The statement of an employer of his rea sons for discharging a girl, made to her fa ther at his request, is privileged ; but if the employer voluntarily makes the statement, it would not be privileged ; Rosenbaum v. Roche, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 237, 101 S. W. 1164.
To justify the speaking of slanderous words on the ground of privilege, it must ap pear not only that the defendant believed he was speaking the truth, but that there were reasonable grounds for such belief ; Tooth aker v. Conant, 91 Me. 438, 40 Atl. 331.
See PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
Malice is essential to the support of an action for slanderous words. Odgers, Lib. & SI. 271. But malice is, in general, to be .pre sumed until the contrary be proved; 4 B. & C. 247 ; 1 Saund. 242, n. 2 ; 5 B. & P. 385; see Smith v. Printing & Pub. Ass'n, 55 Fed. 240, 5 C. C. A. 91; except in those cases where the occasion prhna facie excuses the publication ; 4 B. & C. 247. See M'Alniont v. McClelland, 14 S. & R. (Pa.) 359; Colby v. McGee, 48 Ill. App. 294. Repetition of the slander after suit begun may be shown to prove malice and aggravate damages; Halsey v. Stillman, 48 Ill. .App. 413. Defendant is not required, in an action for slander in charging plaintiff with theft, to prove the truth of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, hut a preponderance of evidence is sufficient ; Lewis v. Shull, 67 Hun (N. Y.)
543, 22 N. Y. Supp. 484. An admission by defendant at plaintiff's request and in the presence of a third party that on a previous occasion he had used the alleged slanderous words, is no ground of action when it does, not appear that the language was originally used in the presence of a third party ; O'Don nell v. Nee, 86 Fed. 96.
The word "malicious" in defining the in tent with which a slander is spoken, is not to be considered in the sense of spite or ha tred against a person, but as meaning that the party is actuated by improper and indirect motives other than interest of the public ; Blumhardt v. Rohr, 70 Md. 328, 17 Atl. 266 ; Wynne v. Parsons, 57 Conn. 73, 17 Atl. 362. See MALICE.
A corporation may be liable for slander committed by its employe ; Sawyer v. Rail road, 142 N. C. 1, 54 S. E. 793, 115 Am. St. Rep. 716, 9 Ann. Cas. 440 ; while acting with in the scope of his employment and in the actual performance of duties touching the matter in question ; Rivers v. R. Co., 90 Miss. 196, 43 South. 471, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 931 ; Hypes v. R. Co., 82 S. C. 315, 64 S. E. 395,