These legal remedies, however, are still so inadequate, as well to prevent future waste as to give redress for waste already committed, that they have in a great measure given way to the remedy by bill in equity, by which not only future waste, whether vol untary or permissive, will be prevented, but an account may be decreed and compensation given for past waste in the same proceeding; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. 179. Complainant in an ac tion for waste must either have actual pos session, or must show in himself an actual, valid, subsisting title; Walker v. Fox, 85 Tenn. 154, 2 S. W. 98.
A contingent remainderman may maintain an injunction to restrain waste by the life tenant ; University v. Tucker, 31 W. Va. 621, 8 S. E. 410.
An action on the case in the nature of waste, will lie by the holder of a mortgage on lands, against a purchaser from the mort gagor of the equity of redemption, for acts of waste committed with a knowledge that the value of the security will be injured thereby. This was a case of new impression (so stated in both courts) and was decided on general principles; Van Pelt v. McGraw, 4 N. Y. 110.
The reversioner need not wait until waste has actually been committed before filing his bill; for if he ascertains that the tenant is about to commit any act which would op erate as a permanent injury to the estate, or if he threatens or shows any intention to commit waste, the court will at once interfere and restrain him by injunction from doing so ; 18 Ves. Ch. 355; Douglass v. Wiggins, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 435; 1 Jac. & W. 653.
Sometimes a tenant, whether for life or for years, by the instrument creating his es tate holds his lands without impeachment of waste. This expression is equivalent to a
general permission to commit waste, and at common law would authorize him to cut tim ber, or open new mines and convert the prod uce to his own use ; Co. Litt. 220; 11 Co. 81 b; 15 Ves. 425. But equity puts a limited construction upon this clause, and only al lows a tenant those powers under it which a prudent tenant in fee would 'exercise, and will, therefore, restrain him from pulling down or dilapidating houses, destroying pleasure-houses, or prostrating trees planted for ornament or shelter; 2 Vern. 739; 6 Ves. 110.
As to remedy by writ of estrepement to prevent waste, see ESTREPAIENT ; Dickin son v. Nicholson, 2 Yeates (Pa.) 281; 3 Bla. Com. 226.
As to remedies in cases of fraud in commit ing waste, see Hov. Frauds 226.
In Forest Law. The destruction of vert by cutting down or lopping of trees, which might afterwards grow. Rawle, Exmoor Forest 29.
As used in a tariff act, it generally refers to remnants and by-products of small value that have not the quality or utility either of the finished product or of the raw material. Scrap does retain the name and quality; Pat ton v. U. S., 159 U. S. 503, 16 Sup. Ct. 89, 40 L. Ed. 233. Articles produced incidentally to the manufacture of other articles and which are themselves ready to be used for various purposes without further treatment are, un der the tariff laws, subject to the classifica tion as manufactures rather than as "waste" ; Shatlus v. U. S., 155 Fed. 213.