A statute permitting the supreme court to reduce a sentence imposed by a trial court is not unconstitutional as an exercise of par doning power by the judiciary ; Palmer v. State, 70 Neb. 136, 97 N. W. 235; nor is a statute allowing the governor to fix a new date for execution when the date in the judg ment has passed, since it is a ministerial and not a judicial act; Bullitt v. Sturgeon, 127 Ky. 332, 105 S. W. 468, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 268.
Where one is found guilty of manslaughter on an indictment for murder, and on a new trial granted on appeal he is subsequently found guilty of murder, the case will be remanded with directions to sentence for manslaughter only ; People v. Farrell, 146 Mich. 264, 109 N. W. 440.
A prisoner who is paroled without statuto ry authority cannot, upon violation of his pa role, be required to remain in prison beyond the time when the original sentence expired ; Scott v. Chi_hester, 107 Va. 933, 60 S. E. 95, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 304.
A person who commits a felony while en joying his liberty under a bond given to stay execution of a judgment for a previously committed felony must serve such second sentence upon the expiration of the first; State v. Finch, 75 Kan. 582, 89 Pac. 922, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 273; but a death sentence in a subsequent prosecution will be put into ef fect although the prisoner is serving a pre viously imposed life sentence; Brown v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 114, 95 S. W. 1039. Where, under an indeterminate sentence act, the court fixes a maximum term below the statutory period, the prisoner cannot bring a writ of habeas corpus to be released at the expiration of the maximum period, since he is subject to the statutory maxi mum; In re Duff, 141 Mich. 623, 105 N. W. 138. On an indictment charging separate offences under the same statute, the court may impose separate and cumulative sen tences; but a single sentence for a term longer than is authorized by the statute for one offense is void as to the excess; U. S. v. Peeke, 153 Fed. 166, 82 C. C. A. 340, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 314. An act authorizing a board of commissioners of a county work house to deduct from sentence for good con duct, leaving the whole matter to arbitrary discretion, is an unconstitutional delega tion of legislative authority ; Fite v. State, 114 Tenn. 646, 88 S. W. 941, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 520, 4 Ann. Cas. 1108; People v. Cummings, 88 Mich. 249, 50 N. W. 310, 14 L. R. A. 285 ; Com. v. Holloway, 44 Pa. 210, 84 Am. Dec. 431; State v. Board, 16 Utah 478, 52 Poe.' 1090; contra, State v. Peters, 43 Ohio 629, 4 N. E. 81; Opinion of Justices, 13 Gray (Mass.) 618; State v. Austin, 113 Mo. 538,
21 S. W. 31; State v. Patterson (N. J.) 22 Atl. 802.
A Pennsylvania act (1911) provides that the court shall "pronounce upon such facts a sentence of imprisonment for a definite term and state in such sentence the minimum and maximum limits thereof and the maxi mum limit shall never exceed the maximum time now or hereafter prescribed as a pen alty for such offence." It is said that the act does not fir punishment; it relates ex clusively to the manner of sentence. As was first pointed out by Judge Sulzberger a maxi mum sentence is the only portion of the sen tence which is valid; the minimum sentence is merely an administrative notice by the court to the executive department calling at tention to the policy that when a man's so called minimum sentence is about to expire . . . the propriety of granting a qualified pardon may be determined; Com. v. Kalck, 239 Pa. 541, 87 Atl. 61, where it was held that such an act is constitutional, follow ing State v. Perkins, 143 la. 55, 120 N. W. 62, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 931, 20 Ann. Cas. 1217 ; In re Conditional Discharge of Convicts, 73 Vt. 414, 51 Atl. 10, 56 L. R. A. 658; People v. Illinois State Reformatory, 148 Ill. 413, 36 N. E. 76, 23 L. R. A. 139 ; State v. Peters, 43 Ohio 629, 4 N. E. 81; Com. v. Brown, 167 Mass. 144, 45 N. E. 1; Davis v. State, 152 Ind. 34, 51 N. E. 928, 71 Am. St. Rep. 322; People v. Hayes, 140 N. Y. 484, 35 N. E. 951, 23 L. R. A. 830, 37 Am. St. Rep. 572. To the same effect, Berry v. Com., 141 Ky. 422, 132 S. W. 1030.
The suspension of civil rights of a per son sentenced to the penitentiary for a term less than life begins at the date of his im prisonment ; Harmon v. Bowers, 78 Kan. 135, 96 Pac. 51, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 502, 16 Ann. Cas. 121.
In England where one convicted of an of fense is not less than 16 nor more than 21 years old, and by reason of bad associates it is expedient to subject him to instruc tion and discipline, the court may pass a sen tence of detention under penal discipline in a Borstal institution for not less than one nor more than three years ; here he is drilled and taught a trade and trained morally and physically. Act of 1908.
See CUMULATIVE SENTENCE; JUDGMENT; HABITUAL CRIMINALS' ACT ; PRISONER; TICK ET OF LEAVE; SOLITARY CONFINEMENT.
As to the formal address of the court to the prisoner before sentence, see ALLOCUTION. SENTENCE OF DEATH RECORDED. A custom in the English courts, now disused, of entering sentence of death on the record which is not intended to be pronounced. The effect was the same as if it had been pro nounced and the offender reprieved.