What constitutes a duty on exports or imports has been a matter of frequent litigation in the supreme court. It has been finally decided that the term "import" as used in the constitution does not refer to articles imported from one state to another, but only to articles imported from foreign states ; Wood ruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 123, 19 L. Ed. 382 ; but the prohibition contained in those provisions of the constitution which ordain that congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign na tions and among the several states ; that no state shall levy any imposts or duties on imports or ex ports ; that the citizens of each state shall be en titled to all the immunities and privileges of citi zens of the several states, have been construed to gether by the supreme court ; and various statutes of the different states have been declared unconsti tutional because they violated them. Thus a stat ute allowing an additional fee to port-wardens for every vessel entering a port'; Southern S. S. Co. v. Port-Wardens, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 31, 18 L. Ed. 749 ; a tax on passengers introduced from foreign coun tries ; Smith v. Turner, 7 How. (U. S.) 286, 12 L. Ed. 702; a tax on passengers going out of a state ; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 35, 18 L. Ed. 745; a tax levied upon freight brought into or through one state into another ; State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 232, 21 L. Ed. 146; a tonnage tax on vessels entering the harbors of a state, ei ther from foreign or domestic ports ; State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 204, 20 L. Ed. 370; Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 581, 22 L. Ed. 201 ; Can non v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 577, 22 L. Ed. 417 ; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434, 25 L. Ed. 743 ; have all been so decided. It is said that wherever subjects, in regard to which a power to regulate' commerce is asserted, are in their nature national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regula tion, they are exclusively within the regulating con trol of congress. But the mere grant of the com mercial power to congress does not forbid the states from passing laws to regulate pilotage. The power to regulate commerce includes various subjects, up on which there should be some uniform rule, and upon others different rules in different localities. The power is exclusive in congress in the former, but not so in the latter class ; Achison v. Huddle son, 12 How. (U. S.) 297, 13 L. Ed. 993. See COM MERCE.
Whatever these restrictions are, they operate on all states alike, and if any state laws violate them,. the laws are void ; and without any legislation of congress the supreme court has declared them so ; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 122, 4 L. Ed. 529 ; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 4 L. Ed. 629; cases supra; Cooley, Const. Lim. 729.
The United States have certain powers, the prin cipal of which are enumerated in art. 1, § 8, running into seventeen specific powers. Others are granted to particular branches of the government: as, the treaty-making power to the president and senate. These have an equal effect in all the states, and so far as an authority is vested in the government of the Union or in any department of it, and so far as the states are prohibited from the exercise of cer tain powers, so far in our domestic affairs we are a unity.
The United States is a sovereign and independent nation vested with the entire control of internation al relations, and with all the powers of government necessary to maintain that control and make it ef fective ; Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 698, 13 Sup. Ct. 1016, 37 L. Ed. 905 ; and see Chae Chan Ping v. IL S., 130 U. S. 606, 9 Sup. Ct. 623, 32 L. Ed. 1068.
Within these granted powers the sovereignty of the United States is supreme. The constitution, and
the laws made in pursuance of it, and all treaties, are the supreme law of the land. Art. 6. And they not only govern in their words, but in their mean ing. If the sense is ambiguous or doubtful, the United States, through their courts, in all cases where the rights of an individual are concerned, are the rightful expositors. For without the au thority of explaining this meaning, the United States would not be sovereign.
In these matters, particularly in the limitation put on the sovereignty of the states, it has been sometimes said that the constitution executes itself. This expression may be allowed ; but with as much propriety these may be said to be laws which the people have enacted themselves, and no laws of congress can either take from, add to, or confirm them. They are rights, privileges, ar immunities which are granted by the people, and are beyond the power of congress or state legislatures ; and they require no law to give them force or efficiency. The members of congress are exempted from arrest, except for treason, felony, and breach of the peace, in going to and returning from the seat of govern ment. Art. 1, § 6. It is obvious that no law can affect this immunity. On these subjects all laws are purely nugatory, because if they ga beyond or fall short of the provisions of the constitution, that may always be appealed to. An individual has just what that gives hlm,—no less and no more. It may be laid down as a universal rule, admitting of no ex ception, that when the constitution has established a. disability or Immunity, a privilege or a right, these are precisely ae that instrument has fixed them, and can be neither augmented nor curtailed by any act or law either of congress or a state legis lature.
It has been justly thought a matter of importance to determine from what source the United States derive their authority. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 402, 4 L. Ed. 579. When the consti tution was framed, the people of this country were not an unformed mass of individuals. They were united into regular communities under state govern nients, and to these had confided the whole mass of sovereign power which they chose to intrust out of their own hands. The question here proposed is whether our bond of union is a compact entered in to by the states, or the constitution is an organic law established by the people. To this question the preamble gives a decisive answer: We, the people, ordain and establish this constitution. The mem ibers of the convention which formed it were indeed appointed by the states. But the government of the had only a delegated power, and, if they had au inclination, had no authority to transfer the allegiance of the people from one sovereign to an other. The great men who formed the constitution were sensible of this want of. power, and recom mended it to the people themselves. They assembled in their own conventions and adopted it, acting in their original capacity as individuals, and not as representing states. The state governments are passed by in silence. They had no part in making it, and, though they have certain duties to perform, as, the appointment of senators [now by popular vote under the 17t• amendment], are properly not parties to it. The people in their capacity as sover eign made and adopted it ; and it binds the state .gevermente without their consent. The United States as a whole, therefore, emanates from the peo ple, and not from the states, and the constitution and laws of the states, whether made before or since the adoption of that of the United States, are suhor dlnate to it and the laws made in pursuance of it. See Fisher, Evolution of Const.