Air Co-Operation - Position at the End of the War

AIR CO-OPERATION - POSITION AT THE END OF THE WAR By the end of the War, the force, which by then had become the Royal Air Force, was organized in brigades, wings and squad In a war of any magnitude it is reasonable to assume that very large air forces will be employed on each side. These are likely to consist of squadrons of the following types and capabilities : (a) Army Co-operation.—Consisting of two-seater aeroplanes capable of staying in the air about three hours, fitted with either radio telephony, or wireless telegraphy, a camera and defensive equipment in the form of machine guns. Their first duty is to obtain information, and they should only fight when forced to do so. In the British Air Force, the pilot carries out all the obser vation work, the passenger being employed in looking out for enemy aircraft.

(b) Day Bombers.—Day-bombing aeroplanes will probably have a radius of action of about 2oom., and be capable of carry ing about 500 lb. of bombs ; they can also be fitted with wireless telegraphy and a camera for occasions when they are employed on reconnaissance duties.

(c) Night Bombers.—Multi-engined aeroplanes, which will be capable of carrying about one ton of bombs, with a radius of action of about 50o miles.

(d) Fighters.—Single-seaters, very fast, able to climb and manoeuvre very rapidly. They will be employed chiefly in fight ing enemy aircraft.

The organization of these squadrons would be in groups and wings since the group has now taken the place of the brigade. In stead of there being one army co-operation squadron per corps, there would normally be one army co-operation with each corps, composed of a number of army co-operation squadrons equal to the number of divisions in the corps. The actual number of army co-operation squadrons may, however, vary as the size of the force increases. Having shown the types of aircraft that the commander-in-chief of an army would have at his disposal, it is now proposed to discuss their employment in helping the military force to achieve its object. These duties will be examined under the following headings : reconnaissance, artillery, co-operation, offensive action and protection.

a military commander can formu late a definite plan for the defeat of his enemy, he must have ample information concerning him. He must know where the enemy has his main force, the line along which he is intending to develop his attack, the location of his reserve troops, and whether or no the enemy has troops working round his flanks. A military commander has several sources of information—from spies, from captured prisoners, reports coming through neutrals, and possibly captured orders. All these will give him a portion of the informa tion he wants, but even when he has pieced together all the evidence available from these sources, the real movements of the enemy will, in all probability, be a matter of conjecture, arrived at by drawing deductions from the incomplete informa tion available. The enemy is likely to secure the movements of his force by a screen of mobile troops. In the days before aero planes, a commander would seek to gain information concern ing the movement of the enemy's main forces by using his cavalry to penetrate this screen. The information so obtained might prove very costly in casualties, much of the information obtained would, in all probability never get back to the commander who required it, and would only reveal what was happening at certain points, where the screen had been penetrated. In other words, the military commander would still feel that he wanted to see what was really happening the other side of the hill. Having aeroplanes at his disposal enables him to accomplish this. His day bombing aeroplanes have the additional function of carrying out long distance reconnaissance. By this means he is able to direct his reconnaissance aircraft as far as Zoom. into enemy country, and from the information which they obtain, and from the in f ormation available from the other sources already mentioned, the military commander should be able to anticipate the plan of his enemy.

It must not, however, be supposed that these reconnaissance aeroplanes can be sent such a distance at a height from which it would be easy to see with the eye what was happening on the ground. They will carry out this duty singly, flying at about twenty thousand feet, and by far the greater proportion of their information will be obtained by taking photographs of the im portant points over which they pass. Consequently, the success of the reconnaissance will, to a great extent, depend on the ac curacy with which the military commander has chosen the places to be reconnoitred. By means of this long-distance reconnais sance, a military commander will be able to obtain his strategical information ; his subordinate commanders, however, will require much tactical information concerning the enemy's movements within som. of our own troops. Thus, a corps commander will want to know if the enemy is increasing the number of troops in his area, or if there are any signs of a withdrawal; early in formation of the presence of tanks is particularly important. Again, a divisional commander will require the fullest details of what is happening on his immediate front. He will want to know where the enemy has his reserves, where he is digging trenches, and details of his disposition.

This reconnaissance for corps and divisions will be carried out by the army co-operation squadrons. These squadrons are usually allotted to a corps on the basis of one per division in the corps. The squadrons in each corps are administered by a wing head quarters, which will be situated at corps headquarters, the wing commander acting as air adviser to the corps commander. If the war is one demanding the maximum effort, and a national army is produced, the allotment of army co-operation squadrons may be altered from a divisional to a corps basis. The reconnaissance for corps and divisions will be carried out at a much lower height than the strategical reconnaissance, and consequently much information will be obtained from the actual observation made by the pilot. It is obviously essential that it should be transmitted without delay to the military commander who has ordered the reconnaissance. For the reconnaissance carried out for corps, aeroplanes are fitted with wireless telegraphy. The messages are received at corps headquarters direct, and, if he wishes, the corps commander can also communicate with the aeroplane by this means. The aeroplanes carrying out reconnaissance for a division are in very intimate touch with the divisional commander, since they are equipped with radio telephony sets, which enable the pilot to telephone his reports direct to divisional headquarters, and also make it possible for the divisional commander to tele phone instructions to the pilot in the aeroplane. Besides this visual reconnaissance, these aeroplanes carrying out reconnais sance for corps and divisions take many photographs, from which the staffs of these formations can draw an accurate picture of the enemy's organization and disposition.

Artillery Co-operation.--An

important part of the work of the army co-operation squadron is co-operation with the artillery. The undulations of the ground often make it impossible for artil lery commanders either to find suitable targets to aim at, or to be able to range their guns on to important points, such as bridges and crossroads, which they may want to shell. Consequently, aeroplanes are employed to "spot" the positions of enemy bat teries. This is usually done by seeing the flash of the enemy guns when they fire, and then sending down their position by wire less. These reports are usually confirmed by photographs, which show clearly where the enemy batteries are. Other targets, such as bodies of troops or transport, are also reported to the artil lery. If the artillery commander wishes it, a pilot having "spotted" a target can range a battery on to it. This is effected by means of a simple code, the target being taken as the centre of a clock, twelve o'clock always being the north point. Imagin ary circles radiate outwards from the centre of the clock at distances of io, 25, 5o, roo, 2ooyd., etc. These circles are lettered, the corrections to the guns being sent down by sending the letter of the distance circle followed by the hour of the clock. "A" is the letter for the rooyd. circle. Thus, if the shell burst rooyd. due east of the target, the correction would be A.3. (i.e., rooyd. at 3 o'clock) . By this means our aeroplanes are able to tell the battery commander exactly where his shells are falling, it being his province to work out the actual corrections for the guns. To receive these messages, artillery brigades and batteries are equipped with wireless telegraphy receiving sets (see fig., p. 446).

Offensive Action.

The duties described above, which are performed by aircraft assisting the army, are confined to obtain ing information. A military commander will, however, have at his disposal bombing aeroplanes, which if directed on to suitable objectives, may have a far-reaching effect on the course of the campaign. Having gained information concerning the movement of his enemy's main forces, he will obviously try to hamper the enemy in the achievement of his plan, and the weapon with which he will be able to strike his enemy first, and nearest his vitals, is his bombing force. For the employment of this force, he has before him three main courses. He can direct it against his enemy's industrial areas, his communications, or his troops, if in a favourable situation to offer a target. He should select one of these objectives, and concentrate his whole strength on it, f or, to be effective, bombing must be concentrated and continuous. A military commander, by concentrating a big bombing f orce on to the enemy's industrial area, can reduce enormously their output of the munitions, clothing and food which are essential if their armies are to be maintained in an efficient fighting con dition. In choosing such a target as this, a military commander would have as his object the cumulative effect of the raids over a period probably lasting several months. The military com mander may want to produce some more immediate effect on the situation ; for instance to prevent reinforcements and supplies from reaching an area in which he intended to strike some de cisive blow. An effective way might be to create a block on a railway or a main road, and having created it, to maintain it by subsequent bombing raids at frequent intervals both day and night. As a general rule, the further back a line of communication can be blocked, the more extensive will be the area affected.

Situations will arise occasionally, when the employment of air craft to attack tactical targets is imperative. These occasions will occur at the most critical moments of the land campaign. For instance, if one's own army were retreating, all available bombers, and possibly fighters too, would be turned on to attack the ad vancing columns of the enemy so as to disorganize their advance and give our own army time to get established on a defensive position. Conversely, at the crisis of some great offensive, the enemy army might just be breaking and starting to retreat ; then every available aeroplane would be concentrated on the creation of such havoc amongst the retreating columns of the enemy that the retreat would be turned *into a rout.

Protection.

For a commander to obtain the full value of his reconnaissance and offensive action, he must be protected against similar enemy action. He will, in other words, wish to attain and maintain, air-superiority. To enable him to achieve this, he will have fighter aircraft whose main function is to fight enemy air craft, and enable the reconnaissance and bombing aircraft to carry out their work without undue interference. Experience in the past has shown that air-superiority is apt to fluctuate. One side will suddenly bring several new squadrons into the field, or re-equip all its fighter squadrons with a new type of aeroplane more efficient than the fighters of the other side. Consequently a continuous progressive effort is required, and even then, it is difficult to ensure the continuous maintenance of air superiority.

The Future.

To look into the future at a transitory stage like the present, is difficult. Most of the great Powers are thinking about mechanization. The mechanization of armies, however, will not alter the principles underlying the conduct of a land cam paign, and, consequently the requirements of mechanized armies will probably be much the same as those equipped with the pres ent day appliances. The air units working with mechanized forces will obviously have to be highly mobile. There is, however, a possible development which may take place, in which the attain ment of the ultimate object (the subjugation of the will of the enemy people) will be achieved by the air rather than the land forces. In such a case, the function of these highly mobile land forces would be to secure suitable bases from which great bombing formations could strike at the vitals of the enemy nation.

(T. L. L.-M.)