RECENT POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY. Possession of the fruits of crime recently after its commission is prima facie evidence of guilty possession ; and if unexplained, either by direct evidence, or by the attending circumstances, or by the character and habits of life of the posses sor, or otherwise, it is usually regarded by the jury as conclusive. 1 Tayl, Ev. § 122. See 1 Greenl. Ev. § 34 ; Wilson v. U. S., 162 U. S. 615, 16 Sup. Ct. 895, 40 L. Ed. 1090. . It is manifest that the force of this rule of presumption depends upon the recency of the possession as related to the crime, and upon the exclusiveness of such possession.
If the interval of time between the loss and the finding be considerable, the presump tion, as it affects the party in possession of the stolen property, is much weakened, and the more especially so if the goods are of such a nature as, in the ordinary course of things, frequently to change hands. From the nature of the case, it is not possible to fix any precise period within which the effect of this rule of presumption can be limited; it must depend not only upon the mere lapse of time, but upon the nature of the prop erty and the concomitant circumstances of each particular case. Thus, where two ends of woollen cloth in an unfinished state, con sisting of about twenty yards each, were found in the possession of the prisoner two months after they had been stolen, it was held that the prisoner should explain how he came by the property ; 7 C. & P. 551. But where the only evidence against a prisoner was that certain tools had been traced to his three months after their loss, an acquittal was decided ; 3 C. & P. 600. And so, on an indictment for horse-stealing, where it appeared that the horse was not discovered in the custody of the accused until after six months from the date of the robbery; 3 C. & K. 318 ; and where goods lost sixteen months before were found in the prisoner's house, and no other evidence was adduced against him, he was not called upon for his defence ; 2 C. & P. 459.
Such possession of stolen goods may be in dicative of any more aggravated crime which has been connected with theft., Upon an in dictment for arson, proof that property which was in the house at the time it was burnt was soon afterwards found in the possession of the prisoner was held to raise a probable presumption that he was present and con cerned. in the offence; 2 East, Pl. Cr. 1035. A like inference has been raised in the case of murder accompanied by robbery ; Wills, Circ. Ev. 72, 241; in the cases of burglary and ?shopbreaking ; 4 B. & Ald. 122 ; 9 C. & P. 364; Com. v. Millard, 1 Mass. 6; and in the case of the possession of a quantity of counterfeit money ; Russ. & R. 308; Dearsl. 552 ; but the recent possession of stolen prop erty by one charged with receiving it, know ing it to be stolen, raises no presumption that he knew that it had been stolen ; State v. Bulla, 89 Mo. 595, 1 S. W. 764.
Upon the principle of this presumption, a sudden and otherwise inexplicable transition from a state of indigence, and a consequent change of habits, is sometimes a circum stance extremely unfavorable to the suppo sition of innocence ; Com. v. Montgomery, 11 Mete. (Mass.) 534, 45 Am. Dec. 227. See Bos ton & W. R. Corp. v. Dana, 1 Gray (Mass.) 101.
But this rule of presumption must be ap plied with caution and discrimination ; for the bare possession of stolen property, though recently stolen, uncorroborated by other •evi dence, is sometimes fallacious and danger ous as a criterion of guilt ; 2 Hale, Pl. Cr. 289.
See 1 Benn. & H. Lead. Qr. Cas. 371, where this .subject is fully considered ; RECEIVER OF STOLEN Goons.