REWAR D. The offer of recompense given by authority of law for the performance of some act for the public good, which, when the act has been performed, is to be paid. The recompense actually so paid.
The offer may be made to an individual ; Franklin v. Heiser, 6 Blatchf. 426, Fed. Cas. No. 5,054 ; or by public, oral statement, post er, or newspaper ; Hayden v. Souger, 56 Ind. 46, 26 Am. Rep. 1; Symmes v. Frazier, 6 Mass. 344, 4 Am. Dec. 142 ; its acceptance and performance create a valid contract ; Poll. Contr. 11 ; Ans. Contr. 31; Pierson v. Morch, 82 N. Y. 503 ; Kasling v. Morris, 71 Tex. 584, 9 S. W. 739, 10 Am. St. Rep. 797; Cummings v. Gann, 52 Pa. 484; such per formance being sufficient consideration ; Ry er v. Stockwell, 73 Am. Dec. 634 ; 4 B. & Ad. 621. The offer, not being a contract until performance, may be withdrawn prior there to ; Harson v. Pike, 16 Ind. 140; Biggers v. Owen, 79 Ga. 658, 5 S. E. 193 ; Freeman v. Boston, 5 Mete. (Mass.) 57 ; Ryer v. Stock well, 14 Cal. 137, 73 Am. Dec. 634 ; that the claimant was ignorant of the withdrawal, where the offer and withdrawal were by pub lic advertisement, is immaterial; Shuey v. U. S., 92 U. S. 75, 23 L. Ed. 697. See REVO CATION.
The offer of a reward may contain such terms as the party sees fit to prescribe; Arn is v. Conner, 43 Ark. 337; provided they are lawful; Bish. Contr. § 467 ; Smith v. Arnold, 106 Mass. 269 ; and substantial performance is usually sufficient ; Besse v. Dyer, 9 Allen (Mass.) 152, 85 Am. Dec. 747.
Where a reward was for an "arrest," fur nishing information that led to an arrest was not enough ; M'Claughry v. King, 147 Fed. 465, 79 C. C. A. 91, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 216, 8 Ann. Cas. 856 ; Kinn v. Bank, 118 Wis. 537, 95 N. W. 969, 99 Am. St. Rep. 1012 ; Wil liams v. R. Co., 191 Ill. 610, 61 N. E. 456, 85 Am. St. Rep. 278 ; the arrest must be legal; Moore v. Peace (Ky.) 97 S. W. 762; Morris v. Kasling, 79 Tex. 141, 15 S. W. 226, 11 L. R. A. 389.
A reward may be offered by the govern ment or by a private person ; Furman v. Parke, 21 N. J. L. 310; by a railroad com pany ; Central R. & B. Co. v. Cheatham, 85 Ala. 292, 4 South. 828, 7 Am. St. Rep. 48 ; but not by the District of Columbia ; Baker v. Washington, 7 D. C. 134 ; nor by municipal corporations, unless authorized by statute ; Butler v. McLean, 32 Ill. App. 397; Loveland v. Detroit, 41 Mich. 367, 1 N. W. 952 ; Gale v. South Berwick, 51 Me. 174; Hawk v. Mar ion Co., 48 Ia. 472 ; Board of Com'rs of Grant Co. v. Bradford, 72 Ind. 455, 37 Am. Rep. 174; contra, York v. Forscht, 23 Pa. 391. But where the selectmen of a town of fered a reward in excess of that authorized by statute, it was held good for the lawful amount ; In re Kelly, 39 Conn. 159 ; and such officials are personally liable for the excess ; Lee v. Trustees of Flemingsburg, 7 Dana (Ky.) 29; contra, Huthsing v. Bousquet, 2 McCrary 152, 7 Fed. 833. .
Any one who complies with the terms of the offer, if not guilty of fraud, may recover the reward ; Hassan v. Doe, 38 Me. 45;
Blain v. Exp. Co., 69 Tex. 74, 6 S. W. 679; Means v. Hendershott, 24 Ia. 78 ; although not embraced in the description of the per sons to whom it was originally proposed; First Nat. Bk. v. Hart, 55 Ill. 62 ; 64 L. T. 594 ; but not for apprehending a person who has been admitted to bail; Marking v. Needy, 8 Bush (Ky.) 22 ; nor one discharged from ar rest by the committing magistrate ; Board of Sup'rs of Itawamba Co. v. Candler, 62 Miss. 193. The owners of a proprietary medicine offered a reward to any one who used it and then contracted influenza ; held a contract with one who met the conditions ; [1893] 1 Q. B. 256. Where a prize is offered in a county competition, one who meets the conditions may recover ; 39 Wash. L. R. 18.
One may recover a reward offered by his employers; Chicago A. R. Co. v. Sebring, 16 Ill. App. 181; but not if he is morally bound to furnish the information ; Burke v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 50 Cal. 218 ; or it is his official duty to do so ; Morris v. Kasling, 79 Tex. 141, 15 S. W. 226, 11 L. R. A. 398 ; Smith v. Whildin, 10 Pa. 39, 49 Am. Dec. 572. And a reward offered by the state for the capture of a criminal cannot be claimed by an officer whose official duty it is to make the arrest; the rule being founded on public policy, it is opposed to opening the door to any induce ment for public officers to delay arrests until rewards are offered; Smitha v. Gentry (Ky.) 45 S. W. 515, 42 L. R. A. 302, where it was held that no one could have any property right in a reward until it was earned by making the arrest, so that where, by, sharp practice in making use of information de rived, over the telephone, one person secured the reward and prevented another, who really gave the information, from obtaining the benefit of it, the latter had no right of action. But it is held that a promise to pay a reward to a police constable is binding because there might be some information which he was not bound, in the discharge of his ordinary duty, to give ; 11 A. & E. 856.
A reward was offered by the defendant for the arrest of a criminal. A police officer made the arrest, but the prisoner broke away from him and in the pursuit surrendered to the plaintiff. The defendant voluntarily paid the reward to the officer. Plaintiff on a suit for a share of the reward was held not en titled to any part of it ; Stair v. Heska Amone Congregation (Tenn.) 159 S. W. 840.
An offer of a reward is not void as against public policy, because made for conviction of offences afterwards to be committed ; Wil moth v. Hensel, 151 Pa. 200, 25 Atl. 86, 31 Am. St. Rep. 738.
It is held to be necessary that the person performing the service should know of the offer when he did so ; Howland v. Lounds, 51 N. Y. 604, 10 Am. Rep. 654; Broadnax v. Ledbetter, 100 Tex. 375, 99 S. W. 1111, 9 L.