Attorney-General Garland advised Pres ident Cleveland that he was without authori ty to sign a bill after adjournment. • In U. S. v. Weil, 29 Ct. CL 523, it was held that the president had the power to sign bills after the adjournment of congress.' In cases arising under state constitutions, it was held in Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165 ; Hardee v. Gibbs, 50 Miss. 802, that the pOwer to sign a bill ceased with the adjournment, but under the language of the Illinois constitution, a signature after adjournment was held valid; Seven Hickory v. Ellery, 103 U. S. 423, 26 L. Ed. 435. The President can sign a bill dur ing a recess of congress; La Abra Silver Minn. Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S. 423, 20 Sup. Ct. 168, 44 L. Ed. 223 (not decided whether he can do so after final adjournment). See EX ECUTIVE POWER.
In People v. Bowen, 21 N. Y. 517, it was held, under a constitutional provision al most identical with that of the constitution of the United States, that a signature after adjournment was valid. And this was fol lowed in State v. Fagan, 22 La. Ann. 545.
Much discussion has arisen .on the ques tion whether a statute which appears to be contrary to the laws of God and nature, and to right reason, is void. Earlier dicta in the affirmative (see 8 Co. *118 a', 12 Mod. 687) are not now considered to be law ; L. R. 6. C. P. 582. See Dwarris, Stat. 482. The question as applicable to this country is treated under CONSTITUTIONAL. It being historically true that the American people are a religious people, as shown by the religious objects ex pressed by the original grants and charters of the colonies, and the recognition of reli gion in the most solemn acts of their history, as well as in the constitutions of the states and the nation, the courts, in construing statutes, should not impute to any legislature a purpose of action against religion ; Church of the Holy Trinity v. U. S., 143 U. S. 457, 12 Sup. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226.
As to statutes which contravene the con stitution, see CONSTITUTIONAL.
By the common law, statutes took effect by relation back to the first day of the ses sion at which they were enacted ; 4 Term 660. The injustice which this rule often worked led to the statute of 33 Geo. III. c. 13, which declared that, except when other wise provided, statutes should take effect from the day of obtaining the royal assent, unless otherwise ordered therein. This rule, however, does not obviate the hardship of holding men responsible under a law before its promulgation. By the Code Napoleon, a
law takes effect in each department of the empire as many days after its promulgation in that department as there are distances of twenty leagues between the seat of govern ment and the place of promulgation. The general rule in America is, that an act takes effect from the time when the formalities of enactment are actually complete, unless it is ordered otherwise or there is some constitu tional or statutory rule on the subject; Cool ey, Const. Lim. 187 ; Matthews v. Zane, Wheat. (U. S.) 164, 5 L. Ed. 425.
The constitutions of many states contain provisions that acts shall not take effect till a certain time after their passage, or after adjournment of the legislature, but such con stitutions usually contain also a provision that the legislature may, in a case of emer gency, provide that an act shall take effect immediately, and it has become a common practice so to provide even in ordinary acts. But an act which merely provides that "it shall take effect on and after its passage and approval" does not come within such an emergency as to take effect immediately ; State v. Exp. Co., 80 Neb. 823, 115 N. W. 619.
Where an act was passed May 16, which declared that it should take effect May 14, it went into effect on its passage ; McLaughlin v. Newark, 57 N. J. L. 298, 30 Atl. 543.
The Tariff Act of 1897 took effect at the moment it was approved by the president, which was six minutes past 4 o'clock p. m., Washington time, on July 24, 1897, and goods imported and entered for consumption on that day, but prior to such approval, were dutiable Under prior legislation ; U. S. v. Ise lin, 87 Fed. 194.
An act increasing taxes and annexing pen alties, falls within the first article of the con stitution prohibiting ev post facto laws, and giving effect to statutes only from the time of their receiving the president's signature; Salmon v. Burgess, 1 Hughes, 356, Fed. Cas. No. 12,262. "The law is an entirety. If, as to its penal features, it cannot be held to have gone into effect until 9 p. m. of the day of its enactment, neither can it be held to have gone into effect before that hour as to its other provisions." Id. See, also, U. S. v. Burr, 159 U. S. 78, 15 Sup. Ct. 1002, 40 L. Ed. 82, as to the tariff act of 1894.