Delirium, from disease or This, while the paroxysm continues to such an ex tent as to deprive a person of the right ex ercise of reason, is a sufficient impediment to the execution of a will ; Tayl. Med. Jur. 626 ; 18 Ves. Ch. 12 ; 1 Ves. Sen. 19. See, also, Barrett v. Buxton, 2 Aik. (Vt.) 167, 16 Am. Dec. 691. But there is not the same presump tion of the continuance of this species of mental perversion, whether it proceed from the intoxication of stimulus or the delirium of fever, as in ordinary insanity ; Black v. Ellis, 3 Hill (S. C.) 68; Hix v. Whittemore, 4 Mete. (Mass.) 545. See DELIRIUM FEBRILE ; DELIRIUM TREMENS; DRUNKENNESS; DE MENTIA; IDIOT.
Fraud. If a person is induced by fraud or undue influence to make a will or legacy, such will or legacy is void ; 4 Ves. 802; 6 H. L. Cas. 2 ; Tyler v. Gardiner, 35 N. Y. 559 ; Grif fith v. Diffenderffer, 50 Md. 466, 480 ; 1 Redf. Wills 507-537. See UNDUE INFLUENCE.
The nature and character of the will are generally irrelevant; Jackson v. Jackson; 39 N. Y. 153 ; though unreasonable or unnatural provisions are evidence of mental defect ; Caldwell v. Anderson, 104 Pa. 199 ; Lainb v. Lamb, 105 Ind. 456, 5 N. E. 171; In re Bud long, 126 N. Y. 423, 27 N. E. 945.
When a testator has the legal capacity to make a will he has the legal right to make an unequal, unjust, or unreasonable will; Couch v. Eastham, 29 W. Va. 784, 3 S. E. 23; Snider v. 'Burks, 84 Ala.. 53, '4 South. 225. The fact that a will is unreasonable is not enough to render it invalid ; In re Spencer, 96 Cal. 448, 31 Pac. 453 ; but it tends to prove invalidity ; Appeal of Crandall, 63 Conn. 365, 28 Atl. 531, 38 Am. St. Rep. 375.
The burden of proof on the issue of testa mentary capaCity is upon those who contest the will; Leach v. Burr, 188 U. S. 510, 23
Sup. Ct. 393, 47 L. Ed. 567; In re Motz's Es tate, 136 Cal. 558, 69 Pac. 294 ; Entwistle v. Meikle, 180 Ill. 9, 54 N. E. 217; Smith v. Day, 2 Pennewill (Del.) 245, 45 Atl. 396; In re Burns' Will, 121 N. C. 336, 28 S. E. 519 ; a person of full age is presumed to be capable of making a will; Steele v. Helm, 2 Marv. (Del.) 237, 43 Atl. 153 ; Hull v. Hull, 117 Ia. 738, 89 N. W. 979; but where unsoundness of mind is established, the burden of proving a sufficient disposing memory, when the will was executed, is on the defendant; Ken worthy v. Williams, 5 Ind. 375 ; when perma nent unsoundness of mind has been establish ed by the plaintiffs, it is presumed to con tinue until the contrary is shown, but the pre sumption is overcome when the evidence of defendants leaves the question evenly bal anced ; Roller v. Kling, 150 Ind. 159, 49 N. E. 948. The effect of the presumption in favor of sanity is merely to shift the duty of go ing forward with the evidence to the contes tants and not to change the burden of es tablishing the will. See 13 Harv. L. Rev, 510. Where insanity is in issue, the burden is on the proponent to show testamentary capacity ; but the presumption of sanity ob. tains until it is overcome by the contestant's evidence ; Hopkins v. Wampler, 108 Va. 705, 62 S. E. 926; Dobie v. Armstrong, 160 N. Y. 584, 55 N. E. 302.
See also, as to the burden of proof, 36 Cent. L. J. 408 ; Prentis v. Bates, 93 Mich. 234, 53 N. W. 153, 17 L. R. A. 494 ; Graybeal v. Gardner, 146 Ill. 337, 34 N. E. 528; Norton v. Paxton, 110 Mo. 456, 19 S. W. 807; Eastis v. Montgomery, 95 Ala. 486, 11 South. 204, 36 Am. St. Rep. 227.