THE FEDERAL CASES. 1. Place of making governs; Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n v. Jeffords, 107 Fed. 402, 46 C. C. A. 377, 53 L. R. A. 193; Robinson v. Brick Co., 127 Fed. 804, 62 C. C. A. 484; thus the place of making is adopted as opposed to the law of the domicil of the parties; Northwestern S. S. Co. v. Ins. Co., 161 Fed. 166; or to the place from which the offer is sent ; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States v. Trimble, 83 Fed. 85, 27 C. C. A. 404 ; or to the place where a document is signed; prior to its taking effect elsewhere as an obligation; Phipps v. Harding, 70 Fed. 468, 17 C. C. A. 203, 30 L. R. A. 513.
2. In a small number of cases, it has been held that the law of the place of perform ance governs the validity of the contract ; Smith v. Ins. Co., 5 Fed. 582 ; Pacific States Savings, Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Green, 123 Fed. 43, 59 C. C. A. 167; Berry v. Chase, 146 Fed. 625, 77 C. C. A. 161; but where there is more than one place of performance, it has been held that the parties ex necessitate must be referred to the law of the place of making; Morgan v. R. Co., 2 Woods 244, Fed. Cas. No. 9,804. , 3. The place by the law of which the con tract is valid: In usury cases it has often been held that, if the place of performance would hold an agreement void for usury, the law of the place of making may be resorted to for making the contract valid ; Sturdi vant v. Bank, 60 Fed. 730, 9 C. C. A. 256; Andruss v. Saving Ass'n, 94 Fed. 575, 36 C. C. A. 336; Dygert v. Trust Co., 94 Fed. 913, 37 C. C. A. 389.
4. Place intended by the parties: In some cases the court seeks to find the intention of the parties, and governs the contract by that ; Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 253 ; Gibson v. Ins. Co., 77 Fed. 561. This is the rule most commonly laid down in the usury cases, where the parties are pre sumed to intend the law of the place of making or of the place of performance, ac cording to which would make the contract valid ; Cromwell v. Sac County, 96 U. S. 51, 24.L. Ed. 681; Matthews v. Murchison, 17 Fed. 760; so in other than usury cases; Hub bard v. Bank, 72 Fed. 234, 18 C. C. A. 525 ; but where both laws would make the agree ment usurious, the intention of the parties is allowed no weight, and the law of the place of making governs ; Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 65, 10 L. Ed. 61; Heath v. Gris- • wold, 5 Fed. 573, 18 Blatch. 555. The law of the place of making is presumed, in some cases, to be that intended by the parties; Liverpool & G. W. S. Co. v. Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 9 Sup. Ct. 469, 32 L. Ed. 788 ; Mu tual Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 179 U. S. 262, 21 Sup. Ct. 106, 45 L. Ed. 181; The Majestic, 60 Fed. 624, 9 C. C. A. 161, 23 L. R. A. 746 ; in a few other cases, the law of the place of performance is presumed to be that intended by the parties ; Hall v. Cordell, 142 1J. S. 116, 12 Sup. Ct. 154, 35 L. Ed. 956 ; Johnson v. Norton Co., 159 Fed. 361, 86 C. C. A. 361. When the parties expressly agree that the contract shall be subject to a certain law, it has been intimated, though never expressly decided by the Supreme Court, that the court will give effect to this intention ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U. S. 551, 24 Sup. Ct. 538, 48 L. Ed. 788; but no such stipula tion will be given effect where it is regarded as against public policy ; Lewisohn v. Steam ship Co., 56 Fed. 602 ; Botany Worsted Mills v. Knott, 76 Fed. 582 ; or where the parties would thereby avoid the provisions of a stat ute of the place of making ; Fowler v. Trust
Co., 141 U. S. 384, 12 Sup. Ct. 1, 35 L. Ed. 786; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hathaway, 106 Fed. 815, 45 C. C. A. 655 ; Albro v. Ins. Co., 119 Fed. 629 ; but a legislative enactment which declares a public policy and prohib its its violation has, to some extent, an ex tra-territorial effect ; thus, a prohibition in a decree of divorce against the re-marriage of the guilty party during the lifetime of the other has, in general, no extra-territorial effect ; Dimpfel v. Wilson, 107 Md. 329, 68 Atl. 561, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1180, 15 Ann. Cas. 753 ; Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18, 40 Am. Rep. 505 ; Thorp v. Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602, 43 Am. Rep. 189; Moore v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 521, 44 Am. Rep. 408 ; yet where a statute forbids such remarriage within a specified time, and the persons go to another state for the express purpose of evading the law of their domicil, contract a marriage in such state, valid under its laws, and return to the state of their domicil, such marriage will there be held invalid as against public policy and good morals ; Lanham v. Lanham, 136 Wis. 360, 117 N. W. 787, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 804, 128 Am. St. Rep. 1085 ; and where the state statutes prohibit the guilty party in a divorce granted for adultery from mar rying the co-respondent, during the lifetime of the innocent spouse, a marriage in anoth er state, valid according to its laws, will not be recognized in the state declaring such a marriage to be against its public policy and good morals; Peunegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 244, 10 S. W. 305, 2 L. R. A. 703, 10 Am. St. Rep. 648; Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 39 Atl. 16, 39 L. R. A. 539, 63 Am. St. Rep. 776 ; so where a statute prohibited the marriage of uegroes and white persons, such a marriage, when made outside of the state and valid where performed, was held void in the state enacting it ; Dupre v. Boulard's Ex'r, 10. La. Ann. 411; Kinney v. Corn., 30 Gratt. (Va.) 858, 32 Am. Rep. 690 ; so where an English statute provided that a marriage with a de ceased wife's sister should be invalid, a mar riage made outside of England, and lawful where it was celebrated, was held void in England ; 9 H. L. Cas. 193 ; so where there was statutory prohibition of the marriage of first cousins, such a marriage was held void where the parties contracted a valid mar riage elsewhere and returned to the state prohibiting it; Johnson v. Johnson, 57 Wash. 89, 106 Pac. 500, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 179.
A like provision in the Civil Code of South Dakota was held not to warrant the annul ment of a marriage contracted in California between first cousins who at the time of the marriage were citizens of California ; Garcia v. Garcia, 25 S. D. 645, 127 N. W. 586, Ann. Cas. 19120, 621.
A statute declared that re-marriage by one of the parties to a divorce within a given time, either within or without the state, should be void ; after a divorce within the state, one of the parties within the prohibit ed time went to a foreign country and there acquired a domicil and contracted a mar riage valid by its laws ; six years after she returned to the state, where she was di vorced and married again. On a prosecution for bigamy, her foreign marriage was held valid ; State v. Fenn, 47 Wash. 561, 92 Pac. 417, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 800, on the ground that her domicil was at the time in such for eign country.