TRESPASS. An unlawful act committed with, violence, actual or implied, causing in jury to the person, property, or relative rights of another.
Any unlawful act committed with vio lence, actual or implied, to the person, prop erty, or rights of another.
Any unauthorized entry upon the realty of another to the damage thereof.
The wanton and unnecessary destruction of the property of another in removing it where there is a right to do so, as, for example, in abating a nuisance or putting out of the way an obstruction, of a highway, constitutes a trespass ; Beardslee v. French, 7 Conn. 125, 18 Am. Dec. 86. "Throughout the Middle Ages, trespass is regarded as a crime ;" Mait land, 2 Sel. Essays Anglo Amer. Leg. Hist. 589.
In determining the nature of the act, neither the amount of violence or the intent with which it is offered, nor the extent of the damage accomplished or the purpose for which the act was committed, are of any importance :, since a person who enters upon the land of another without leave, to lead off his own runaway horse, and who breaks a blade of grass in so doing, commits a trespass ; Heermance v. Vernoy, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 5.
It is said that some damage must be .committed to make an act a trespass. It is undoubtedly true that damage is required to constitute a trespass for which an action will lie ; but, so far as the tort it self is concerned, it seems more than doubtful if the mere commission of an act affecting another, without legal authority, does not constitute trespass, though until damage is done the law will not regard it, inasmuch as the law does not regard trifles. See infra.
The distinction between the different classes of trespass is of importance in determining the na ture of the remedy.
A trespass committed with force is said to be done vi et omits; one committed by entry upon the realty, by breaking the close.
In Practice. A form of action which lies to recover damages for the injury sustained by the plaintiff, as the immediate consequence of some wrong done forcibly to his person or property, against the person committing the same.
The action of trespass, properly so called, is distinguished, from trespass on- the case, which is an action for injuries committed without force, and is usually termed simply case (q. v.). In states where common law forms of actions are still used, the distinction between trespass and trespass on the case is generally abolished by statute and a declara tion good for either is good for both. In other states, either action is known merely as an action of tort and in others as a civil ac tion.
• The action lies for injuries to the person of the plaintiff, as, by assault and battery, wounding, imprisonment, and the like ; Beech er v. Parmele, 9 Vt. 352, 31 Am. Dec. 633; Andre v. Johnson, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 375.
It lies, also, for forcible injuries to the person of another, whereby a direct injury is done to the plaintiff in regard to his rights as parent, master, etc.; Akerley v. Haines,
2 Caines (N. Y.) 292 ; Hornketh v. Barr, 8 S. & R. (Pa.) 36, 11 Am. Dec. 568. It does not lie for mere nonfeasance, nor where the matter affected was not tangible.
An action of trespass at common law will lie in a state court by the owner of one vessel against the owner of another for damages by fire at a wharf ; Chappell v. Bradshaw, 128 U. S. 132, 9 Sup. Ct. 40, 32 L. Ed. 369.
The action lies for injuries to personal property, which may be committed by the several acts unlawfully striking, chasing if alive, and carrying away to the damage of the plaintiff, a personal chattel ; 1 Wins. Saund. 84; of which another is the owner and in possession; Brainard v. Burton, 5 Vt. 97; and for the removal or injury of inanimate personal property; Robinson v. Mansfield, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 139 ; Betts v. Lee, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 348, 4 Am. Dec. 368; of which another has the possession, actual, or constructive ; Dan iels v. Pond, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 369, 32 Am. Dec. 269 ; Hoyt v. Gelston & Schenck, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 141; Dallam v. Fitler, 6 W. & S. (Pa.) 323 ; without the owner's assent. A naked possession or right to immediate possession is sufficient to support this action ; Carter v. Simpson, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 535 ; Hower v. Gee saman, 17 S. & R. (Pa.) 251; Whitney v. Ladd, 10 Vt. 165.
An action lies for an unintentional act of trespass, even if there is no malice ; Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 381, 10 Am. Dec. 224; but a man who accidentally shoots another, without negligence, is not liable in an action of trespass ; [1891] 1 Q. B. 86. See Wilson v. Live Stock Co., 153 U. S. 39, 14 Sup. Ct. 768, 38 L. Ed. 627; TRESPASSER.
The action lies also for injuries to the real ty consequent upon entering without right upon another man's land (breaking his close). The inclosure may be purely imaginary ; Dougherty v, Stepp, 18 N. C. 371; but reach es to the sky and to the centre of the earth; Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 381, 10 Am. Dec. 234.
Where the rightful owner of land, entitled to the immediate possession, attempts to re cover it, he is not liable in a civil action of trespass for assault upon a trespasser,- if he used no more force than was necessary for the expulsion of the intruder ; Souter v. Cod man, 14 R. I. 119, 5f Am. Rep. 364; Low v. Elwell, 121 Mass. 310, 23 Am. Rep. 272; Bristor v. Burr, 120 N. Y. 427, 24 N. E. 937, 8 L. R. A. 710; Walker v. Chanslor, 153 Cal. 118, 94 Pao. 606, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 455, and note, 126 Am. St. Rep. 61. But in such case, where the question of criminal liability is raised, it is held that the owner has no right to resort to force to regain his possession ; Corn. v. Haley, 4 Allen (Mass.) 318; State v. Bradbury, 67 Kan. 808, 74 Pat. 231; Terrell v. State, 37 Tex. 442 ; Hickey v. U. S., 168 Fed.