The signature "Ezekiel Norman, for Rachel Doherty, at her resquest," was held to be valid in a Pennsylvania will ; Vernon v. Kirk, 30 Pa. 218; and the surname signed to a church subscription with the word "family" added was binding upon the signer ; Hodges v. Nalty, 113 Wis. 567, 89 N. W. 535.
If a person is designated by, his proper name in the body of a deed, the fact that he signs by a wrong name will not invalidate it; Middleton v. Findla, 25 Cal. 76. Where a witness to a will named John D. Lynn signed the name of Jno. R. Jacobs, the name of the decedent, it was held that he had sign ed his name as witness under the statute ; In re Jacob's Will, 73 Misc. Rep. 162, 132 N. Y. Supp. 481; it was said in' that case that where a testator signs his will or a witness attests it under a fictitious name, it is suffi cient. Where a witness to the will of Mr. Sperling signed only these words "Servant to Mr. Sperling" omitting his name, it was held good ; Goods of Sperling, 3 Swa. & Tr. 272. Where "Richard Edmunds, Solicitor," witnessed a will, and his clerk signed by mistake "John Clerk, His Clerk," it was held good ; Goods of Oliver, 2 Spinks 57; but where C. G. Warren witnessed the will of Ozias Walker and signed "C. G. Walker," it was held not a proper attestation, three judges dissenting ; In re Walker, 110 Cal. 367, 42 Pac. 815, 30 L. R. A. 460,, 52 Am. St. Rep. 104. The "full name," required for a signature to a limited partnership statement, under a statute, is complied with when the signature is in the form habitually used in business, though only a surname and initial; Laflin & Rand Co. v. Steytler, 146 Pa. 434, 23 Atl. 215, 14 L. R. A. 690. A contract pur porting in its body to be an obligation of a corporation and signed, by one as manager, having authority to do so, is the contract of the corporation. It is not essential that the name of the corporation should appear in the signature ; Bessel v. Austin Min. Co., 144 Fed. 859.
Apart from any expressed or implied re quirement of law, a signature by a stamp, applied by the party or by another at direction, binds him; In re Deep River Nat'l Bank, 73 Conn. 341, 47 Atl. 675 ; Hamil ton v. State, 103 Ind. 96, 2 N. E. 299, 53 Am. Rep. 491.
The possession of a rubber stamp of his signature by a depositor in a bank, kept without negligence, but without notice to the bank, does not relieve the latter for having paid out money on a forged check, made from the stamp. Here an employe used the stamp to obtain a tracing of the depositor's signature ; Robb v. Penna. Co., 186 Pa. 456, 40 Atl. 969, 65 Am. St. Rep. 868.
A person who is awl tarts, will not, in absence of a fraud, be permitted to avoid his written obligation by showing that he did not read if or hear it read ; Taylor v. Fox, 16 Mo. App. 527. One who signs a contract
is conclusively presumed to know its con tents and has no right to rely on representa tions of another person as to its legal effect; Vaillancourt v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Can ada, 82 Vt. 416, 74 AU. 99; and one having average intelligence to read a contract, who signs it not under any emergency, nor under any trick or artifice, cannot afterwards avoid it on the ground of fraud ; Truitt-Silvey Hat Co. v. Callaway & Truitt, 130 Ga. 637, 61 S. E. 481; there must be a statement of fact knowingly untrue; Gillespie v. Fulton Oil & Gas Co., 236 III. 188, 86 N. E. 219. And where a promissory note was signed under the impression that it was one of some un important papers, the signature was held valid in the hands of an innocent third party ; McCoy v. Gouvion's Ex'r, 102 Ky. 386, 43 S. W. 699.
One who cannot read a contract which he is about to execute is bound to procure it to be read and explained to him before he signs it, and is chargeable with knowledge of its contents whether he does so or not; Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Belliwith, 83 Fed. 437, 28 C. C. A. 358. But where the other party misread the paper in such man nen as to create the impression thal it con tained the same matter which had been or ally agreed to, and thereby procured the sig nature, the failure to read it before signing did not prevent the avoidance of the con tract; Western Mfg. Co. v. Cotton & Long, 126 Ky. 749, 104 S. W. 758, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 427.
"If a man knows that the deed is one pur porting to deal with his property and be exe cutes it, it will not be sufficient for him, in order to support a plea of non est factum, to show that a misrepresentation was made to him as to the contents of the deed"; [1907] 1 Ch. 537, quoted with approval in [1908] 1 Ch. 1; but see [1911] 1 K. B. 489, where the Court of Appeals seems to take a different view. The view expressed in [1908] 1 Ch. 1, was that the old cases on misrepresenta tion as to the contents of a deed were really based upon the illiteracy of the person, to whom the deed was read, and that an illiter ate man was treated as a blind man, and an educated person is estopped to avail him self of the plea of non est factum against a person who innocently acts upon the faith of the deed being valid.
The signature is usually made at the bot tom of the instrument; but in wills it has been held that when a testator commenced his will with these words, "I, A B, make this my will," it was a sufficient signing ; 3 Lev. 1. And see Sudg. Vend. 71; 2 Stark. Ev. 605, 613. But this decision is said to be absurd; 1 Brown, Civ. Law 278, n. 16 ; Schoul. Wills 315. See Merlin, Repert. Signature, for a history of the origin of the signature; and, also, 4 Cruise, Dig. 32, c. 2, 73.