QUIT-CLAIM. A form of deed of the na ture a release containing words of grant as well as release. 3 Washb. R. P., 5th ed. 606.
The term is in constant and general use in American law to denote a 'deed substan tially the same as a release in English law. It presupposes a previous or precedent con veyance or a subsisting estate and posses sion; Thornt. Cony. 44. It is a conveyance at common law, but differs from a release in that it is regarded as an original conveyance, at least in some states; Rogers v. Hillhouse, 3 Conn. 398; Hall's Lessee v. Ashby, 9 Ohio, 96, 34 Am. Dec. 424; Doe v. Reed, 4 Scam. (III.) 117, 38 Am. Dec. 124. The operative words are remise, release, and forever quit claim; Thornt. Cony. 44. Covenants of war ranty against incumbrances by the grantor are usually added. See a full article in 12 Cent. L. J. 127; 34 id. 174.
The rule that a purchaser by a quitclaim deed is not to be regarded as a bona fide purchaser without notice of a prior incum-. brance; O'Neal v. Seixas, 85 Ala. 80, 4 South. 745; Huff v. Crawford, 89 Tex. 214, 34 S. W. 606; has no application where the registry laws require the recording of such an incumbrance in order to make it a lien on lands in the hands of a subsequent purchas er; White v. McGarry, 47 Fed. 420. One ac cepting•a quit-claim deed from his grantor is bound, at his peril, to ascertain what equi ties, if any, exist against his title; Bowman v. Griffith, 35 Neb. 361, 53 N. W. 140 ; but the receipt of the quit-claim deed does not of it self prevent the grantee from showing that he is a bona Me purchaser ; Moelle v. Sher wood, 148 U. S. 21, 13 Sup. Ct. 426, 37 L. Ed. 350 ; U. S. v. Land Co., 148 U. S. 31, 13 Sup. Ct. 458, 37 L. Ed. 354 ; and the grantee under such deed may be a bona fide purchaser un der the recording acts; Smith v. McClain, 146 Ind. 77, 45 N. E. 41.
A quit-claim deed conveys only the inter est of the grantor at the time of the convey ance ; Pleasants v. Blodgett, 39 Neb. 741, 58 N. W. 423, 42 Am. St: Rep. 624; but such a deed is as effectual to divest and transfer a complete title as any other form of con veyance; Moelle v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 21, 13 Sup. Ct. 426, 37 L. Ed. 350. Such a deed
from a judgment debtor of land, sold under execution, passes merely the right of redemp tion and does not relieve the land of dower of the debtor's wife, though she did re side in the state when the deed was execut ed; Lynde v. Wakefield, 19 Mont. 23, 47 Pac. 5. A title acquired subsequently to the ex ecution of a quit-claim, with special warran ty simply, does not enure to the grantee, and a subsequent purchaser from the grantor is not affected by the recording of the deed ex ecuted before the grantor acquired the title ; Bennett v. Davis, 90 Me. 457, 38 Atl. 372.
A grantee in a warranty deed whose imme diate grantor also took under a warranty deed, is entitled protection as a bona fide Purchaser notwithstanding the fact that re motely in the chain of title there exists a quit-claim deed ; Sherwood v. Moelle, 36 Fed. 478, 1 L. R. A. 797 ; Snowden v. Tyler, 21 Neb. 199, 31 N. W. 661; but one who takes a quit-claim deed is presumed to do so with notice of any outstanding equity interest and he therefore knows that he is taking a doubt ful title and is put on inquiry concerning it. "The very form of the deed indicates to him that the grantor has doubts concerning the title ; and the deed itself is notice to him that he is getting only a doubtful title ;" Johnson v. Williams, 37 Kan. 179, 14 Pac. 537, 1 Am. St. Rep. 243, per Valentine, J., who is quoted on this point by Brewer, J., in Sherwood v. Moelle, 36 Fed. 478, 1 L. R. A. 797, and referred to as "one of the most painstaking and thoughtful judges I know. He has collected the various authorities." Under a Massachusetts statute, a quit claim deed takes precedence over a prior deed, recorded subsequently to the quit claim, where the graotee in the latter is without notice of the other ; Stark v. Boyn ton, 167 Mass. 443, 45 N. E. 764. A quit claim deed, duly recorded, is held to be with in the protection of a statute providing that deeds shall take effect only on delivery for record ; Schott v. Bosh, 49 Neb. 187, 68 N. W. 346, 59 Am. St. Rep'. 531; where will be found much learning on the subject of these deeds.