AIR FORCES. The World War provided a powerful stimulus to war flying, and great advances were made in technical equip ment and experience. This intensive development led to constant changes in the practice and application of flying, so that when peace came it was expected that progress would be as rapid as in wartime. This led to a hesitancy on the part of most nations to commit themselves definitely to a rigid line of policy in aviation matters. The tendency was to wait for what the future disclosed rather than to base programmes of development entirely upon past experience.
The nations therefore shaped their aeronautical policies with an open mind, and in most cases refrained from radical adjust ments and expedients which progress to date might have suggested as desirable. What in externals appeared stagnation was not nec essarily so. Every forward step, if it is to be sure, must be pre ceded by much research and experiment before it is presented as a concrete achievement.
Analysis of available data, research and experiment, although less apparent, equals in importance the more tangible evidence of aeronautical progress. A policy readily adjustable to whatever changes the future may bring; an elastic organization that lends itself readily to expansion; adequate provision for research and experiment; training facilities; a husbanding of the resources, industries and trades that subserve the needs of aviation, and the national attitude towards flying give a truer perspective of poten tial air power than mere numbers of machines. Policy and organ ization are the most important criteria.
Such advances as are made are likely to follow divergent courses. An apparently inevitable spirit of competition between armies and navies also leads to duplication and tends to deprive effort of its full measure of results. The other school considers that the air merits a profession of its own, and that untrammelled devotion to the science and art of flying is necessary to do full justice to possibilities, not only in relation to war but as a factor in modern life. It accordingly seeks to concentrate all aeronau tical effort into one main channel, with branches to the various departments which flying can serve.
As air warfare grew in volume and importance, the defects of the dual system under war conditions became more and more apparent. Full use of the nation's resources was prejudiced, and civilian ministers were not only denied unanimous advice on air matters, but were sometimes forced to choose between discordant views and to settle vital differences of opinion. The drawbacks of this competitive system were particularly glaring in the matter of technical supply. Improvement was sought in the principle of joint naval and military Air Boards to co-ordi nate supply for the two air services. These boards had, however, no executive control over policy, and achieved but little. Finally ttle Air Ministry was brought into being as the only apparent alternative to the existing evils.
Although a war measure, the Air Ministry survived the peace, and administers not only the Air Force but controls civil aviation as well. It was, however, not allowed to continue its existence as a department of State without considerable hostility and adverse criticism. Its chief opponents were the navy and army. With their establishments reduced to a minimum, and their budget grants diminishing every year, the older fighting services viewed with misgiving the allotment of funds to the newcomer. They argued that the main use of aircraft in war is to assist directly or indirectly the army and the navy, and that accordingly these services should have entire control of their respective air arms. The reply to this objection is that the conquest of the air has disclosed possibilities which transcend the scope of land and sea warfare; that to narrow the viewpoint to naval or military problems is to bring their possibilities into a false per spective; and although that aerial assistance to the forces that fight upon the sea and on land is necessary, this need by no means marks the limit that should be set to aerial operations. Moreover, to regard the air merely as an auxiliary to the sea and the land is a dangerous doctrine, since circumstances may render naval and military operations secondary to those carried out by air forces. Another criticism was that a separate air force is extravagant, since it involves additional overhead expenditure. The reply is that this is offset by the economy achieved in having a single authority dealing with air matters.
One result of recognizing aviation as a profession in its own right has been a breakaway from. traditional practice in policing the British mandates in the East. Security in these territories is the responsibility of the Royal Air Force; aeroplanes are recog nized as the chief instruments for the support of law and order, and military forces are used as auxiliaries. The measure has been justified by the great economy achieved. The development of this conception and its successful application would not have been possible without an Air Staff. Another result is a reversal of principle governing the air vis-a-vis the land and sea forces in the defence of Great Britain against air attack. Instead of dividing the air into two portions, one above the land and the other above the sea, and making the army and navy responsible for their respective spheres, the air is regarded for purposes of national defence as a single field of activity. The Air Force is accordingly responsible for guarding against air attack, and such ancillary ground forces as may be necessary conform to air defence measures.
Italy (q.v.) was the first of the Great Powers to follow the lead of Great Britain in establishing a separate Air Force. This step was taken in 1923 as a result of Signor Mussolini's assump tion of power. The decayed state into which the air services had fallen helped to facilitate a complete reconstruction on new foun dations, and under the impulse of Signor Mussolini's keen interest in air questions, Italy has rapidly risen to be one of the most efficient and active air Powers of the present day.
In 1928, under pressure of public opinion following repeated accidents, and in particular the death of the minister M. de Bokanowski in an accident, France followed the example of Great Britain and Italy in unifying the control of her air activities under a separate ministry.
The requirements of civil and war flying differ considerably. For commerce, economy in running and maintenance and pay ing load are the factors that count most. For war, speed, climb ing power, the carriage and use of armament, and fighting qual ities in general are the chief factors that control design. Conse quently, apart from the fact th.at they connote an aircraft industry and the existence of a potential reserve of pilots, aeroplanes used for civil purposes do not contribute directly to a nation's strength in the air.
Details of the various air forces or air arms and the system of control and organization in the different countries, are given under the heading of each country, as part of the section on Defence.
(A. W. H. E. W.)