Receipts "in full." When, however, we find a receipt acknowledging payment "in full" of a specified debt, or "in full of ail accounts" or of "all demands," the instrument is of a much higher and more conclusive charac ter. It does not, indeed, like a release, oper ate upon the demand itself, extinguishing it by any force or virtue in the receipt, but it is evidence of a compromise and mutual set tlement of the rights of the parties. The law infers from such acknowledgment an adjustment of the amount due, after consid eration of the claims of each party, and a payment of the specified sum as a final sat isfaction ; Paige v. Perno, 10 Vt. 491; Reid v. Reid, 13 N. C. 247, 18 Am. Dec. 570 ; Um. rie v. Gilbert, Wright (Ohio) 764; Danziger v. Hoyt, 120 N. Y. 190, 24 N. E. 294. This compromise thus shown by the receipt will often operate to extinguish a demand, al though the creditor may be able to show he did not receive all that he justly ought. Papers showing a receipt of money in full satisfaction of a decree appealed from, can not be varied or contradicted by parol evi dence ; Bofinger v. Tuyes, 120 U. S. 198, 7 Sup. Ct. 529, 30 L. Ed. 649. See ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
If the rights of a party are doubtful, are honestly contested, and time is gii en to allow him to satisfy himself, a receipt in full, though given for less than his just rights, will not be set aside. Thus, in general, a re ceipt in full is conclusive when given with a knowledge of the circumstances, and when the party giving it cannot complain of any misapprehension as to the compromise he was making, or of any fraud; Holbrook v. Blodget, 5 Vt. 520 ; 1 Camp. 392 ; Eve v. Mosely, 2 Strobh. (S. C.) 203 ; and unless given in ignorance of its purport, or under circumstances constituting duress, it is an acquittance in bar of any further demand ; De Arnaud v. U. S., 151 U. S. 483, 14 Sup. Ct. 374, 38 L. Ed. 744. It is held to be a contract and not to be explained ; Conant v. Kimball's Estate, 95 Wis. 550, 70 N. W. 74.
But receipts of this character are not whol ly exempt from explanation ; fraud or mis representation may be proved, and so may such mistake as enters into and vitiates the compromise of the demand admitted ; 1 Camp.
394; Trisler v. Williamson, 4 H. & McH. (Md.) 219, 1 Am. Dec. 396 ; Thomas v. Aus tin, 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 265; 2 C. & P. 44. The evidence In explanation must be clear and full, and addressed to the point that there was not in fact an intended and valid com promise of the demand. For if the compro mise was not binding, the receipt in full will not aid it. The receipt only operates as ev idence of a compromise which extinguished the claim ; Bailey v. Day, 26 Me. 88 ; Pal merton v. Huxford, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 166 ; Mc Dowall v. Lemaitre, 2 McCord (S. C.) 320; Lawrence v. Nay. Co., 4 Wash. C. C. 562, Fed. Cas. No. 8,143.
A receipt for a specified amount of money and designated notes executed by a defend ant to the plaintiff's intestate may be used as evidence that it was a deposit with the latter and not a payment to him where there is other evidence to the same effect; North rop v. Knott, 114 Cal. 612, 46 Pac. 599.
Though a receipt in full is presumed to be in full settlement the presumption is not conclusive ; Newton's Ex'r v. Field, 98 Ky. 186, 32 S. W. 623; and where it is given for work and labor, a receipt in full for the bill rendered is not conclusive evidence of a final settlement unless it purports to be so ; O'He hir v. Traction Co., 91 Hun 639, 36 N. Y. Supp. 140. Where the question is raised whether the purchase price of an article has been paid notwithstanding a receipt, and there is evidence to the contrary, the ques tion is for the jury ; Mosel v. Brewing Co., 2 App. Div. 93, 37 N. Y. Supp. 525; and a jury is not precluded from finding that a re ceipt in full was not intended to be such by the fact that he who signed it gave no ex planation for doing so ; Duncan v. Grant, 87 Me. 429, 32 Atl. 1000.
Receipts in deeds. The effect to be given to a receipt for the consideration-money, so frequently inserted in a deed of real prop erty, has been the subject of numerous and conflicting adjudications. The general prin ciple settled by weight of authority is that for the purpose of sustaining the conveyance as against the vendor and his privies the re ceipt is conclusive: they are estopped to de ny that a consideration was paid sufficient to sustain the conveyance ; Wilt v. Franklin, 1 Binn. (Pa.) 502, 2 Am. Dec. 474 ; Green vault v. Davis, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 643. But in a subsequent action for the purchase-money or upon any collateral demand, e: g. in an ac tion to recover a debt which was in fact paid by the conveyance, or in an action for dam ages for breach of a covenant in the deed, and the like, the grantor may Show that the consideration was not in fact paid—that an additional consideration to that mentioned was agreed for, etc.; McCrea v. Purmort, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 460, 30 Am. Dec. 103 ; Bul lard v. Briggs, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 533, 19 Am. Dec. 292; Johnson v. Taylor, 15 N. C. 355; Schillinger v. McCann, 6 Greenl. (Me.) 364; 5 B. & Ald. 606; Saunders v. Hendrix, 5 Ala. 224; Harris v. Harris, Harr. (Del.) 3545 Moore v. McKie, 5 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 238 ; Sparrow v. Smith, 5 Conn. 113 ; Ayres v. McConnel, 15 Ill. 230 ; Herbert v. Scofield, 9 N. J. Eq. 492. But there are many con trary cases. See Steele v. Adams, 1 Greenl. (Me.) 2.; Maigley v. Hauer, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 341; Dixon v. Swiggett, 1 Harr. & J. (Md.) 252 ; Steele v. Worthington, 2 Ohio 182; 1 B. & C. 704. And when the deed is attacked for fraud, or is impeached by creditors as vol untary and therefore void, or when the ob ject is to show the conveyance illegal, the receipt may be explained or contradicted ; Den v. Shotwell, 23 N. J. L. 465; Coxe v. Sartwell, 21 Pa. 480 ; Clapp v. Tirrell, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 247; Kimball v. Fenner, 12 N. H. 248. See ASSUMPSIT ; DEED; RECITAL.