AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, a conflict lasting four years in the United States of America between eleven States of the South, which asserted their right to leave the Union, and the States and Territories of the North, which were determined to maintain the Union. The Southern States contained slightly over half the population of the Northern States which remained in the Union. At the opening of the conflict, an independent government, the Confederate States of America (q.v.) was set up. The Civil War began when the guns of the South fired on the Federal Fort Sumter on April 12, 186i, and ended with the surrender of Gen eral Lee at Appomattox on April 9, and of General Johnston at Greensboro on April 26, 1865. Approximately 4,000,00o troops took part in the war, which resulted in the preservation of the Union, the abolition of slavery, and many important social and economic changes.
For the sake of clearness, the names of Confederate statesmen, soldiers and ships are in italics.
It was a difficult problem which confronted him. Seven slave States had seceded, but eight still remained in the Union. Any attempt at coercion would throw all these States, except Dela ware (which practically counted as a northern State), into the arms of the Confederacy. With these siding with the seceders or even maintaining neutrality as between the two combatants, it seemed impossible to restore the Union by force of arms. At this stage neither side wanted war; certainly not the North, where a strong feeling was growing in favour of letting "the wayward sisters depart in peace"; the South was less reluctant to face the risk, because its leaders were confident that the other slave States would rally to their help, but they were no less confident that, if peace could be maintained, these States would soon seek admission to the Confederacy. Lincoln's inaugural speech was really addressed to the slave States still in the Union; to the Confederate States it sounded like a declaration of war. But they sought to avoid the responsibility of striking the first blow. Theirs was a defensive role, that of a newborn nation only asking to be left alone. They hoped to force Lincoln's hand over Sumter. Anderson's position there was daily growing more difficult. The late administration had imposed a policy of inaction. He would himself have gladly evacuated the fort to avert a civil war. But his duty as a soldier compelled him to sit there with folded hands, whilst the enemy were completing their preparations. His provisions would be exhausted by mid-April. The Confederate batteries had made such progress that he doubted whether it was still possible to relieve the fort, unless possession of the whole harbour were secured, and for that purpose he esti mated that 20,000 men would be required. The whole U.S. army only numbered 17,00o men, most of whom were scattered in small posts on the Indian frontier, whence they could not be hastily withdrawn. Only on March 5 did Lincoln learn that Anderson might be starved into surrender. Gen. Scott, his chief military adviser, urged evacuation on military grounds. But Lin coin had pledged himself "to hold, occupy and possess the prop erty and places belonging to the Government." It would be fatal to the prestige of his administration to start by going back on his word. Evacuation might seem a virtual recognition of the Con federacy. He determined to send food supplies only to Sumter. If the Federal flag was fired on, that would constitute a casts belli. The responsibility of beginning the war would be thrust upon the Confederates. To prevent them from pleading a misunderstand ing, he gave Pickens precise information of his intention. Lincoln must have foreseen the actual event. But only by war could the Union be restored, and the sooner war came, the better; the longer the Confederate Government was allowed to function un challenged, the more difficult it would become to unite the North in resistance to its "declaration of independence." Lincoln's despatch was delivered to Pickens (April 8), who promptly in formed his President. From Montgomery orders were sent to Beauregard to reduce Sumter. On Anderson's refusal to evacuate, the batteries opened fire at 4 :3o A.M. on the 12th. The bom bardment continued without intermission till the afternoon of the next day, when Anderson agreed to surrender. At noon of the 14th Anderson evacuated the fort and the Federal flag was lowered. The ready acceptance of Lincoln's challenge by the South was probably due to the desire of its leaders, who now realized his steadfast purpose, to provoke a collision for fear lest the ardour of their people, a considerable minority of whom were originally opposed to secession, might abate. At that date Fts. Sumter and Pickens were the only places where_ they could strike a blow, and they selected the more vulnerable.
In Kentucky parties were fairly equally divided. There was general sympathy for the South, of which the State regarded itself as a part, but also a genuine devotion to the Union. If the governor favoured secession, a small majority in the legislature was opposed to it. His refusal to supply Lincoln with troops met with no protest from the Unionists, who at first concen trated upon keeping the State neutral. But neutrality could not be a permanent attitude.' It gave too great an advantage to the Confederates, who drew food supplies from Kentucky and were sheltered from invasion along their western front from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi. Sooner or later the Federal armies must occupy Kentucky as a base for an offensive cam paign. But a premature movement would drive Kentucky into secession and to lose Kentucky would be "nearly the same as to lose the whole game," in Lincoln's judgment. Understanding the feelings of his fellow Kentuckians better than any of his coun sellors at Washington, he handled the critical situation with consummate tact. It was worth suffering some temporary dis advantage to win Kentucky in the end. The legislature steadily refused to summon a convention, which might declare for seces sion. The governor was too good a Kentuckian to overstep the constitutional limits of his office. In August a new legislature was elected with an overwhelming Unionist majority. The inevitable decision was hastened by the tactless policy of the Confederacy. Kentucky declared for the North (Sept. 20) .
In Missouri, Governor Jackson was a violent secessionist, eager to go all lengths to take his State out of the Union, and the legislature seemed ready to support him. But the convention, which was summoned, was overwhelmingly Unionist. An extreme section of Unionists, led by F. P. Blair, whose brother was in Lincoln's cabinet, and largely recruited from the Germans St. Louis, was ready to meet violence with violence. The St. Louis arsenal, the best equipped in all the slave States, was too rich a prize to be allowed to fall into Jackson's hands. But in February Scott had placed in it a sufficient Federal force to secure it against sudden surprise, and in March the convention had ad journed without even discussing secession. A large majority of the people favoured neutrality, and a policy of conciliation would probably have preserved peace within the State, as in Kentucky. But Lincoln allowed himself to be guided by the Blairs. Their agent was the fanatical Capt. Lyon, who broke up (May i o) a militia camp close to St. Louis on the ground that Jackson was planning an attack on the arsenal, and his return to the city with his prisoners caused a riot with considerable loss of life. This premature appeal to force and the use of Federal troops caused a revulsion of feeling. Civil war became inevitable, when Lyon was appointed temporary commander of the department. He promptly ascended the Missouri with a small force, occupied the State capital, Jefferson City (June i s) and routed a body of secessionist militia at Booneville (June 17). After this defeat Jackson fled to the Arkansas border.
Lincoln by undertaking definitely a policy of coercion had lost four more of the slave States, but secured three, and West Vir ginia was soon to make a fourth.
Both sides had to create their armies before they could fight. Here the South had a distinct advantage. The officers who re signed their commissions contained a disproportionately large number of the ablest men in the old army ; the two Johnstons and Lee had been pre-eminent in their profession. Davis was a graduate of West Point, had served seven years in the regular army, later as a volunteer won distinction in the Mexican War, had been secretary of war and was chairman of the military committee in the Senate till just before the outbreak of the Civil War. He could be trusted to appoint the best officers to command his armies and to see that the first steps in military organization were wisely taken. Lincoln was void of military experience, had no knowledge of the professional merits of his officers and per sonal acquaintance with but a few, including McClellan, and no business training. His appointments were too often made for political reasons. Banks, Butler and Fremont were flagrant in stances. Again, the Southerners could be more quickly trained as soldiers. There was an aristocracy accustomed to rule, and another class of whites who recognized its claim to their obedience. Under the patriarchal conditions of Southern civilization its men were more robust, accustomed to an open-air life, of pug nacious disposition, trained to the use of gun and horse. The democratic North except in the west, did not provide such good fighting material. The Federal armies were uniformly more successful in the West, where the troops on both sides were much of the same class and the North's superior resources turned the scale, whereas in the East townsmen and European immigrants were fighting against country-bred men. But, given time, the quality of the Northern armies would improve and throughout the advantage of superior numbers would be theirs. But this advantage would be least felt in the first months of the war. The initial problem of both governments was not how to raise men, .but how to equip them. There were more volunteers than could be armed. The stocks in the arsenals were quickly exhausted. The South had at least its fair share of them, and Davis was purchasing arms in England. But the meagreness of his order (1 o,000 rifles) indicates that he did not anticipate a lengthy war.
Scott had little faith in the militia. He proposed to use them to defend Washington and recover Harper's Ferry, whilst he trained the volunteers for an autumn campaign. Washington was served by two railways, the Orange and Alexandria (0. and A.) running southward to Lynchburg and the Baltimore and Ohio (B. and 0.) passing through Harper's Ferry. The former was joined at Manassas Junction, 3om. from Washington, by the Manassas Gap railway from Strasbourg in the Shenandoah val ley. The Valley (as it was commonly called) between the Blue Ridge and the Alleghanies was of great strategical importance, pro viding the Confederates with a covered line of advance into Mary land and giving them control of a considerable section of the B. and 0. railway. To the Federals it was of less offensive value, as its direction led away from Richmond, but its possession would enable them to strike at Richmond's direct line of railway com munication with the West.
Lee, now acting as Davis's military adviser, was gathering two armies, one under Beauregard at Manassas Junction, the other at Harper's Ferry under J. E. Johnston. The latter evacuated his post (June 15) when Patterson with a larger force threatened attack, and fell back covering the Manassas Gap railway.
The Richmond authorities had vainly attempted to retain their hold on the western section of the State. Having failed to raise recruits from the district itself for its defence, they sent a small force to hold the crests of the Alleghanies. But McClellan crossed the Ohio and overwhelmed it (July 11-13) at Rich Mountain and Carrick's Ford. Meanwhile a convention at Wheeling had repudi ated secession and set up "a Restored Government of Virginia." West Virginia's defection was a serious blow to the Confederates, losing them the Ohio, which they intended to make their line of defence, and the western portion of the B. and 0. railway.
At Washington there was a demand that Beauregard should be attacked before the term of the militia's service expired. "On to Richmond," the new capital of the Confederacy, was the popular cry. On political grounds a plausible case could be made out for overruling Scott's advice. McDowell, whom Scott, too old and infirm for service in the field, had appointed commander of the forces south of the Potomac, submitted a plan of operations ( June 24). With 30,00o men he proposed to drive Beauregard's 20,000 back behind the Rappahannock, provided that Patterson prevented Johnston from joining him. The Manassas Gap railway gave the Confederates the advantage of "interior lines." McDowell ad vanced from Alexandria (July 16). The two armies met (July 21) at Bull Run (q.v.), where after several hours' fighting the Fed erals left the field. Their retreat became a panic-stricken flight, which carried them back to the Potomac. The Confederates were too disorganized to conduct an immediate pursuit. Presently they advanced to Centreville, where they established their main posi tion and waited for the Federals to make the next move. Wash ington quickly recovered from its alarm. McClellan was sum moned from West Virginia and started to organize a fresh army. The first pitched battle of the war was barren of decisive results.
In the west a neutral Kentucky interposed a barrier between the combatants, but there was some fierce fighting in south-west Missouri. Lyon pursued Jackson as far as Springfield, where he halted to await reinforcements. Ex-Governor Price, commanding the State militia, raised a fresh force and being joined by Mc Culloch's troops from Arkansas advanced against Lyon, who being left unsupported was defeated and killed at Wilson's Creek (Aug. io). This battle too lacked decisive results. McCulloch, having entered Missouri without orders from the Government, retired after his victory into Arkansas, leaving Price to continue the struggle with his own resources.
The Confederate generals at Centreville had been vainly press ing Davis for reinforcements that they might enter Maryland. They realized the danger of prolonged inaction, while McClellan's army was daily growing stronger. If Davis could reinforce them with 20,000 trained men, they proposed to cross the Potomac and by threatening the communications of Washington force McClellan to risk a pitched battle, before he had time to train his raw levies. Davis in conference with his generals (Oct. i) said that he had no reinforcements to spare; he could not withdraw troops from the coast, which was itself threatened with attack. Though the Con federate coastline extended 3,00o m. the Federals could make the blockade practically effective by sealing up the few important harbours and getting possession of the North Carolina "sounds." The forts guarding Hatteras Inlet had been captured (Aug. 29) ; those protecting the entrance to Port Royal, S.C., fell to another and larger force (Nov. 7) ; and a third expedition on a still larger scale under Burnside was being equipped against Roanoke island, whose capture would complete the conquest of North Carolina's "inland waters." What, however, chiefly decided Davis to refuse his generals' re quest was his determination to stand strictly on the defensive in the belief that the war had been won at Bull Run, and that before the spring campaign could open, European intervention would end hostilities. Even in West Virginia, where Rosecrans, McClellan's successor, was pushing forward into the Kanawha valley, no real counter-offensive was attempted. Lee after Bull Run was sent to co-ordinate the operations of four separate detachments acting independently of each other. But he failed to produce an effective combination, and after his return to Richmond in October the loss of West Virginia was regarded as inevitable.
In the west, Confederate encroachments upon Kentucky's ter ritory forced it into the war. Fremont, commanding in Missouri, was threatening an expedition down the Mississippi, which would involve the occupation of the Kentuckian shore. Therefore Polk, general and bishop, early in September seized Hickman and Col umbus, which afforded strong defensive positions on the river, whilst Grant, one of Fremont's brigadiers, promptly replied by occupying Paducah and Smithland at the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland. Polk's refusal to withdraw his troops, unless Grant set the example, ended Kentucky's neutrality. A new the atre of war was opened up, the great extent of which offered im mense possibilities to either side. McClellan on becoming general in-chief set up in the west two military departments, that of the Missouri embracing all Kentucky west of the Cumberland under Halleck, and that of the Ohio including the rest of Kentucky under Buell. Davis appointed A. S. Johnston, one of his ablest generals, to supreme command in the west. Johnston advanced into Kentucky and took up a defensive position with his left at Columbus and his right at the important railway junction of Bowling Green, whilst Forts Henry and Donelson in the centre guarded the approaches up the Tennessee and Cumberland. At the outset the Federals were ill prepared to take the offensive. In Missouri, Fremont had left everything in confusion. Kentucky appeared unable or unwilling to defend itself. The troops from the free States north of the Ohio had been largely diverted to West Virginia or Missouri. Lincoln and McClellan were at one in pressing Buell to advance into East Tennessee, Lincoln wishing to send relief to the distressed Unionists there and make of it a second West Virginia, whilst McClellan considered that the success of his campaign in Virginia depended upon the capture of the East Tennessee railway, Richmond's direct line of communica tion with the west. But the proposed movement presented great difficulties, especially so late in the year, when the roads were almost impassable. There was no railway or navigable river to serve as a line of communication for an invading force, whilst the enemy could bring up troops from east or west over their rail way. Buell proposed a different plan. An offensive against John ston should precede any movement into East Tennessee. Halleck with two "flotilla columns" should ascend the Tennessee and Cumberland and break through the Confederate line at its most vulnerable point. Buell would himself advance overland on Nash ville, Tennessee's capital. This was the plan of campaign, which when carried out two months later met with brilliant success, but it found no favour with Lincoln, McClellan or Halleck. A small Confederate force advancing through Cumberland Gap into Ken tucky was defeated by Thomas at Mill Springs (Jan. 19, 1862). This victory cleared the way for an advance into East Tennessee, but before Buell could follow it up, his attention was called to another quarter by an unexpected move on Halleck's part.
Beyond the Mississippi Price had marched north towards the Missouri, gathering up recruits as he went. All over the State, except in St. Louis, Southern sympathizers took up arms to avenge the violation of their "State rights." Price, not strong enough to attack St. Louis, aimed at crossing the Missouri to join the secessionists in the north of the State. He captured Lexington (Sept. 2o). But Fremont's advance with 40,00o men forced him to retreat to the southwest border. Fremont followed in pursuit to Springfield, where he was relieved of his command (Nov. 2) . He had won fame as an explorer in the Rockies, and in California during the Mexican War, and had been a candidate for the Presi dency in 1856, but he now proved incompetent both as an ad ministrator and in the field and was held responsible for Lyon's defeat. When Polk from Columbus established a post at Belmont on the Missouri bank, Grant descended the river and attacked Belmont (Nov. 7) . He was eventually driven back to his boats and forced to re-embark. During the winter Halleck restored order out of chaos and made all preparations for driving Price finally out of the State.
On his return to duty in mid-January 1862 McClellan found two changes, both destined to affect his fortunes adversely. Con gress had appointed a joint committee of the two houses on the conduct of the war, and Stanton had become secretary of war. McClellan now revealed his new plan of campaign to Lincoln, who first rejected it, but three days later reopened the discussion. Mc Clellan offered a choice of three oversea routes, stating his own preference for a movement to be made with great secrecy to Ur bana on the lower Rappahannock, where he would be within 5o m. of Richmond. He expected by a rapid advance from that base to cut off a Confederate force in the Yorktown peninsula and cap ture Richmond, before Johnston could intervene. Lincoln did not see how the preparations could be kept secret, and was sure that McClellan would still find Johnston between himself and Rich mond. He objected to any movement which uncovered Washing ton and withdrew McClellan from interposing between the capital and Johnston. He gave, however (Feb. 27), a grudging assent to an oversea movement without specifying the actual point of dis embarkation. Finally he forbade the Urbana plan and left McClellan his choice between landing at Fortress Monroe at the end of the Yorktown peninsula, the route which McClellan con sidered the worst of the three, and making an overland campaign. McClellan chose the first alternative. Probably the withdrawal (March 9) of Johnston behind the Rappahannock reconciled him to the sacrifice of his Urbana plan. Throughout these discussions Lincoln demanded adequate protection for Washington, and Mc Clellan undertook to leave ample forces for the purpose.
Halleck now sent Pope with 20,000 men down the Missouri bank to capture New Madrid and Island No. i o, and summoned Buell from Nashville to Savannah on the Tennessee to join Grant encamped on the opposite bank at Pittsburgh landing. He assumed that the recent campaign had thrown the Confederates perma nently on the defensive and that the concentration of his own forces would be effected without interruption. But Johnston and Beauregard, well served with information by local sympathizers, seized their opportunity. By calling up Bragg from \Pensacola with zo,000 men they concentrated an army of nearly 40,00o at Corinth before the end of March. Van Dorn was bringing i 5,000 men from Arkansas, but they could not wait for his arrival. The battle of Shiloh (q.v.) (April 6-7) was one of the most fiercely contested in the war. Johnston was killed the first day and Beau regard retreated to Corinth. Halleck joined his armies (April II) and having been reinforced by Pope (April 21), who had captured with the help of the gunboats the garrison (7,000) of Island No. io with all its guns and stores, commenced a slow and cau tious advance on Corinth. Beauregard held on to Corinth till May 3oth, when he retreated to Tupelo. The evacuation of Coring was followed by that of Ft. Pillow below Island No. io and Mem phis (June 3) . The Federal squadron fought and destroyed a Confederate flotilla at Memphis (June 6). With the capture of Corinth and Memphis the Federal offensive virtually ended. They had cleared Kentucky and West Tennessee of the enemy, estab lished themselves on the M. and C. railway, and opened the Mississippi to Vicksburg. But the Confederate army of the west had escaped and would presently take the offensive.
West of the Mississippi Halleck had scored another success. Price had been driven out of south-west Missouri by Curtis, who followed him into Arkansas. Van Dorn, commanding in the newly formed Trans-Mississippi department, reinforced Price, and their combined forces attacked Curtis at Pea ridge (or Elk Horn) but suffered a severe defeat (March 7-8). Still farther west the Con federates had suffered another reverse. A small expedition under Sibley had been sent up the Rio Grande to secure Arizona and New Mexico with a view to bringing California into the Con federacy. Sibley occupied Santa Fe in March, but was forced by Canby in April to make a disastrous retreat to Texas, and the whole of the territory, which he had overrun, was secured per manently by the Federals. But of all the disasters suffered in the west by the Confederates in the spring of 1862 the greatest, be cause irreparable, was the loss of New Orleans. Farragut with the Gulf squadron ran past the forts guarding the lower Mississippi and appeared next day before the city (April 24-25), which, abandoned by its garrison, surrendered to the fleet, and was form ally occupied by Gen. Butler's troops (May I).
McClellan's "change of base" placed him in a position to re new the offensive with good chance of success. He was farther away from Richmond, but his communications were absolutely secure. He could advance on either side of the river. Petersburg lay practically defenceless within his reach and its occupation would enable him to cut Richmond's communications with the south, as Grant did in 1864-65. His army was still numerically stronger than Lee's which had suffered the heavier losses in the week's fighting. It was at first assumed at Washington that he would resume the advance on Richmond, when he received rein forcements. But McClellan demanded roo,000 fresh troops, and Lincoln could not find more than 20,000. Political pressure was being put upon him to replace McClellan. To solve the problem, Halleck was appointed general-in-chief (July r r) . A retired en gineer officer, who had taken up legal practice, he was an acknowl edged authority on the art of war. His recent success seemed to mark him out as McClellan's natural successor, but he proved but little help to Lincoln as a military adviser. He visited Mc Clellan's army (July 25) and committed his first blunder by order ing the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac to Aquia creek, where it could unite with Pope's Army of Virginia on the Rap pahannock for an overland advance on Richmond (Aug. 3) .
Jackson's "Valley campaign" is described elsewhere. Here it may be noted that on three separate occasions Jackson caused McDowell's corps to be withdrawn from McClellan. For his attack at Kernstown (March 23) alarmed Lincoln and was partly the cause of his detaining McDowell in the first instance at Washington. Throughout the campaign Lee worked upon Lincoln's anxiety for the safety of Washington to break up the threatened combination against Richmond.
The Confederate Offensive in the East, Aug.–Sept. 1862.—Popewas summoned (June 26) from the west to com mand an army composed of the forces on the Rappahannock and in the Valley. Jackson's campaign had taught Lincoln that one general is better than three. Pope's immediate task was to lighten the pressure upon McClellan by threatening the Vir ginia Central railway. Lee despatched (July 13) Jackson in time to save Gordonsville from Pope's cavalry. Jackson advancing towards Culpeper to prevent the concentration of Pope's scat tered forces defeated Banks at Cedar Run (Aug. 9) , but fell back when Banks was reinforced. Lee joining Jackson with Long street's command (Aug. r5) sought to crush Pope, before he could be reinforced from McClellan's army now definitely leaving the peninsula. Pope narrowly escaped being cut off on the Rapidan and retreated behind the Rappahannock. Lee, learning that por tions of McClellan's army had disembarked at Aquia creek and were marching to Pope, detached Jackson to make a wide detour through the Bull Run mountains and strike Pope's line of com munications at Manassas Junction (Aug. 25-27). Pope, mystified by this movement, made a succession of mistakes and Lee, reunit ing his army on the battlefield, drove Pope across Bull Run (q.v.) (Aug. 29-30) . Pope retired within the fortifications of Washing ton (Sept. 3) . Lee would not allow the second Bull Run to be as barren of results as the first. Having received reinforcements from Richmond, which more than made good his losses, he crossed the Potomac at Leesburg and occupied Frederick (Sept. 7) . He en tered Maryland partly to "shift the burden of military occupation from Confederate to Federal soil." But his objective was mainly political, to influence the approaching elections in the North, im press Europe with a sense of Southern power and detach Maryland from the Union. Finding his line of communications up the Valley threatened by a strong garrison at Harper's Ferry, he divided his forces (Sept. ro), sending Jackson with the larger half to capture that post, whilst he withdrew the rest behind South Mountain. After the fall of Harper's Ferry he proposed to reunite his army and invade Pennsylvania.
McClellan, placed by Lincoln in command of all the forces in Washington, again took the field (Sept. 7) . Not knowing what Lee's next move might be, he advanced slowly, until a copy of Lee's order for the division of his army fell into his hands at Fred erick (Sept. 13) . He forced the South mountain passes (Sept. 14) . Lee fell back behind the Antietam, covering a ford over the Potomac.
Jackson with three divisions had crossed the Potomac at Wil liamsport and appeared before Harper's Ferry from the west (Sept. 13) . Other divisions occupied the heights north and east of Harper's Ferry on the opposite banks of the Potomac and the Shenandoah. The garrison (12,50o), being completely sur rounded, capitulated early on the i 5th. Leaving A. P. Hill's di vision to complete the arrangements for the surrender, Jackson started for Sharpsburg and after a night-march rejoined Lee on the morning of the r 6th with two divisions, and a third arrived later in the day. McClellan reached the Antietam on the r 5th, devoted the next day to reconnaissance and fought the battle of Sharpsburg or the Antietam (q.v.) (Sept. i 7). At the close of the day Lee still held his ground, but on the night of the i8th he recrossed the Potomac. His stay in Maryland was too short to produce any effect upon the political attitude of the State and the inhabitants had shown scant signs of sympathy.
Kirby Smith "turned" Cumberland Gap, swept aside an extem porized force, which faced him at Richmond, Ky. (Aug. 3o), and occupied Lexington (Sept. 2), threatening Louisville and Cincin nati. Bragg, concentrating behind the Cumberland mountains, appeared on Buell's front (Sept. 5). Then ensued a race to Louis ville, in which Buell got the worse of the start, as he dared not uncover Nashville, and reached Bowling Green (Sept. 14) to find Bragg planted squarely across the railway between him and Louis ville. Buell could not risk an offensive battle with so much at stake; Bragg would only fight on the defensive. He moved out of Buell's path owing to lack of supplies (Sept. 21) to make con nection with Kirby Smith, who had collected a large depot of stores at Lexington. Buell entered Louisville (Sept. 25) and having reorganized his army marched out (Oct. r) to find and fight the invaders. Their generals were more occupied with the inauguration of a provisional governor at Frankfort (Oct. 4) than with the need for concentrating their forces. An accidental en counter with indecisive results occurred at Perryville (Oct. 8) between Buell's and Bragg's left wings. Bragg and Kirby Smith now united their armies, but only to retreat through Cumberland Gap into East Tennessee. The Confederate invasion of Kentucky was barren of political results. The provisional governor was chased out of his capital immediately of ter his inauguration. The Federals Resume the Offensive, Nov.–Dec. 1862. Lincoln celebrated Lee's retreat with the Emancipation Proclama= tion. This alienated the Democrats, and if the Administration was to win the autumn elections it must raise its credit by some signal success. McClellan was urged to cross the Potomac and force another battle. He demanded time to reorganize his army. Five weeks passed before he began his advance along the east side of the Blue Ridge. But Lee, bringing Longstreet to Culpeper, again interposed. McClellan was relieved of his command (Nov. 7) and his successor, Burnside, adopted a new plan of campaign, to trans fer his base to Aquia creek, cross the Rappahannock at or below Fredericksburg, and march straight on Richmond. But delay in forwarding a pontoon-train from Washington prevented him cross ing till Lee had taken up a position on the Fredericksburg heights (q.v.). Though the element of surprise was lost, Burnside per sisted in crossing the river and, attacking Lee, was repulsed with terrible slaughter (Dec. 13) .
In the west, Buell was replaced (Oct. 30) by Rosecrans, who as Pope's successor under Grant had gained the credit of defeating Price at Iuka (Sept. 19) and Van Dorn at Corinth (Oct. Before renewing the advance upon Chattanooga he determined to make himself temporarily independent of the railway by accumu lating a reserve of 2,000,000 rations at Nashville. For this pur pose he had first to repair the Louisville railway, as the Cumber land, like the Tennessee, only became navigable in the latter part of the winter. The Government chafed at the delay. Rosecrans refused to be hurried. He commenced his advance against Bragg (Dec. 26), who since returning from Kentucky had established himself at Murfreesboro, where he expected to pass the winter. The battle of Stones river or Murfreesboro (Dec. 31–Jan. 2) ended with Bragg abandoning the battlefield, evacuating Murfrees boro and falling back to Tullahoma. Rosecrans occupied Mur freesboro, and settled down for the winter.
After Van Dorn's defeat Grant moved against Vicksburg. Sher man starting down the river from Memphis was to land his troops at the mouth of the Yazoo, seize the bluffs north of Vicksburg, and attack the city from the rear, whilst Grant, who was already advancing along the Mississippi Central railway towards Jackson (Mississippi) would hold Pemberton, Van Dorn's successor, fast and prevent him sending help to Vicksburg. But Grant had to retire when his supply depot was destroyed by a cavalry raid (Dec. 20), and Sherman was forestalled by Pemberton, who was kept informed by spies of the Federal movement, and defeated at Chickasaw Bluffs (6 m. north of Vicksburg) (Dec. 29). In north west Arkansas Hindman was organizing a fresh invasion of Mis souri but was anticipated by Blunt and Herron, who crossed the frontier and defeated him at Prairie Grove (Dec. 7).
Operations in the East, 1863: Chancellorsville and "the horror of Fredericksburg" the two armies passed the winter facing each other across the Rappahan nock. Hooker replaced Burnside (Jan. 26) and quickly restored the shaken moral of his army. Lee found great difficulty in feed ing his troops, and by direction of the war department Longstreet with two divisions was sent to the south bank of the James to collect provisions in the vicinity of Suffolk, which was in Federal occupation. Longstreet invested Suffolk and at the moment, when his divisions were urgently needed on the Rappahannock, was engaged in a futile siege i 20 m. away.
Both Lee and Hooker were eager to take the offensive. Lee had been considering with Jackson an invasion of Pennsylvania, but in the absence of Longstreet's divisions had to resign the initiative to Hooker. The latter aimed at forcing Lee out of his entrench ments by a wide turning movement over the upper fords of the Rappahannock above its junction with the Rapidan, and sent his newly organized cavalry corps to destroy the railways in Lee's rear and intercept his retreat. He thus deprived himself of "the eyes of his army," and to the absence of his cavalry (except one brigade) was largely due the failure of the Chancellorsville cam paign (q.v.).
Hooker, who outnumbered Lee by fully two to one, concen trated the larger half of his army about Chancellorsville (April 30), whilst Sedgwick crossed the Rappahannock below Fredericks burg. Lee, leaving i o,00o men to check Sedgwick, threw Hooker on the defensive (May i) , outflanked and rolled up his right wing with Jackson's corps (May 2), drove him out of his entrenchments to a fresh defensive position (May 3), turned on Sedgwick, who had captured the Fredericksburg heights, and forced him back over the river (May 4) , and then counter-marched to Chancellors ville to strike another blow at Hooker. But the latter retreated across the Rappahannock on the night of May 5. Lee's victory was dearly bought at the price of Jackson's life (May i o) . He now reorganized his army into three corps under Longstreet, Ewell and A. P. Hill and prepared to carry out his plan of invad ing Pennsylvania.
Longstreet had proposed another plan, viz., to utilize the advan tage of the "interior lines" for the relief of Vicksburg now in dire straits. Lee should leave the army, which had fought at Chancel lorsville, to "contain" Hooker on the Rappahannock, and with Longstreet's two divisions join Bragg in Tennessee. Johnston's troops should be brought from Mississippi and Buckner's from East Tennessee to the same point. The united forces under Lee's command could then take the offensive against Rosecrans with a good prospect of overwhelming him. If victorious, Lee should then invade Kentucky and threaten Louisville and Cincinnati as the most likely means of forcing Grant to raise the siege of Vicks burg. But Lee was unwilling to leave Virginia or divide his army.
Lee's objects were much the same as had prompted his invasion of Maryland in 1862, and in particular he hoped to levy much needed supplies of food and clothing from a free State and at least prevent reinforcements being sent to Grant before Vicks burg. He commenced his movement on June 3. His plan of cam paign was to transfer his army to the Valley, cross the Potomac and march to the Susquehanna. He could count upon Lincoln's anxiety for Washington's safety keeping Hooker from attacking any of his widely separated corps before they were concentrated in Pennsylvania. He left Hill at Fredericksburg till Hooker should withdraw northwards, and Longstreet at Culpeper formed the link between Hill and Ewell pushing down the Valley. A cavalry battle at Brandy Station ( June 9) warned Hooker that Lee was on the move. Being refused permission to march on Richmond, he began to fall back towards Manassas (June 13) . Hill marched to the Valley covered by Longstreet, who advanced east of the Blue Ridge. Ewell captured Winchester (June i 5) and crossed into Maryland, pushing his cavalry forward into Pennsylvania. Long street passed into the Valley in Hill's rear and their two corps were crossing the river on June 23-24. Hooker began crossing on June 25 and concentrated at Frederick, threatening Lee's line of retreat. Hill and Longstreet were at Chambersburg, Ewell on his way to Harrisburg with two divisions at Carlisle and one at York (June 2 7) . But the absence of Stuart's cavalry, which was on a raid round the Federal army, and did not rejoin till July 2, left Lee in ignorance of Hooker's movements. He did not learn till the night of the 28th that Hooker had crossed into Maryland and was threatening his communications. He at once ordered a con centration of all his forces at Cashtown to keep the Federals east of South Mountain by threatening Baltimore. Meade, who had replaced Hooker (June 28), was moving his army northwards to prevent Lee crossing the Susquehanna. A chance encounter on June 3o at Gettysburg (q.v.) brought on the famous battle.
Hill advancing from the west and Ewell coming down from the north had defeated two Federal corps and occupied Gettysburg (July I). Neither Lee nor Meade expected a battle so soon, but Lee could complete his concentration first, and the chance of de feating his opponent in detail urged him to assume the offensive. But he could not get his corps commanders to work together as a team. No attack was delivered (July 2) till 4 P.M., and though the Confederates gained some ground on both flanks and for a moment broke through the Federal centre, at nightfall Meade still held Cemetery Ridge and had his whole army concentrated. Lee made his final assault (July 3) with two divisions against the enemy centre, but again concert of action was lacking, and Pickett's charge, being unsupported, was a costly failure. Lee commenced his retreat (July 4) through the South Mountain passes. He was held up at Williamsport for a week waiting for the river to run down, but on the night of the 13th withdrew his army and trains into the Valley before Meade, who had only appeared on his front the day before, could make up his mind to attack.
Lee gradually fell back behind the Rapidan and Meade followed him across the Rappahannock as far as Culpeper. Both armies were weakened in September by sending heavy detachments to Tennessee. In October and November the two generals engaged in a campaign of manoeuvre, which had no decisive result and left them in their original positions on the Rapidan and Rappahannock respectively.
Operations in the West, 1863: Vicksburg and Chatta nooga.—In1863, as in 1862, it was in the west that decisive results were obtained. By the capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson the Federals gained complete control of the Mississippi, and in East Tennessee they captured Chattanooga and Knoxville. Grant's Vicksburg campaign (q.v.) was one of the most brilliant operations of the war, though he owed much to his opponent's mistakes.
The problem was to transport his army from the right bank of the Mississippi to the high ground in the rear of Vicksburg. After four unsuccessful attempts (Feb.–March) to open up a water route, by which the enemy's flanks might be turned, Grant in April, when the winter-floods had begun to subside, moved two corps by land to a point below Grand Gulf, the extreme left of the Confederate defences. Part of the Federal fleet had run past the Vicksburg batteries by night (April 16), bringing with them two transports, and five more transports got past six nights later. Grant began crossing the river (April 30). Pemberton, who as commander of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana was responsible for both Vicksburg and Port Hudson, had been so mystified by Grant's demonstrations on the north side of Vicksburg that he had only four brigades available to meet his advance south of the Big Black river. Grant defeated these (May 1) and established a temporary base at Grand Gulf. Having been joined by Sherman with further supplies, he advanced (May 7) against the Vicksburg–Jackson railway, on which Pemberton de pended for supplies and reinforcements. But suspecting after the engagement at Raymond (May 1 2) that a considerable force was collecting at Jackson, Grant cut loose from his base and marched with his whole army on Jackson, living off the country till he could work round to the north of Vicksburg and establish a new base on the Yazoo. J. E. Johnston, commander-in-chief in the west, had been ordered (May 9) to go and assume personal command of the troops in Mississippi. He reached Jackson from Tullahoma (May 13) but found only two brigades there. Next day, after fighting a delaying action at Jackson, he retreated up the Missis sippi Central railway to Canton. Grant then fell upon Pember ton's field-force at Champion's Hill (May 16) and drove it into the fortifications of Vicksburg, occupying Haynes's Bluff two days later. The fate of Vicksburg was now sealed. For Johnston was unable to collect a force strong enough to create a diversion, and Pemberton capitulated (July 4)• Butler's successor at New Orleans was equally successful in reducing Port Hudson, 200 m. below Vicksburg (July 9) . Farragut with two warships had run past the Port Hudson batteries (Mar. 14), and by closing the mouth of the Red River deprived the gar rison of its main source of supplies. Banks commenced siege operations (May 24), and the Confederates were on the verge of starvation when they surrendered.
For several months Rosecrans and Bragg remained watching each other in Middle Tennessee, confining themselves to cavalry raids against each other's lines of communication. Rosecrans was urged by the Government to take the offensive against Bragg to prevent him sending reinforcements to Mississippi. But Rose crans maintained that, while he remained on Bragg's front, the latter would not risk the loss of Middle Tennessee by detaching troops elsewhere. Bragg did in fact send some reinforcements to Johnston. Rosecrans was really afraid that Grant might be defeated and was unwilling to commit himself to a fresh move ment while the issue at Vicksburg remained unsettled. At last he advanced (June 23) and in nine days of incessant rain manoeuvred Bragg out of two strong positions in succession and forced him to retreat behind the Tennessee. He resumed his advance (Aug. 16) in co-operation with Burnside, who advancing from Kentucky occupied Knoxville (Sept. 2). Rosecrans feinting at Bragg's right, as if he intended to cross the Tennessee above Chattanooga and join Burnside, moved the bulk of his army across well below Chattanooga (Sept. 4) and advanced over the mountain ranges south of the river against Bragg's line of retreat. This manoeuvre forced Bragg to evacuate Chattanooga (Sept. 8), but he retreated only 25m. to Lafayette, where he covered the railway, waiting for a chance of defeating Rosecrans's army in detail. Rosecrans, im agining Bragg to be in full retreat, fell into the trap and pressed forward with three columns so widely separated that no two were within supporting distance of each other. But Bragg failed to close the trap. Two chances of overwhelming isolated portions of the Federal army were lost by his lieutenants. Rosecrans recon centrated his army (Sept. 18), and Bragg, having received con siderable reinforcements, including five brigades under Longstreet, from Virginia, attacked and defeated him (Sept. 19-20) in Chickamauga valley (q.v.) and drove him back into Chattanooga, where the Federal army was practically besieged and in danger of starvation. Grant was now appointed to the supreme command in the west and reached Chattanooga (Oct. 23), where Hooker with reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac had already arrived. Grant substituted Thomas for Rosecrans in command of the Army of the Cumberland and averted all fear of starvation by opening a short line of communication with Bridgeport by way of two ferries over the Tennessee. Bragg now weakened himself by sending Longstreet with a large detachment against Burnside (Nov. 3) . Grant on the arrival of four divisions o: the Army of the Tennessee under Sherman took the offensive and stormed Bragg's position on Missionary ridge, which overlooked Chattanooga (q.v.) (Nov. 25).
In his anxiety for Burnside's safety Grant ceased his pursuit of Bragg's retreating army (Nov. 28) and despatched Sherman to Knoxville, where Longstreet was besieging Burnside. After failing in an assault upon the Federal works (Nov. 29), Longstreet raised the siege (Dec. 4) on Sherman's approach and retreated up the Holston valley. The greater part of East Tennessee was now in Federal hands.
Grant crossed the Rapidan (May 4). After two days' battle in the Wilderness (q.v.) he moved by the left flank to Spottsyl vania and continued this "side stepping" manoeuvre till close to Richmond. But in these forty days he never got Lee into the open. On the Po, North Anna, Totopotomoy and at Cold Har bor he found Lee entrenched across his path. No diversion came from Butler, who missed the opportunity of capturing Peters burg in the first week and was "bottled up" by Beauregard (May i6). The other subsidiary movement was nearly as unsuccessful.
After Grant's defeat at Cold Harbor (June 3) Lee detached Early's corps to save Lynchburg from Hunter, who had already captured Staunton. Hunter retreated into West Virginia, leaving the Valley open to Early, who marched down it, crossed the Potomac, defeated a scratch force on the Monocacy (July 9) and appeared before Washington ( July i i) . Grant sent back one corps for the protection of the capital. But Early withdrew (July 12) and retired into the Valley, having given Washington and Baltimore a sudden fright, but without seriously deranging Grant's plans. Grant's casualties had reached 55,000, and though probably he inflicted as heavy losses on Lee in proportion, he had to part with 36 time-expired regiments, and the reinforcements, which kept up his numbers, could not replace the veterans of the old army.
Grant's finest achievement was the transfer of his army across the Chickahominy and the James unopposed under Lee's nose (June 12-15), but he lost the chance of capturing Petersburg (June 15-18), which Lee was slow to reinforce (q.v.). The ensuing siege of Petersburg was "trench warfare" and a siege only in name, as Lee's army was never invested. Grant's aim was to extend his lines to his left so as to get possession-of the rail ways from the south and south-west to Petersburg and Rich mond, whilst making demonstrations on the north bank of the James and "feeling" the Richmond defences. The fiasco of the "Burnside mine" (July 30)—when a mine was successfully ex ploded under a salient in the Confederate lines, but the assault ing troops owing to the mismanagement of Burnside, the corps commander on whose front the attempt was made, were re pulsed with heavy loss—warned him against frontal attacks on Lee's lines round Petersburg. He secured a considerable section of the Weldon railway, but at the end of the year Lee still held the Southside and Danville lines.
The only Federal successes in the east this year were won by Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley (q.v.). Sent by Grant to drive out Early, he won three victories in a month (Sept. i9–Oct. r 9) and completely devastated the Valley, which had become the granary of Richmond. These victories, coupled with Sherman's capture of Atlanta (Sept. 2), secured Lincoln his overwhelming triumph over the Democratic candidate, Gen. McClellan.
The Richmond Government had wished Johnston to effect a junction with Longstreet and invade Middle Tennessee, but Johnston finding his army in no condition to take the offensive remained at Dalton, where he occupied a strong defensive posi tion. Grant's instructions to Sherman were "to move against Johnston's army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can." To Grant the destruction of the enemy army was the primary objective, but Sherman thought more of occupying strategic points in Confederate terri tory. Atlanta, Johnston's base, was at the junction of four im portant railways and "full of foundries, arsenals and machine shops. Its capture would be the death-knell of the Confederacy" (Sherman) . Eventually Sherman captured Atlanta but let the confederate army escape. He had about the same superiority of numbers as Grant had, roughly ioo,000 against 6o,000, and was as far from Atlanta as Grant was from Richmond. But as compared with Grant he had one great disadvantage. He was practically tied to the railway and could not be continually shift ing his base. Grant had intended that Banks should effect a diversion in Sherman's favour by a movement on Mobile in co operation with Farragut's fleet. But Banks was not available, having been previously sent by Halleck up the Red River to establish at Shreveport a base for the military occupation of northern Texas, the Government fearing that the French in Mexico were planning to establish an independent republic in Texas.
The campaign opened (May 4). Between Dalton and Atlanta the railway crossed three rivers, the Oostanaula at Resaca, the Etowah and the Chattahoochee.
Johnston's policy was to delay Sherman's advance as much as possible, withdrawing from his successive positions before he could be drawn into a pitched battle except upon his own terms. He was prepared to fall back as far as Atlanta, which he regarded as impregnable, "too strong to be taken by assault and too ex tensive to be invested." Sherman's general plan of campaign was to keep Thomas's army in the centre to "contain" Johnston's army, for which it was in itself a match, and use the other two to turn his flanks. With McPherson's army he outflanked John ston's left and forced him to evacuate Dalton (May 13) and Resaca (May is). In the comparatively open and rolling country between the Oostanaula and the Etowah Johnston expected to be able to make a stand and give battle, but his corps commanders dissuaded him, and retreating across the Etowah (May 20) he took up a strong position in the mountain pass at Allatoona.
By temporarily cutting loose from the railway and marching on Dallas Sherman turned the Allatoona pass and by shifting McPherson over to the left flank gradually forced Johnston to contract his lines round Marietta (q.v.). Wishing to save his troops the fatigue of yet another flank movement over roads rendered al most impassable by continuous rain, Sherman attacked Johnston's lines on Kenesaw mountain (June 27), but was repulsed with heavy loss. Resuming the outflanking movement round Johnston's left he manoeuvred him out of the Marietta position (July 2), and a week later Johnston withdrew his whole army behind the Chattahoochee, after Schofield had crossed above his right flank. Though in this protracted duel only the engagement at Kenesaw mountain ranks as a battle, skirmishing never ceased, often de veloping into hard fighting, especially during the operations round Dallas. During May and June Sherman's casualties amounted to about 17,000, and Johnston's were relatively, if not actually, greater. Johnston was preparing to fall upon Sherman's columns, as they crossed the Peach Tree creek, the only natural obstacle between the Chattahoochee and Atlanta's northern defences, when he was superseded by Hood (July 17). Davis was tired of John ston's Fabian tactics and believing that he would abandon Atlanta without a battle, put a fighting general in his place. Hood promptly fought three battles before the end of July, but was defeated in them all, and evacuated Atlanta (q.v.) (Sept. 2). Sherman waited for Hood's next move. Hood crossed the Chattahoochee (Sept. 29) and striking first at Sherman's communications marched to Gadsden (Alabama) drawing Sherman in pursuit more than room. from Atlanta as far as Gaylesville (Oct. 20). When Hood moved still farther west to cross the Tennessee, Sherman started back to Atlanta to execute his long-cherished plan of marching through Georgia to the coast. He left Thomas to deal with Hood. But the force assigned to Thomas was barely sufficient for the purpose.
In actual numbers superior to Hood's army, it was made up of widely separated commands ; one corps was still in Missouri, and until its arrival at Nashville (Nov. 30) Thomas can hardly be said to have had an army at all. Sherman could easily have spared another i 2,000 men, and this addition to his strength would have made Thomas's position absolutely safe.
Hood's plan was to destroy Thomas's forces before they could concentrate, capture Nashville, invade Kentucky, threaten Cin cinnati and then march through East Tennessee to join Lee. But a three weeks' delay at Florence to collect supplies proved fatal. Schofield with 23,00o men had time to take position at Pulaski and delay his advance, whilst Thomas was concentrat ing his other forces at Nashville. Having failed to envelop Scho field on the Duck river, Hood attacked him furiously but un successfully at Franklin (Nov. 30) and appeared before Nashville (Dec. 2). In spite of the severity of his losses and the fact that he was confronted by an army superior to his own, Hood was still bent on retaining the offensive and detached his cavalry against the Federal lines of communication. He remained before Nashville in the vain hope of receiving reinforcements promised from Texas, until Thomas marched out and defeated him in the most decisive battle of the war (q.v.) (Dec. 15-16). Hood escaped over the Tennessee, but his army as a fighting force prac tically ceased to exist.
Sherman started from Atlanta (Nov. 15) on his 3oom. march with 6o,000 men and without encountering any organized re sistance reached the outskirts of Savannah (Dec. 1o), feeding his army off the country. His purpose was to demonstrate "the hollowness" of the Confederacy and by ruining the railway system of Georgia, now the granary of the South, prevent food reaching Richmond. Georgia was left undefended except by Wheeler's cavalry and the State militia, Hood's invasion of Ten nessee being counted upon to bring Sherman back in pursuit. Sherman, having destroyed 16om. of the Georgia Central rail way, by storming Ft. McAllister established communication with the fleet in Ossabaw sound. Savannah was evacuated (Dec. 2o). Sherman was now free to join Grant by sea or land.
Though the Confederates still held Mobile, its value as a port was gone. Farragut had forced an entrance into the bay (Aug. 5) and captured the forts guarding the harbour mouth. Only in the Trans-Mississippi had the Confederates gained any success. Banks's Red River expedition proved a complete failure and he retreated to New Orleans. But the Federals retained their hold upon northern Arkansas, including Little Rock, the State capital. Price made a last raid into Missouri in September and October.
Sherman advanced (Feb. 1) and occupied Columbia (Feb. 17), which was accidentally burnt. Charleston was evacuated (Feb. 18) . Although the march over swollen rivers and swamps was most arduous, Fayetteville, N.C., was occupied (March 11), where communication was established with Wilmington, which had been captured (Feb. 22). Sherman now aimed at Goldsboro to effect a junction with Schofield, who had left Wilmington for New Berne. To prevent this junction Johnston attacked Sher man's left wing at Bentonville (March 19) , but withdrew his forces and retreated to cover Raleigh (March 21) . Sherman joined Schofield at Goldsboro (March 23). From Goldsboro Sherman moved out against Johnston (April 1o) and occupied Raleigh (April 13) . Next day Johnston asked for an armistice. The assassination of Lincoln (April 14) caused a delay, but Johnston finally surrendered at Greensboro (April 26). In the lower South, Wilson conducted a brilliant cavalry campaign in Alabama, defeating Forrest and capturing Selma (April 2), the last Confederate arsenal, and Canby, Banks's successor, captured Mobile (April 12) . Taylor surrendered the Confederate forces in Alabama and Mississippi to him (May 4), and Kirby Smith sur rendered the Trans-Mississippi forces (May 26). Davis was captured by some of Wilson's cavalry (May 1o).
Two powerful ironclads were built in England for the Con federates, but the British Government prevented them sailing. One ironclad built in France passed into Southern hands, but reached Havana too late to take part in the war. Three com merce-destroyers built or purchased in England drove the Federal mercantile marine from the seas. Having auxiliary sail power they could economize coal. The "Alabama" during her 22 months' cruise never put into a Confederate port. She captured 68 prizes in the Atlantic, Indian ocean and China sea, sank the Hatteras gunboat off Galveston but was herself sunk off Cherbourg by the sloop-of-war "Kearsarge" (June 11, 1864) . The "Shenan doah's" objective was the whaling fleet in the North Pacific, which she destroyed (June 1865), having no official news that the war was over. The Geneva Arbitration (1872) found Great Britain responsible for the losses inflicted by these three cruisers to the amount of $15,5oo,000.
The Federal navy concentrated upon blockading the seven principal southern ports. Lincoln had proclaimed a blockade of the Southern coast (April 19, 1861) . But for many months it was little more than nominal for lack of ships which could enforce it. An attempt to close Charleston harbour by sinking stone laden hulks in the entrance proved a failure. Not till the middle of 1862 could the blockade be regarded as even moderately effective. Then with the export of cotton at last unrestricted and an increasing demand in the English market, vessels specially adapted for blockade-running were built in the English ship yards, and in spite of the Federal navy blockade-running only ceased to be a profitable speculation when the ports were actually in Federal occupation. Savannah had been practically closed since the capture of Ft. Pulaski (April 1862). The loss of Charleston and Wilmington left the Confederacy without an Atlantic port, and reduced the armies of Lee and Johnston to a state of desti tution.
Conclusion.—Thecollapse of the Confederacy was so sudden and complete that it took Europe by surprise. Sherman's "march to the sea" first opened foreign eyes to the probability of Southern defeat. But by the end of 1863, when Lee had suffered defeat at Gettysburg and Bragg had finally lost Chattanooga, and the Federals had recovered the Mississippi between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, thus completely isolating the Trans-Mississippi department, ultimate defeat stared the Confederacy in the face. The sole remaining hope was that the North through sheer war weariness might throw away the victory already won. When Grant seemed fought to a standstill by Lee round Richmond in the summer of 1864, and between Sherman and Atlanta John ston's army interposed still unbeaten, the North very nearly reached the limit of its endurance. The Democrats put forward a programme, the first article of which pronounced the war a failure. Lincoln despaired of re-election. But the fall of Atlanta and Sheridan's triple victory over Early in the Valley came in time to turn the scale in favour of the Government. Gradually too the significance of Grant's position in front of Petersburg began to be realized. Lee had lost the power to manoeuvre, when he was shut up in Richmond and Petersburg, and could not force Grant to relax his hold. Yet once more the North was filled with alarm when Hood crossed the Tennessee and, with Sherman far away in Georgia, threatened an invasion of Ken tucky. Grant himself was on his way to take command at Nash ville, when he heard the news of Thomas's crowning victory. Sherman could now present Lincoln with Savannah as a Christmas gift, and the one organized army of the Confederacy in the west was definitely broken up.
The South made a great mistake during the first winter of the war, when the North was organizing its military strength and the Confederates took no counter-measures. Their Government, counting on European recognition to be followed by peace, left A. S. Johnston in the west with an entirely inadequate force to hold Kentucky and Tennessee. At the first onset the Federals broke through his line of defence ; his counterstroke failed ; Ken tucky and a great part of Tennessee were permanently lost, New Orleans fell, and the Federals gained control of great stretches of the Mississippi. Then the Confederate Government awoke from its dream. The first Conscription Act (April 1862) retained in service the 148 regiments of one-year volunteers and by en couraging voluntary enlistment enabled Lee to save Richmond, but the ground lost in the west was never recovered.
The Confederacy had one inherent weakness. It was composed of "sovereign" States, which would temporarily sacrifice their "State rights" for the success of their revolution, but demanded that the Central Government should provide for their protection, and if it failed in that duty, would take their own measures for self-defence. The State governors were always a thorn in Davis's side. From the first they required delicate handling and, when things began to go wrong, became refractory. This State patriot ism combined with geographical conditions to isolate the different sections of the country and prevented the Confederates from raking proper advantage of the "interior lines." Only once did troops from the Trans-Mississippi come to the help of their coun trymen on the other side of the river. Van Dorn moved from Ar kansas to Beauregard's aid at Corinth, but his men were very reluctant to cross the river, and it is significant that no attempt was made to bring reinforcements to Vicksburg in 1863 from that department. Only once were considerable reinforcements sent from the east to the west, when Longstreet with two divisions was sent to Bragg's aid, and the victory of Chickamauga (q.v.) was the result.
The west was the really decisive theatre of war. In the east Lee's victories did not alter the strategical position.. The end of each campaign found the Army of the Potomac on the Rappa hannock, still menacing Richmond. But the fall of Vicksburg cut the Confederacy in two ; the loss of the food supplies, espe cially cattle, from the Trans-Mississippi was sorely felt, and the capture of Chattanooga and Knoxville not only cut off another section of territory, but opened the way to Georgia, the granary of the South. That Lee's and Johnston's armies were reduced to starvation was due to the loss of Georgia's supplies. Grant indeed captured Richmond and Lee's army, but had he chosen he might have brought Sherman's army by sea from Savannah to the James, and it could have been there two months before he began his final move.
In final analysis the North's naval superiority must be reckoned a decisive factor. It made possible the conquest of the Mississippi and Sherman's march through Georgia. The capture of New Berne by the Burnside expedition (Mar. 1862) provided the Federal land forces with a base, from which they could threaten an advance on Richmond, and caused the permanent retention in North Carolina of a considerable Confederate force, which might have been profitably employed elsewhere, notably at the time of Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania. The blockade threw the South upon its own resources, which proved inadequate, especially in the matter of munitions of war and medical stores. It was not lack of food, but the difficulty of transport, which reduced the Confed erate armies to the verge of starvation. The Southern railways were not equal to the strain of a four years' war. The rolling stock could not be replaced when worn out or the permanent way kept in working order owing to the lack of iron rails.
(W. B. Wo.) BIBLIOGRAPHY.-J. F. Rhodes, A History of the United States (i906), vols. iii., iv., v., and The American Civil War (1917) ; E. Channing, The War for Southern Independence (1925) ; J. B. McMaster, His tory of the People of the United States during Lincoln's Adminis tration (192 7) ; J. K. Hosmer, The American Civil War ( I q I 3) ; G. C. Eggleston, History of the Confederate War (Iq1o) ; W. G. Shotwell, The Civil War in America (1923) ; W. B. Woods and J. E. Edmonds, A History of the Civil War (1905) ; J. Formby, The Ameri can Civil War (191o). The official documents are found in Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies and Navies, 13o vols.