Territory conquered during a war is part of the domain of the conqueror for all com mercial and belligerent purposes, so long as he continues in possession ; Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 9 Cra. 191, 3 L. Ed. 701; but it is not incorporated into the domain of the conqueror except by a treaty of peace under which the former owner renounces it, or by long possession ; U. S. v. Hayward, 2 Gall. 485, Fed. Cas. No. 15,336.
It is a general practice to permit alien residents to remain in the country during a war and to protect their property from sei zure, or, if they return to their own state, to allow them to take it with them. Even property of the enemy found afloat in ports at the breaking out of the war is usually allowed safe conduct to a home port with time to finish loading cargo. The president's proclamation of April 26, 1898, fixed April 21 as the beginning of the Spanish war, and gave Spanish merchant vessels found in United States ports till May 21, inclusive, to load and depart with safe conduct to their destination, except vessels carrying military or naval officers, or coal in excess of their own needs, or contraband, or despatches ; and permitted any such vessels which, prior to April 21, had sailed from any foreign port to any United States port, to reach their des tination, unload, and return to any port not blockaded.
Congress, in a resolution approved by the President on April 20, 1898, declared that the people of Cuba and of right, ought to be, free and independent. Diploffiatic re lations were terminated on the same day. On April 22, a blockade of a part of the Cuban coast was instituted. On April 23, the queen of Spain, and on the 26th, the president, declared war. See The Pedro, 175 U. S. 354, 20 Sup. Ct. 138, 44 L. Ed. 195. Congress declared on April 25 that a state of war had existed from and after April 21. Id. See, also, The Rita, 87 Fed. 925.
The Boxer uprising in China in June, 1900, constituted a state of war within the 58th Article of War ; Hamilton v. McClaughry, 136 Fed. 445.
War suspends all commercial intercourse between the citizens of belligerent states, except so far as may be allowed by the sovereign authority. The only exceptions are contracts for ransom and other matters of absolute necessity and the payment of debts to an agent of an alien enemy where such agent resides in the same state with the debtor ; but even such payments to an agent of an alien enemy must not be done with a view of transmitting the funds to the principal during the continuance of war ; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 95 U. S. 429,
24 L. Ed. 453.
The doctrine of the renewal of contracts suspended by a war Is based on considera tions of equity and justice and cannot be invoked to revive a contract which it would be inequitable to revive, as where time is of the essence of the contract or the parties cannot be made equal ; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U. S. 24, 23 L. Ed. 789. In a learned opinion by Gray, J, in Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Mass. 572, 97 Am. Dec. 124, 1 Am. Rep. 142 (quoted with approval in New York L. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 95 U. S. 429, 24 L. Ed. 453, and 'Williams v. Paine, 169 U.
S. 72, 18 Sup. Ct. 279, 42 L. Ed. 658), it was said: "The result is, that the law of nations, as judicially declared, prohibits all inter course between citizens of the two bellig erents which is inconsistent with the state of war between their countries, and that this includes any act of voluntary submis sion to the enemy, or receiving his protec tion ; as well as any act or contract which tends to increase his resources; and every kind of trading or commercial dealing or intercourse, whether by transmission of money or goods, or orders for the delivery of either, between the two countries, di rectly or indirectly, or through the inter vention of third persons or partnerships, or by contracts in any form looking to or involving such transmission, or by insur ances upon trade with or by the enemy. Beyond the principle of these cases the pro hibition has not been carried by judicial decision. The more sweeping statements in the text-books are taken from the dicta which we have already examined, and in none of them is any other example given than those just mentioned. At this age of the world, when all the tendencies of the law of nations are to exempt individuals and private con tracts from injury or restraint in consequence of war between their governments, we are not disposed to declare such contracts un lawful as have not been heretofore adjudged to be inconsistent with a state of war." The trading or transmission of property or money which is prohibited by interna tional law during war, is from or to one of the countries at war. An alien enemy resid ing in this country may contract and sue as a citizen can ; Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Mass. 573, 97 Am. Dec. 124, 1 Am. Rep. 142. Where a creditor, though the subject of the enemy, remains in the country of the debtor, or has an agent there, payment to the creditor or his agent is not a violation of the duties imposed by a state of war upon the debtor ; id.