PECULIAR REMEDIES, AND THE MANNER OF ADMINISTERING THEM. Under this head are —specific performance of contracts; re-exe cution, reformation, rescission, and cancella tion of contracts or instruments ; restraint by injunction; bills quia tinwt; bills of peace; protection a party liable at law, but who has no interest, by bill of interplead er; election between two inconsistent legal rights ; conversion; priorities; tacking; marshalling of securities; application of purchase-money. (See these several titles.) In recent periods, the principles of the court of chancery have in many instances been acted on and recognized by the courts of law (as, for instance, in relation to mort gages, contribution, etc.) so far as the rules of the courts of law admitted of their intro duction.
In some states the entire jurisdiction has, by statute, been conferred upon the courts of law, who exercise it as a separate and distinct branch of their authority, upon the principles and according to the modes and forms previously adopted in chancery.
In a few, the jurisdictions of the courts of law and of equity have been amalga mated, and an entire system has been sub stituted, administered more according to the principles and modes and forms of equity than the principles and forms of the common law.
It is to be noted, however, that the equity system is not abolished or abridged by the changes in the courts which administer it, and it is held that the constitutional grant of equity powers to certain courts cannot be impaired by the legislature, so that acts re quiring the trial by jury of facts in chancery cases are unconstitutional; Brown v. Kala
mazoo Circuit Judge, 75 Mich. 274, 42 N. W. 827, 5 L. R. A. 226, 13 Am. St. Rep. 438; Callanan v. Judd, 23 Wis. 343. So, in an act requiring the court of chancery to direct an issue in suits to quiet title, a provision au thorizing that court to set aside a verdict and order a new trial is not unconstitutional as violating the division of powers between courts of equity and law ; Brady v. Realty Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 748, 64 Atl. 1078, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 866, 118 Am. St. Rep. 778. See an admirable discussion of this head of equi table jurisdiction in the opinion of Philips, J., in Big Six Development Co. v. Mitchell, 138 Fed. 286, 70 C. C. A. 569, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 332, affirmed in the Circuit Court of Ap peals in s. c. 138 Fed. 279, 70 C. C. A. 569, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 332 (with note), and cer tiorari denied in id., 199 U. S. 606, 26 Sup. Ct. 746, 50 L. Ed. 330.