TURE ACTS.
In the United States, the admiralty courts discharge the duties both of a prize and an instance court (q. v.). The district courts are prize courts ; Glass v. The Betsey, 3 Dall. (U. S.) 6, 1 L. Ed. 485. And are given such jurisdiction by the Judicial Code, March 3, 1911, with a direct appeal to the supreme court.
On the breaking out of hostilities the dis trict court appoints commissioners, not ex ceeding three, to examine witnesses, etc., un der the direction of the court ; one shall be a retired naval officer, and at least one of the others shall be a member of the bar of the court; R. S. § 4621. For the practice see Bened. Adm. § 509-512; 1 Wheat. (U. S.) 494, note; 2 Wheat. (U. S.) 429, note; and as to the English practice, 2 Halleck, Int. L., Baker's ed. 421. Questions of booty may be referred to the admiralty by the crown; Knapp, P. C. 360.
If there is probable cause for the seizure of a vessel that is not a good prize, the cap tors may have their costs though the vessel is not condemned; Hooper v. U. S., 22 Ct. Cls. 408; they are not liable in damages; The Rover, 2 Gall. 240, 325, Fed. Cas. No. 12,091; but if a captor unreasonably delays bringing suit for condemnation, he is liable for demurrage if the court decrees a restora tion; U. S. v. The Nuestra Senora De Regla, 108 U. S. 92, 2 Sup. Ct. 287, 27 L. Ed. 662, where the United States was held liable for demurrage from the time when surrender might have been made, at the rate fixed by the charter party. A captor does not lose his right by delay in sending home a prize for adjudication, if he thinks it necessary and uses discretion and good faith; Jecker v. Montgomery, 18 flow. (U. S.) 110, 15 L. Ed. 311. It is the usual practice of the prize court to give freight to the neutral carrier of enemy's goods that are seized; 3 Phill. Int. L. 373. The burden of proof that the prize is neutral rests upon the claimant ; and if he fails to show it, condemnation en sues; 2 C. Rob. 77; he must clear himself of suspicion ; Hooper. v. U. S., 22 Ct. Cls. 408.
A prize court of the captors cannot sit in neutral territory, though it may in conquer ed territory, and in that of a co-belligerent; 2 Halleck, Int. L., Baker's ed. 401.
The decision of a prize court is conclusive against the subject of the state and as to the property in the subject-matter against all parties ; but unlawful condemnation may subject the state of the captors to demands for indemnity by a foreign state; id. 407. But courts of other nations may examine as to the jurisdiction of a prize court, and if a condemnation therein was not according to the rules of international law, may treat it as a nullity ; id. 411. Condemnations of
prize courts are final in actions between in dividuals, and as to the vessel condemned, giving purchasers a good title against all the world, but do not bind foreign nations, if wrongfully decreed; Cushing v. U. S., 22 Ct. Cls. 1.
There is a clearly marked distinction be tween proceedings for prize and forfeiture. "The libel for prize is founded upon the law of nations, and depends for proof upon the facts of her acts upon the high seas. The libel for forfeiture is for the violation of a municipal statute, and depends upon a set of facts and circumstances entirely different from that of piratical aggression. The of fences charged are separate and distinct, and the cause of action is in no wise the same." The City of Mexico, 28 Fed. 150. In the case of The Hata, It was said that "when a ship is libelled for prize, and the facts fail to sustain the libel, but make out a strong prima facie case of a statutory forfeiture, it would be the duty of the court to remand the case for a new libel ; but under no cir cumstances could a ship be libelled for one offence, and have a decree entered against it for another distinct and separate offence." The Itata, 56 Fed. 505, 515, 5 C. C. A. 608.
The duties of prize courts are thus describ ed by Lord Stowell: "In forming my judgment, I trust that it has not for a moment escaped my anxious recollection what it is that the duty of my station calls for from me; namely, not to deliver occasional and shifting opinions to serve present purposes of particular national interests, but to administer, with indiffer ence, that justice which the Law of Nations holds out, without distinction, to independ ent States, some happening to be neutral, and some belligerent. The seat of judicial authority is, indeed, locally here, in the bel ligerent country, according to the known law and practice of nations; but the law itself has no locality. It is the duty of the person who sits here, to determine this question ex actly as he would determine the same ques tion, if sitting at Stockholm; to assert no pretensions on the part of Great Britain which he would not allow to Sweden in the same circumstances; and to impose no duties on Sweden, as a neutral country, which he would not admit to belong to Great Britain in the same character." 1 C. Rob. 340.