As to the force and effect of pardons gen erally, see PARDON ; AMNESTY. As to the treaty power, see TREATY.
Nomination and appointment to office are voluntary acts distinct from the issuing of the commission ; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cra. (U. S.) 137, 155, 2 L. Ed. 60; and the presi dent may, after confirmation, withhold a commission, and until it has been delivered the appointment is not consummated; Case of Lieutenant Cox, 4 Opiu. A. G. 218 ; but it was held in Marbury v. Madison, I Cra. (U. S.) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60, that formal delivery of a commission was not necessary to complete the appointment, which was done by affix ing the seal to the commission ; this having been done, the death of the president before the delivery will not affect its validity ; U. S. v. Le Baron, 19 How. 73, 15 L. Ed. 525. See OFFICER; EXECUTIVE POWER; which lat ter title see also as to the power of the president to make recess appointments.
Inferior officers, such as are mentioned in the second paragraph of the section, include clerks of courts ; In re Hennen, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 230, 10 L. Ed. 138; U. S. v. Avery, 1 Deady, 204, Fed. Gas. No. 14,481; extradition commissioners; Rice v. Ames, 180 U. S. 371, 21 Sup. Ct. 406, 45 L. Ed. 577; vice-consuls ; U. S. v. Eaton, 169 U. S. 331, 18 Sup. Ct. 374, 42 L. Ed. 767 ; inspectors of immigration ; Nishimura Ekiu v. U. S., 142 U. S. 651, 12 Sup. Ct. 336, 35 L. Ed. 1146.
Sec. 3. The authority given to the presi dent to communicate his views and recom mendations to congress, and his power to ad journ them in case of disagreement between the two houses, does not seem to have been the occasion of any judicial or official con struction. It is interesting to note that Pres ident Wilson has revived the earlier custom of communicating his views to both houses in person. The power to convene the two houses in extraordinary sessions has been frequently exercised, and there is not in the federal constitution, as there is in those of many states, any power given to the presi dent to limit the subjects of consideration to that for which he calls the extraordinary sessions. As to the power to receive ambas sadors and other public ministers, and the inferences which have been drawn from it, and also the direction to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, see EXECUTIVE POWER.
It was determined in Blount's Case, p. 22, 102, that a member of eithe• house of con gress is not a civil officer subject to impeach ment, nor is a territorial judge, his office be ing created by legislation only; 3 Opin. A.
G. 409. As to the method of proceeding and impeachment, generally, see that title. The constitutional power of impeachment does not interfere with the president's power of removal for cause which he deems adequate ; Shurtleff v. U. S., 189 U. S. 311, 23 Sup. Ct. 535, 47 L. Ed. 828. See EXECUTIVE POWER.
The third article contains three sections. The first vests the judicial power in sundry courts, provides for the tenure of office by the judges, and for their compensation. The second provides for the extent of the judicial power, vests in the supreme court original' jurisdiction in certain cases, and directs the manner of trying crimes. The third defines treason, and vests in congress the power to declare its punishment.
Sec. 1. This article deals with the judicial power, as to which, generally, see that title. As to the power of the courts to declare an act of congress or of a state legislature un constitutional, see CONSTITUTIONAL. The au thority of the federal courts over state leg islation is confined to cases in which it is repugnant to the federal constitution, and they have no power to declare it void under the state constitution; Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 280, 7 L. Ed. 679.
The federal courts are not to be treated by the state courts as belonging to another sovereign ; Com. v. R. Co., 58 Pa. 43.
It was established by an early case that the power of congress to create inferior tri bunals is unlimited except by the sense of that body as to what is necessary and proper ; Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cra. (U. S.) 299, 2 L. Ed. 115; and in to same case it was answered to an objection that the judges of the su preme court had no right to sit as circuit judges, that the practice and acquiescence in the custom "affords an irresistible answer and has indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible nature . . . too strong and ob stinate to be shaken or controlled ; . . . the question is at rest and ought not now to be disturbed." It has also been determined in many cases that the territorial courts are not courts of the United States ; Good v. Martin, 95 U. S. 90, 24 L. Ed. 341; Reynolds v. U. S., 98 a S. 145, 25' L. Ed. 244. As to the territorial courts, generally, see McAllister v. U. S., 141 U. S. 174, 11 Sup. Ct. 949, 35 L. Ed. 693.