But in Sanders v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. R. 101, 112 S. W. 68, 22 L. R. A. (N. 5.) 243, it was held that one is not guilty of murder in in ducing another to take poison which results in the latter's death, if the latter knew the character of the poison and took it volun tarily for the purpose of committing suicide, which is not unlawful unless made so by stat ute. As to the effect of repentance and with. drawal from a suicide pact and the effort to dissuade the other person from it, see State v. Webb, 216 Mo. 378, 115 S. W. 998, 20 L R. A. (N. S.) 1142, 129 Am. St. Rep. 518, 16 Ann. Cas. 518, where it was held that Irk such case it is not necessary that the deceas ed should have abandoned his purpose and led the accused in good faith to believe that he had done so.
A note in 17 Harv. L. R. 566, suggests that the fact that no punishment by way of forfeiture of goods or the like could be ad ministered under our law for suicide had given rise to the belief that it was not a crime even within jurisdictions in which the common law prevails. The inconsistencies of some American decisions are noted and the conclusion reached that it is no less criminal in this country than in England, but that the policy of the law is different, no punishment being prescribed for the sui cide, because impracticable, but the aiding or abetting being usually punishable as a crime.
Evidence of an Intention to commit sui cide is material in a murder case, where the deceased was found dead under circumstanc es not inconsistent with the theory, of sui cide; Com. v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 31 N. E. 961, 24 L. R. A. 235.
See FELO DE SE; SELF-DESTRUCTION; IN SURANCE.
In regard to wills made just before com mitting suicide, the prevalent doctrine is that the act self-destruction may not necessari ly imply insanity, and that if the will is a rational act, rationally done, the sanity of the testator is established ; Brooks v. Bar rett, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 94 ; 1 Hagg. Eccl. 109; 2 Eccl. 415; Succession of Bey, 46 La. Ann. 773, 15 South. 297, 24 L. R. A. 577.
It has been held that when the owner of a deposit receipt gives it to another, the gift to take effect at the death of the donor, under such circumstances that the jury find it to been done in contemplation of sui cide, it is not a good donatio mortis conga; [1896] 2 I. R. 204.
It is held in England, in regard to life in surance, that in every case of intentional suicide, whatever may have been the mental condition, the policy becomes void; [1905] I K. B. 31 ; 5 Mann. & G. 639. In I F. F. 22, the court charged the jury the question was, did the assured know he was throwing himself out of the window. If he did, no recovery could be had under the policy. Oth erwise, if he did not. Such appears to be the rule in Ohio, Maryland, and Massachu setts ; Knickerbocker L. Ins. Co. v. Peters, 42 Md. 414 ; Cooper v. Ins. Co., 102 Mass. 227, 3 Am. Rep. 451; and, it is said, in Ger many, Holland, and France; 6 Ins. L. J. 719;
May, Ins. § 312.
When the question then came before the United States supreme court in Life Ins. Co. Y. Terry, 15 Wall. 580, 21 L. Ed. 236, it held that the assured must have acted under the control of such reasoning faculties as to be able to understand the moral character, general nature and consequences of his act, and this doctrine was frequently reaffirmed in that court and followed in state courts ; Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Akens, 150 U. S. 468, 14 Sup. Ct. 155, 37 L. Ed. 1148 ; Blackstone v. Ins. Co., 74 Mich. 592, 42 N. W. 156, 3 L. R. A. 486; New Home L. Ass'n v. Hagler, 29 Ill. App. 437; Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Groom, 86 Pa. 92, 27 Am. Rep. 689; Newton v. Ins. Co., 76 N. Y. 426, 32 Am. Rep. 335. Where the insurance is for the benefit of a third person, suicide is never a defense unless expressly made so by the contract; Fitch v. Ins. Co., 59 N. Y. 573, 17 Am. Rep. 372; Kerr v. Ben. As'n, 39 Minn. 174, 39 N. W. 312, 12 Am. St. Rep. 631; unless the policy is fraudulently taken out for the purpose of providing for the fam ily and creditors of the insured ; Smith v.
Ben. Soc., 51 Hun (N. Y.) 575, 4 N. Y. Supp. 521. The trend of the decisions as stated led to an effort by the life insurance com panies to evade them by making the excep tion "suicide, sane or insane," and this was held to prevent a recovery ; Bigelow v. Ins. Co., 93 U. S. 284, 23 L. Ed. 918; Pierce v. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 389 ; Streeter v. Acc. Soc., 65 Mich. 199, 31 N. W. 779, 8 Am. St. Rep. 882 ; Scarth v. Mut. L. Soc., 75 Ia. 346, 39 N. W. 658; Adkins v. Ins. Co., 70 'Mo. 27, 35 Am. Rep. 410; and the same has been held with reference to a provision in a pol icy against suicide, "felonious or otherwise, sane or insane ;" Scarth v. Mut. L. Soc., 75 Ia. 346, 39 N. W. 658; by his "own act or intention, whether sane or insane ;" Adkins v. Ins. Co., 70 Mo. 27, 35 Am. Rep. 410; or "die by his own hand, sane or insane ;" Streeter v. Ace. Soc., 65 Mich. 199, 31 N. W. 779, ,8 Am. St. Rep. 882; or "shall die by his own band or act, sane or insane ;" De Gogor za v. Ins. Co., 65 N. Y. 233 ; but death by the suicide of the insured, although insane, is not "death by his own hand," whereby the policy is to be void in that event ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. I.eubrie, 71 Fed. 843, 18 C. C. A. 332, 38 U. S. App. 37; and the provision in a policy that if the in sured shall "die by his own hand while in sane," the insurer shall pay the amount of the premiums and interest, applies only in case the self-destruction is intentional ; but where the insured killed himself while inca pable of knowing the effect of his act, the whole amount of the policy can be recovered; Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Daviess' Ex'r, 87 Ky. 541, 9 S. W. 812 ; or if death is acci dental; Keels v. Life Ass'n, 29 Fed. 198.