-THE DIPLOMACY OF FUEL.
It remained only to convince the Government and the French Parliament, and to realise by a diplomatic agree ment in due form this new manifestation of the Entente Cordiale. The political work was carried out at the same time as the financial manoeuvres, and Sir John Cadman and Lord Curzon proved themselves as skilful as Sir Marcus Samuel.
The question was to obtain authority from the Republic to exploit its oil wealth, by turning to account the superior equipment at their disposal, and by promising to reserve to it a right of preference over part of the British produc tion. The better to disguise the British nature of the enterprise, it was the Royal Dutch under its Dutch name, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij, which was chosen to make the proposal.
On 25th March, 1919, at the moment when at Versailles the economic clauses of the Treaty were being discussed, this company addressed to the Clemenceau Cabinet the following offer : The company declared itself " willing to co-operate with the plans of the French Government in whatever concerns the management and exploitation of the various oil interests which might be reserved to France as a consequence of the Peace Treaty." (This had special reference to the German concessions to be shared among the Allies.) It offered in exchange " to reserve to France, by priority, a part of its oil production in such a way as to ensure the continuity of supplies for her civil, military and maritime needs." And the delegate of the Royal Dutch, enlarging on his proposition, concluded : " In brief, the Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij is ready to put at the disposition of France all its world-wide technical, industrial, com mercial and financial organisation, not only in the countries referred to above, but also in all the other producing or consuming countries in which France might need its help, and in which the Koninklijke Maatschappij possesses direct industrial and financial interests." It was, therefore, the whole of the French resources they had in mind.
M. Clemenceau welcomed this proposal. A preliminary agreement was concluded in 1919 ; but it was necessary to get it ratified by Parliament.
Our representatives are not usually very well informed upon great international affairs ; the time they must waste in ministerial antechambers, on account of their con stituents, does not give them either much chance to study them, or the necessary independence to judge them. Nevertheless, the project met with some resistance in com mittee. In particular, uneasiness was aroused at the idea of ceding our colonial oil fields to a British trust, at the very moment when we were so seriously short of fuel, and when the British Government in the course of every negotiation threatened to refuse us coal.
To calm these anxieties it was laid down that in all our colonies, protectorates and zones of influence, French interests should participate to the extent of at least two thirds in the companies formed by the trust.
The Chambers were in this way persuaded—rather naïvely perhaps—that the control of these enterprises would remain in French hands.
A last obstacle still remained. It could not be doubted that the United States, when they became acquainted with the project, would display a lively displeasure at an agree ment which definitely excluded them from all the oil fields coming under French influence. Now our country is under no fewer obligations to America than to Britain ; our importers are constantly obliged to appeal to American credit ; and all the world knows that the German indemnity can be of very little use in relieving our budget unless it is capitalised by a great international loan, of which it is hoped that the United States will subscribe the greater part.
Were we not risking the alienation of an indispensable supporter ? In diplomatic circles some hesitation was manifested.
Mr. Lloyd George exerted himself to put an end to it. The Treaty of Versailles was worded in such a way that all the part of the booty which was immediately realisable was assigned to Britain, while France received advantages realisable in a more or less distant future. The British Foreign Office having taken the German Fleet and colonies had its hands free, while the Quai d'Orsay was still in need of its co-operation. Hence the incessant bargains in which we have been obliged each time to pay for British help : a percentage of the German indemnity, the price of coal from the Ruhr, etc.
The United States, through its own fault, remained out side the negotiations, and so left the field free for the British.
At San Remo, the destinies of Turkey were decided. France, to whom the Franco-British Agreement of 1916 had given a large sphere of influence from the Gulf of Alexandretta to Persia, found herself in a difficult position. Mustapha Kemal and the Turkish Nationalists had ex cluded her from Cilicia. The Emir Feisul was pushing the Senegalese battalions of General Gouraud towards the Syrian coast. This was a blow to our national prestige, all the more serious in that it meant that our financiers would lose control of the Beirut-Damascus and the Rayak-Aleppo railways, and the concessions as to ports which they had obtained in the time of the Turks. The strangest part of it all—and everybody knew it—was that the power of Emir Feisul depended upon the arms, the money and the support of our good friends, the British. Then Lord Curzon said, " Sign the agreement with the Royal Dutch, and you shall have Syria." M. Millerand accepted. Immediately, Feisul was left to himself. Thus the triumphal entry of General Gouraud into Damascus was paid for by the abandonment of all our oil resources.