RES IPSA LOQUIT UR (Lat. the transac tion speak for itself). A phrase often used in actions for injury by negligence where no proof of negligence is required beyond the ac cident itself, which is such as necessarily to involve negligence. See 5 Ex. 787. It is thus defined by Erle, J., in Scott v. London Docks Co., 2 H. & C. 596: "When the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the acci dent is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords rea sonable evidence, in the absence of explana tion by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care." This definition has been termed a legal classic ; 1 Thomp. Negl. § 15, with a note collecting numerous cases.
In Shearm. & Redf. Negl. § 59, it is said that where it is shown that the accident is such as that its real cause may be the neg ligence of the defendant, add that whether it is so or not is within the knowledge of the defendant, the plaintiff may give the requir ed evidence of negligence without himself ex plaining the real cause of the accident by proving the circumstances and thus raising the presumption that if the defendant does not choose to give the explanation, the real cause was negligence on the part of the de fendant. Paducah Traction Co. v. Baker, 130 Ky. 360, 113 S. W. 449, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1185 ; In re Hawkins, 165 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 ; Hawser v. R. Co., 80 Md. 146, 30 Atl. 906, 27 L. R. A. 154, 45 Am. St. Rep. 332 ; Consolidated Traction Co. v. Thalheim er, 59 N. J. L. 474, 37 AU. 132; Rockwell v. McGovern, 202 Mass. 6, 88 N. E 436, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1022.
Wigm. Evid. § 2509, gives the cases in every state, and advances the following con siderations that ought to limit the operation of the rule: 1. apparatus must be such that in the ordinary instances no injurious operation is to be expected unless from a careless construction, inspection or user. 2.
Both the inspection and user must have been at the time of the injury in the control of the party charged.
The doctrine is that when a thing which Causes injury without fault of the person in jured, is shown to be under the exclusive control of defendant and would not cause the damage, in ordinary course if the party in control used proper care, it affords reason able evidence, in the absence of an explana tion, that the injury arose from defendant's want of care; San Juan Light & Transit Co. v. Requena, 224 U. S. 89, 32 Sup. Ct. 399, 56 L. Ed. 680, where the doctrine was held rightly applied against an electric light com pany in the case of a person injured while adjusting an electric light in his residence by an electric shock transmitted from out side wires entirely without fault on his part and in a manner which would not have hap pened had the wires been in proper condi tion.
Where damage is done by the falling of objects to the highway from a building, the rule applies and the accident is of itself evi dence of negligence; Doll & Sons v. Ribetti, 203 Fed. 593, 121 C. C. A. 621, per Gray, C. J., following 2 H. & C. 722 ; 6 Q. B. 759.
The sudden sinking of a sidewalk under the weight of a pedestrian is evidencd of ligence on the part of a contractor who took up and relaid it, in the execution of public work ; Rockwell v. McGovern, 202 Mass. 6, 88 N. E. 436, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1022; oth erwise, in a suit against a city and its con tractor in which there was judgment below against the contractor which was reversed, the court pointing out that the street was in the care of the city and that there was no evidence that the sidewalk was out of repair and that the city had knowledge of the fact ; Cunningham v. Dady, 191 N. Y. 152, 83 N. E. 689.
The sudden starting a street car as a passenger is alighting raises the presumption of negligence ; Paducah Traction Co. v. Ba ker, 130 Ky. 360, 113 S. W. 449, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1185.