-THE SAN REMO AGREEMENT.
This Agreement was published in Le Temps of 25th July.' A brief analysis, undertaken in the light of the facts which we have just exposed, will suffice to illustrate its general sense and scope.
To begin with, the first paragraph warns us that " this memorandum relates to the following States or countries : Rumania, Asia Minor, the territories of the old Russian Empire, Galicia, French colonies and British Crown colonies. The agreement may be extended to other countries by mutual consent." It is, therefore, not only the oil fields of Mesopotamia which are abandoned to the British trust—as they would have had us believe in the Chamber since the noisy debate on Mosul—it is, in fact, the whole of our oil interests, present and future, whether in the colonies or abroad.
(a) Rumania is the country in which French interests are the most important. They will be increased still more by the spoils of the Deutsche Bank and the Disconto Gesellschaft, whose oil concessions are to be shared among the Allies. It is agreed that for ex-enemy concessions, as for those which France will be able to obtain in the future from the Rumanian Government, Franco-British companies will be constituted, in which each of the two countries will have half the capital and half the votes on the board of directors.
This equality is not a favour, for the French capital invested in Rumanian oil is at least as important as that of Britain.
Furthermore, as the British trust, thanks to its personnel and to its special equipment, is alone in a position to begin exploitation, the part of our business men will be limited, as usual, to finding capital ; but, bound by the very nature of their companies, they will not be able to appeal to any other contractors than their British allies for the work of development. The Americans are thus rigidly excluded from that part of the Rumanian oil fields which may fall to the share of France ; and for Sir Marcus Samuel and his associates this is the essential point.
(b) In Russia, where French interests are much less important than those of our Allies, an equal distribution of votes and shares is not provided for ; this would have been to the advantage of our nationals. But it is stated that the two Governments will grant their " joint support " to those of their nationals who make " joint efforts " to obtain concessions, and to export and deliver oil. If, therefore, in all that vast field which constitutes the former Russian Empire, the French thought of associating them selves with Americans, our Government would be obliged to support their rivals.
(c) In Mesopotamia, the oil is to be exploited by a private company which " shall be under permanent British control " (and in which, consequently, America can have no part).
The French will be able to subscribe 25 per cent. of the
capital plus 71 per cent. of the part reserved for the natives, say, a third of the total capital, under which condition they will have a right to a quarter of the oil produced, delivered at the same price as to other associates.
In exchange, our Government will authorise the Anglo Persian Oil Company to establish, through our sphere of influence and in the ports of the Syrian coast, all the pipe lines, railways, reservoirs and refineries necessary to the work of development. It undertakes to place no transit or export dues upon this oil, and even the materials required in the constructive work will be exempt from all import duties and wayleaves. To put it in other words, we are treating the Anglo-Persian Oil Company as a privileged French concern, while at the same time undertaking the responsibility of guaranteeing, free of charge, the security of its enterprises in all our zone of influence. Obviously the expenses of General Gouraud's army of occupation are not mere waste from everybody's point of view.
Up to the present, only oil fields in foreign countries have been considered. France can only obtain them by diplo matic pressure, and evidently they will be the objects of bargaining.
(d) But those which are in our own territories, in lands conquered with difficulty, at the cost of our blood and treasure, ought surely to be reserved for our nationals alone. They are, nevertheless, included in the bargain. And what a bargain I " In the French colonies, protectorates, and zones of influence, including Algeria, Tunis and Morocco " (nothing is forgotten), the French Government will facilitate the acquisition of concessions to every Franco-British group " of good standing " and " furnishing the necessary guarantees." (Was it feared that an American group might camouflage itself as Franco-British ?) To calm our uneasiness, we were reminded that the French Parliament requires, in all these combinations, that French interests shall be represented in the proportion of at least 67 per cent.
In return, the British Government will accord the same advantages to French prospectors who may wish to work within the British Empire. But this favour is limited to the Crown colonies, and within these " to the territories of the Crown " ; 1 and, further, " in so far as existing regulations allow " ; and finally, " nothing in this agreement shall apply to concessions which may be the subject of negotiations initiated by French or British interests." With such restrictions one wonders, indeed, what would remain to the French prospectors if any such existed I This clause has evidently only been inserted for the sake of symmetry, and to give an appearance of " cordial co-operation and reciprocity " to an agreement in which all the real advantages are on one side.