England F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 25 Ind. 537; Bragdon v. Ins. Co., 42 Me. 259; Sheldon v. Ins. Co., 25 Conn. 207, 65 Am. Dec. 565; Jackson v. Ins. Co., 5 Gray (Mass.) 52; and may be retro spective, provided there is no concealment or misrepresentation by either party ; Hallock v. Ins. Co., 26 N. J. L. 268.
Where eighteen policies are ready for de livery, but one of the buildings is destroyed by fire just before delivery, but after the agreement with the agent, there is no exist ing contract ; German Ins. Co. v. Downman, 115 Fed. 481.
A policy returned by the applicant to the company because it does not correspond with his application is not cancelled, especially where the company has insisted that it is all right ; Waters v. Annuity Co., 144 N. C. 663, 57 S. E. 437, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 805. A company is not bound to return unearned premiums in order to bring about a cancella tion of the policy; Davidson v. Ins. Co., 74 N. J. L. 487, 65 Atl. 996,.13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 884, 12 Ann. Cas. 1065; contra, Glen F. Ins. Co. v. Michael, 167 Ind. 659, 74 N. B. 964, 79 N. E. 905, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 708; and where a standard policy provides for the return of the unearned premiums, the insured may waive such condition by his voluntary and unconditional surrender of the policy upon receiving notice of cancellation by the com pany ; Buckley v. Ins. Co., 188 N. Y. 399, 81 N. E. 165, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 889.