ADMIRALTY. The department of State which regulates, controls, and maintains the Navy on behalf of the British Govern ment is the Admiralty. The term "Admiralty" is used- (to quote the old official definition) to mean "The Lord High Admiral for the time being . . . and when there shall be no such Lord High Admiral in office, any two or more of the Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral of the United King dom." Actually, the system whereby responsibility centred in a Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom was terminated in the reign of Henry VIII. and since then the office has been executed by a board, which, varying somewhat in its constituency, has been the forerunner of the Admiralty of to-day.
Before that time there was no recognized organization to supply the wants of the Navy, which were dealt with spasmodically as they arose. Then, with the increase in the strength of the Navy, it became more and more obvious that change was imperative. This brought about the formation of a board of principal officers, subordinate to the lord high admiral, whose duty it was to supply the needs of the fleet, and established the sound principle that political and executive control should be superior to, but separate from, administration. The new system also did much to relieve those responsible for the conduct of warlike operations from details of supplies, design, and so forth.
The political and executive authority passed at one time to the king and council and again to a parliamentary committee and yet again to a lord high admiral to the king, but finally it came to be vested in the Board of Admiralty, with whom it remained through out the great maritime wars from the end of the 17th century to the downfall of Napoleon. This authority, in practice, was not ex ercised in full by the board of principal officers or the navy board, whose energies were mainly devoted to the administration of supplies. In principle, the several commissioners were, from early days, intended to keep in direct and constant communication with the first lord and with each other, and also with the civil depart ments working under their control. James I. enjoined that the principal officers and commissioners of the Navy should be in constant communication among themselves, consulting and ad vising "by common counsel and argument of most voices" and live as near together as could conveniently be arranged, and should meet at the Navy office at least twice a week.
Originally there existed an ordnance board instituted specially for the Navy, but this eventually passed into military hands— very much to the detriment of the Navy's ordnance requirements. It was for long a byword in inefficiency and sloth. There is now a joint board with naval, military, and air force representatives to deal with design but not with supplies, which are the concern of the several departments.
In 1868 H. C. Eardley Childers, on becoming first lord, endeav oured to rectify the shortcomings of the system, but it cannot be said that his reforms were very successful, _since they resulted in the several lords being restricted more than ever to the business assigned to them, whereby board meetings became the exception rather than the rule and much passed into the unprofessional hands of the civil first lord. The disaster to the low freeboard masted turret-ship "Captain" brought matters to a head. Childers retired and was succeeded by Goschen in 1871.
The new first lord reverted to the principles of the original system, which made for more collective responsibility. We see the naval staff in embryo in a foreign intelligence committee, inaugu rated in 1884. This was developed into the intelligence committee in 1887. It was largely due to the efforts of Lord Charles Beres f ord that these committees came about and from then onwards the more enlightened sections of the Navy never ceased to press for the formation of a proper war staff.
In 1886 Lord Charles resigned from his appointment as fourth sea lord on the ground that the organization provided for an intelligence department and, for the conduct of war, was inade quate. Various changes in the responsibilities of the First Sea Lord were made by an Order-in-Council of 1904, one of the princi pal of these being that the senior naval lord was given virtual supremacy over all his colleagues. He was also given considerable responsibility connected with material.
In 1911 Mr. Churchill. as first lord, established a naval war staff. In theory this step was admirable, but in practice the staff was not given the necessary standing or authority in the machine. As a result, proper use was not made of its services dur ing the earlier years of the World War, especially in analysing and preparing plans before embarking upon such enterprises as the Dardanelles campaign. The individual influence of the most force ful personality on the board still dominated naval policy to the exclusion of proper staff work and even, on occasion, to considered and well-informed judgment.
In May 1917 we see a new development, whereby the First Sea Lord was made chief of the naval staff, and two naval members were added to the board, with titles of "deputy chief of the naval staff" and "assistant chief of the naval staff." For a short time there was also a third addition, with the title of "deputy first sea lord"; but responsibility continued to rest on all the members of the board.
As the war developed, it became more and more evident that those naval lords who were chiefly engaged in matters of adminis tration and supply could not, at the same time, devote adequate attention to the control of the naval side of the war. In point of fact, the position was that they were held responsible in matters with which it was humanly impossible for them to take any very active part. In the autumn of that year the naval staff system was put upon a new and altogether sounder basis and it was separated, so far as was practicable, from administration. Under the presi dency of the first lord two committees were formed—one (consist ing of the four staff lords) to deal with operations, and the other (consisting of the remaining sea lords and the civil lords) to deal with maintenance. The operations committee dealt with such matters as the provision, equipment, efficiency, organization, and utilisation of the Navy as a fighting force : the maintenance com mittee devoted their efforts to personnel, material, supplies, works, and the maintenance of the fleet generally, in accordance with the requirements of the operations committee. Questions of great importance were still referred to the board as a whole.
Under this system the first sea lord, as chief of the naval staff, was responsible for movements of ships, the general conduct of naval warfare, the fighting and sea-going efficiency of the fleet, and other matters connected with its active employment. The second sea lord remained chief of naval personnel; the third sea lord, as controller, continued to deal with material matters such as ship construction, design of guns, mountings, torpedoes, and machinery; the fourth sea lord was chief of supplies and trans port; the deputy chief of the naval staff was head of the opera tions, plans, intelligence, and trade divisions; the assistant chief of the naval staff was head of the gunnery, torpedo, training, and staff duties divisions, and the naval air and tactical sections. There continued to be a civil lord, a parliamentary and financial secre tary, and the permanent secretary to the board, and, at the head, the minister of State, the first lord.
This organization remained substantially the same after the war and may be said to meet well the peace-time requirements of the Navy, while it provides the essential personnel for the higher conduct of any future war at sea.