PRINCIPAL. Leading; chief ; more im portant.
This word has several meanings. It is used in opposition to accessary, to show the degree of crime committed by two persons. Thus, we say, the principal is more guilty than the accessary after the fact.
In estates,, principal is used as opposed to incident or accessary: as in the follow ing rule: "The incident shall pass by the grant of the principal; but not the prin cipal by the grant of the incident: acces soriwnt non ducit sed sequitur suum prim cipale." Co. Litt. 152 a.
It is used in opposition to agent, and in this sense it signifies that the principal is the prime mover. See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
It is used in opposition to interest: as, the principal being secured, the interest will follow. See INTEREST.
The corpus or capital of the estate in contradistinction to the income.
Money bearing interest; a capital sum lent on interest.
It is used also in opposition to surety: thus, we say, the principal is answerable before the surety. See SURETYSHIP; GUAR ANTY.
Principal is used also to denote the more important: as, the principal person.
In the English law, the chief person in some of the inns of chancery is called prin cipal of the house. Principal is also used to designate the best of many things: as, the principal bed, the principal table, and the like.
In Criminal Law. The actor in the com mission of a crime.
All who are present, either actually or constructively, at the place of a crime, and are either aiding, abetting, assisting, or ad vising its commission, or are present for such purpose, are principals in the crime; U. S. v. Boyd, 45 Fed. 851. See Fernandez v. State, 25 Tex. App. 538, 8 S. W. 667.
Principals are of two kinds, namely, prin cipals in the first degree, and principals in the second degree.
A principal in the first degree is one who is the actual perpetrator of the act. 1 Hale, Pl. Cr. 233, 615; Hately v. State, 15 Ga. 346. But to constitute him such it is not necessary that he should be actually present when the offence is consummated ; People v. Adains, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 190, 45 Am. Dec. 468; Smith v. State, 21 Tex. App. 107, 17 S. W. 552. For if one lay poison purposely for another, who takes it and Is killed, the offender, though absent when it was taken, is a principal in the first degree; Clark, Cr. L. 83; 4 Bla. Com. 34; 1 Chitty, Cr. L. 257.
And the offence may be committed in his ab sence, through the medium of an innocent agent: as, if a person incites a child un der the age of discretion, or any other In strument excused from the responsibility of his actions by defect of understanding, ig norance of the fact, or other cause, to the commission of crime, the inciter, though ab sent when the act was committed, is ex ne cessitate liable for the act of his agent and a principal in the first degree; 1 Hale, Pl. Cr. 514; 2 Leach 978. But if the instrument be aware of the consequences of his act, he is a principal in the first degree; the employer, in such case, if present when the fact is committed, is a principal in the second de gree, and, if absent, an accessary before the fact; 1 C. & K. 589; 1 Archb. Cr. L. 58.
Principals in the second degree are those who are present aiding and abetting the commission of the 'act. Rasnick v. Com., 2 Va. Cas. 356. They are generally termed aiders and abettors, and sometimes, im properly, accomplices; for the latter term includes all the particeps criminis, whether principals in the first or second degree or mere accessaries. A person to be a principal in the second degree need not be actually present, an ear or eye witness of the trans action. The presence may be constructive. He is, in construction of law, present aiding and abetting if, with the intention of giving assistance, he be near enough to afford it should the occasion arise. If, for instance, he be outside the house watching to pre vent surprise or the like, whilst his com panions are in the house committing a fel ony, such constructive presence is sufficient to make a principal in the second degree; Clark, Cr. L. 85; Com. v. Knapp, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 496, 20 Am. Dec. 491; 9 C. & P. 437; Brennan v. People, 15 Ill. 511. There must, however, be a participation in the act ; for although a person be present when a felony is committed, yet if he does not con sent to the felonious purpose or contribute to its execution, he will not be a principal in the second degree merely because he does not endeavor to prevent the felony or ap prehend the felon; 1 Russ. Cr. 27; 1 Hale, Pl. Cr. 439; State v. Hildreth, 31 N. C. 440, 51 Am. Dec. 369; Connaughty v. State, 1 Wis. 159, 60 Am. Dec. 370.