FRODMORTEL, or FREOMORTEL. An immunity for committing manslaughter. Mon. Alla t. 1. 173.
F R 0 M. The legal effect of this word has been a fruitful subject of judicial discussion resulting in a great diversity of construction of the word as used with respect to both time and place. Many attempts have been made to lay down a general rule to whether it was to be treated as inclusive or exclusive of a terminus a quo, whether of time or place. Very long ago a critical writ er, after reviewing the cases up to that date, undertook to formulate such a rule thus : From, as well in strict grammatical sense, as in the ordinary import thereof, when re ferring to a certain point as a terminus a quo, always excludes that point ; though in vulgar acceptation it were capable of being taken indifferently, either inclusively or ex clusively, yet in law it has obtained a certain fixed import and is always taken as exclu sive of the terminus a quo. Powell, Powers 449. This conclusion states a rule applied in the majority of cases, and it was said that the prepositions "from," "until," "be tween," generally exclude the day to which they relate, but the general rule will yield to the intent of parties ; Kendall v. Kingsley, 120 Mass. 94. But the rule has not been un varying, and many courts have not hesitated to follow the views of Lord Mansfield, in Cowp. 714 (overruling his own decision of three years before, id. it is either exclusive or inclusive according to context and subject-matter, and the court will con strue it to effectuate the intent of parties and not to destroy it.
As to time, after an examination of au thorities, Washington, J., laid down what he considered the settled principles to be de duced from them : (1) When time is com puted from an act done, the day of its per formance is included; (2) when the words are from the date, if a present interest is to commence, the day is included, if it is a terminus from which to impute time the day is excluded ; Pearpoint v. Graham, 4 Wash. C. C. 240, Fed. Cas. No. 10,877 ; where the latter principle was applied to a lease, as it was also in Lord Raym. 84; and to a bond ; Lysle v. Williams, 15 S. & R. (Pa.) 135 ; and the first proposition has been laid down with reference to the words ."from and after the passage of this act;" Arnold v. U. S., 9 Cra. (U. S.) 104, 3 L. Ed. 671; U. S. v. Williams, 1 Paine 261, Fed. Cas. No. 16,723 ;
U. S. v. Arnold, 1 Gall. 348, Fed. Cas. No. 14,469; contra, Lorent v. Ins. Co., 1 Nott. & McC. (S. C.) 505. See U. S. v. Heth, 3 Cra. (U. S.) 399, 2 L. Ed. 479. From is generally held a word of exclusion ; Wilcox v. Wood, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 346; Oatman v. Walker, 33 Me. 67; Ordway v. Remington, 12 R. I. 319, 34 Am. Rep. 646 ; Atkins v. Sleeper, 7 Allen (Mass.) 487. But a promise made November 1st, 1811, and sued November 1st, 1817, was held barred by statute of limitation; Pres brey v. Williams, 15 Mass. 193. In many cases it is held to be either exclusive or in clusive according to the intention of the par ties; Deyo v. Bleakley, 24 Barb. (N: Y.) 9; Houser v. Reynolds, 2 N. C. 114, 1 Am. Dec. 551. Where an act was to be done in a given number of days from the time of the contract, the day on which the contract was made was included ; Brown v. Buzan, 24 Ind. 194 ; but if the contract merely says in so many days it means so many days from the day of date, and that is excluded; Blake v. Crowninshield, 9 N. H. 304. A fire policy from one. given date to another includes the last day ; whether the first is included was not decided ; L. R. 5 Exch. 296. In most cases when something is required to be done in a given time from the day on which an event has happened, that day is excluded, as in case of proving claims against the estate of a decedent or insolvent; Weeks v. Hull, 19 Conn. 376, 50 Am. Dec. 249 ; enrolling deeds, after execution ; Seawell v. Williams, 5 Hayw. (Tenn.) 283; appeal from arbitra tors, afterward ; Browne v. Browne, 3 S. & R. (Pa.) 496 ; issuing a scire facias to re vive a judgment, after entry; Appeal of Green, 6 W. & S. (Pa.) 327 ; the time an execution runs, after its date ; Homan v. Liswell, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 659; redemption from execution sale ;- id. 518 ; allowing ap peal from a justice; Ex parte Dean, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 605, 14 Am. Dec. 521. The principle is thus well expressed. When time is to be computed from a particular day or , a. par ticular event, as when an act is to be per formed within a specified period from or after a day named, that day is excluded and the last day included ; Sheets v. Selden, 2 Wall. (TI. S.) 177, 17 L. Ed. 822. But it was held that in considering the question of barring a writ of error, the day of the de cree is included; Chiles v. Smith's Heirs, 13 B. Monr. (Ky.) 460.