Though, for the reasons stated, the subil ject of tacking as to mortgages or liens is not a very practical one in this country, the term is used in a number of other connections, as of possessions, disabilities, or items in ac counts or other dealings. In these several cases the purpose of the proposed tacking is to avoid the bar of a statute of limitations.
Tacking Successive PO8868820128. On the issue of adverse possession, the various hold ings of the different claimants in the chain of title may be added together; Frost v. Courtis, 172 Mass. 401, 52 N. E. 515 ; La,ntry v. Wolff, 49 Neb. 374, 68 N. W. 494; and so may successive possessions of different ten ants in common ; Woodruff v. Roysden, 105 Tenn. 491, 58 S. W. 1066, 80 Am. St. 905; or that of father-in-law followed by son-in law; St. Louis v. Keitley, 29 Mo. 593, note. The possessions may be tacked: Of grantor and grantee; Harris v. McGovern, 99 U. S. 161, 25 L. Ed. 317; (but not if the grantor, have no color of title; Morrison v. Craven, 120 N. C. 327, 26 S. E. 940) ; of decedent and his heirs and representatives; Wickes v. Wickes, 98 Md. 307, 56 Atl. 1017; Brucke v. Hubbard, 74 S. C. 144, 54 S. E. 249; the possession of the tenant of premises which were occupied under adverse possession and which he after wards purchased, and that of a tenant had been in possession prior to and during his occupancy and who attorned to him and paid him rent; Houston v. Finnigan (Tex.) 85 S. W. 470.
To permit of such tacking there must be privity of estate; Zweibel v. Myers, 69 Neb. 294, 95 N. W. 597; Jarrett v. Stevens, 36 W. Va. 445, 15 S. E. 177; they must be connect ed through the chain of title; Murray v. Pan nari, 67 N. J. Eq. 724, 57 Atl. 1132; John ston v. Case, 131 N. C. 491, 42 S. B. 957. To constitute continuous adverse possession by tacking that of successive owners, the privity of estate may rest on a conveyance, parol agreement or understanding ; Kepley v. Scul ly, 185 Ill. 52, 57 N. E. 187 ; by operation of law, by descent, or voluntary or involuntary transfers from one to another; Nelson v. Trigg, 72 Tenn. (4 Lea) 701; but they must be directly connected. Interrupted and dis continuous periods of possession cannot be tacked together, so as to ripen into a title; Clark v. White, 120 Ga. 957, 48 S. E. 357; and where several persons enter upon land in succession, the several possessions cannot be tacked together so as to make a continuity of possession under the law of adverse title, un less there is privity of estate, or the several titles are connected"; Low v. Schaffer, 24 Or. 239, 33 Pac. 678. The possession of the as signee of a dower terminates with the death of the dowress and cannot be added to the subsequent possession of her grantee to en able the latter to set up title by adverse pos session against the remainderman; Beaty v.
Clymer, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 322, 75 S. W. 540. Under a statute providing that no estate in lands other than leases for a year or less shall be granted except by operation of law or deed in writing, successive possessions may be tacked so as to make up a continuous adverse possession barring recovery without anything more than a parol sale and transfer from one possessor to another; Illinois Steel Co. v. Budzisz, 106 Wis. 499, 81 N. W. 1027, 82 N. W. 534, 48 L. R. A. 830, 80 Am. St. Rep. 54. As against a mere intruder show ing no title, the possession of the ancestor of a plaintiff in ejectment and that of the an cestor's tenants may be tacked together to perfect a title by adverse possession; Beam v. Gardner, 18 Pa. Super. Ct. 245, where plain tiff was purchasing the title of the heirs. The grantee of mortgaged premises may add to the time of limitation in his favor that which had run in favor of his grantors in order to make up the aggregate re quired to bar the action to foreclose ; Paine v. Dodds, 14 N. D. 189, 103 N. W. 931, 116 Am. St. 674.
Tacking Disabilities. One disability can not be tacked to another to avoid the opera tion of the statute of limitations ; Davis v. Coblens, 174 U. S. 719, 19 Sup. Ct. 832, 43 L. Ed. 1147; as coverture to infancy; Knippen berg v. Morris, 80 Ind. 540; Eager v. Com., 4 Mass. 182; Franklin v. Cunningham, 187 Mo. 184, 86 S. W. 79 ; Elcan v. Childress, 40 Tex. Civ. App.'193, 89 S. W. 84; or infancy to cov erture; Caperton v. Gregory, 11 Grat. (Va.) 505 ; Lamberida v. Barnum (Tex.) 90 S. W. 698; or lunacy to infancy ; Sharp v. Steph ens' Committee, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 687, 52 S.M. 977.
Tacking Items in Accounts for Services or Goods Sold and Delivered. This will not be permitted where such items are separated by a material lapse of time. The accounts must be practically continuous. Where payment is claimed for personal service for two periods separated by a break of some years, the for mer period, being barred, cannot be tacked on to the latter as items in a mutual account current, and there is no liability unless the proof shows that at the beginning of the second period there was an express contract to pay for past as well as future services ; Graham v. Stanton, 177 Mass. 321, 58 N. E. 1023; and where a married woman lived on her own farm, which her husband operated and supported the family, and she bought goods prior to 1888 on open account, and the husband purchased seed in 1894, and in the interval barbed wire, giving notes, which were paid, each of the latter purchases was an independent transaction, which could not be tacked to the old account, so as to take that out of the statute of limitations; Moore v. Blackman, 109 Wis. 528, 85 N. W. 429.