A quitclaim deed from a trustee to the donor of the trust will not revoke the trust, though made solely for that purpose, since a completed trust, without reservation of pow er to revoke, can only be revoked by the con sent of all the beneficiaries ; Ewing v. Shan nahan, 113 Mo. 188, 20 S. W. 1065. See Hell man v. McWilliams, 70 Gal. 449, 11 Pac. 659.
Powers of sale and of substitution of trus tee in a mortgage or deed of trust• are coup led with an interest so that they are not re yoked by the death of the grantor, although the mortgage or deed of trust is a mere right to resort to the thing for the payment of the debt, and the mortgagee or trustee has no es tate, legal or equitable, in the thing con veyed ; Frank v. Mortgage Co., 86 Miss. 103, 38 South. 340, 4 Ann. Cas. 54, 70 L. R. A. 135, with full note on the revocation by death of power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust.
A power of sale of an ancestor's land, for the purpose of an amicable division among the heirs, is revoked by the death of one of the parties, although it contains a provision that it shall not be revoked by death, and au thorizes the payment of the salary and expenses of the agent out of the proceeds of the property; v. Richards, 144 Mich. 395, 108 N. W. 382, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 855, and note. That case is put squarely upon the doctrine that the interest which will protect a power after the death of the person creating it, must be an interest in the thing itself. And a contract placing one's property in another's hands to manage and sell, which is to con tinue after the death of the donor, is never theless terminated by the death of the donor; Mills v. Smith, 193 Mass. 11, 78 N. E. 765, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 865.
The American courts, .following Brown v M'Gran, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 479, 10 L. Ed. 550, hold that the consignee of goods for sale, who has incurred liability or made advances up on the faith of the consignment, acquires a power of sale which, to the extent of his in terest, is not revocable or subject to the con trol of the consignor. But if orders are giv en by the consignor, contemporaneously with the consignment and advances, in regard to the time and mode of sale, and which are, either expressly or Impliedly, assented to by the consignee, he is not at liberty to depart from them afterwards. But if no• instruc tions are given at the time of the consignment and advances, the legal presumption is that the consignee has the ordinary right of fac tors to sell, according to the usages of the trade and the general duty of factors, in the exercise of a sound discretion, and reimburse the advances out of the proceeds, and that this right is not subject to the interference or control of the consignor. See Cotton v.
Hiller, 52 Miss. 7 ; Mooney v. Musser, 45 Ind. 115.
The right of the factor to sell in such case is limited to the protection of his own inter est, and if he sell more than is necessary for that purpose contrary to the order of his principal, he is liable for the loss incurred; Weed v. Adams, 37 Conn. 378.
The case of Parker v. Brancker, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 40, seems to go to the length of hold ing that where the consignment is to sell at a Limited price the consignee may after notice sell below that price, if necessary, to reim burse advances. But to this extent the Amer ican rule has not gone ; 1 Pars. Contr., 8th ed. 70. See, also, Frothingham v. Everton, 12 N. H. 239; Blot v. Boiceau, 3 N. Y. 78, 51 Am. Dec. 345.
The English courts do not hold such a pow er irrevocable in law; 3 C. B. 380 ; 5 id. 895. In the last case, Wilde, C. J., thus lays down the rule. It may furnish a ground for infer ring that the advances were made upon the footing of an agreement that the factor shall have an irrevocable authority to sell in case the principal made default. But it would be an inference of fact, not a conclusion of law. The fact that the agent has incurred expense in faith of the authority being continued, and will suffer loss by its revocation, is a ground of recovery against the principal, but does not render the power irrevocable. A pledge of personal property to secure liabilities of the pledgor, with an express power of sale, confers such an interest in the subject-matter that it will not be revoked by his death; Knapp v. Aloord, 10 Paige (N. Y.) 205, 40 Am. Dec. 241. But a power to pledge or sell the property of the constituent and from the avails to reimburse advances made on liabil ities incurred by the appointee is not so cou pled with an interest as to be irrevocable; Hunt v. Rousmanier's Adm'r, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 174, 5 L. Ed. 589 ; Mansfield v. Mansfield, 6 Conn. 559, 16 Am. Dec. 76. The interest must exist in the subject-matter of the pow er, and not merely in the result of its exer cise, to become irrevocable ; Rochester v. Whitehouse, 15 N. H. 468; McDonald • v. Black's Adm'r, 20 Ohio, 185, 55 Am. Dec. 448. Hence, if one give a letter of credit agreeing to accept bills to a certain amount within a limited' time, the letter is revoked by death, and bills drawn after the death and before knowledge thereof reaches the drawer cannot be enforced against the estate of such deceas ed party; Michigan State Bk. v. Leaven worth's Estate, 28 Vt. 209.