THE POSITION AND RIGHTS OF THE WIFE. At Common Law. Her property rights were put by the marriage very much under the control of the husband. He could manage his own affairs in his own way, buy and sell all kinds of personal property, without her control, and he might buy any real estate he might deem proper ; but, as the wife acquired a right in the latter, he could not sell it, discharged of her dower, except by her consent, expressed in the manner pre scribed by the laws of the state where such lands lay. Her personal property in posses sion was vested in him, and he could dis pose of it as if he had acquired it; this arose •from the principle that they were considered one person in law ; 2 Bla. Cora. 433 ; Jaffrey v. McGough, 83 Ala. 202, 3 South. 594; and he was entitled to all her property in action, provided he reduced it to possession during her life ; 2 Bla. Com. 434. If the wife died before the claims were col lected, the husband received them as her ad ministrator, in which case, after payment of her debts, the surplus belonged to him ab solutely. He was also entitled to her chat tels real, but these vested in him not abso lutely, but sub modo: as, in the case of a lease for years, the husband was entitled to receive the rents and profits of it, and could, if he pleased, sell, surrender, or dispose of it during the coverture, and it was liable to be taken in execution for his debts; and, if he survived her, it was to all intents and purposes his own. In case his wife survived him, it was considered as if it had never been transferred from her, and it belonged to her alone. In his wife's freehold estate he had a life estate during the joint lives of himself and wife ; and when he had a child by her who could inherit, he had an estate by the curtesy. See CURTESY. She was en titled, on. his death, to dower in all the real estate of which he was seised at any time during coverture. See DOWER.
At common law a married woman could not bind herself by contract, express or im plied, by parol or under seal, even for neces saries, nor, though living apart from her husband, could she make a binding contract except for necessaries or for the benefit of her separate estate; Farrand v. Beshoar, 9
Col. 291, 12 Pac. 196; and a contract made by her being invalid would be no considera tion for a subsequent promise during widow hood ; Condon v. Barr, 49 N. J. L. 53, 6 Atl. 614. Her husband might be bound by her acts as his agent, duly authorized; 4 Man. & G. 253 ; but where payment to her was pleaded, her authority must be stated ; 2 id. 173. By her own act her authority could not be enlarged; Bank of America v. Banks, 101 U. S. 240, 25 L. Ed. 850 ; and she could not execute a conveyance, even in re lease of dower, otherwise than by joining with her husband in a deed to a third per son; Tompkins v. Fonda, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 448. No promise of a wife could at common law be enforced against her unless she had a separate estate, and then not by a per sonal decree but only by treating it as an appointment out of such estate ; Condon v. Barr, 49. N. J. L. 53, 6 Atl. 614 ; and then only for her or its benefit; Stowell & Heinz v. Grider, 48 Ark. 220, 2 S. W. 786 ; and no implied promise could be raised against her; Southworth v. Kimball, 58 Vt. 337, 2 Atl. 120.
In the absence of an enabling act the contracts of a married woman are cogniz able only in equity, and cannot be enforced at law, except as affected by the so-called Married Women's Acts ; Mueller v. Wiese, 95 Wis. 381, 70 N. W. 485. The right to con tract conferred by these acts has been held to give her not a general contractual capaci ty, but only ability to make such contracts as have direct relation to the improvement of her separate property ; Reed v. Buys, 44 Mich. 80, 6 N. W. 111; and her property must not merely be incidentally benefited, but there must be a direct relation between it and the contract ; Russel v. Bank, 39 Mich. 671, 33 Am. Rep. 444. Such is the general construction of such statutes destroying the common-law rights of the husband in his wife's property; Canal Bank v. Partee, 99 U. S. 325, 25 L. Ed. 390; Huyler's Hers v. Atwood, 26 N. J. Eq. 504; State v. Dredden, 1 Marvel (Del.) 522, 41 Atl. 925; that, as a general rule, her contracts are binding when necessary or convenient to the use and en joyment of her separate estate; Todd v. Lee, 15 Wis. 365, 380.