Battle of Amiens

AMIENS, BATTLE OF (1918). This is the name for the offensive of the British 4th and French 1st Army under Sir Doug las Haig's orders, an offensive which, launched by surprise on Aug. 8, 1918, and coming close after the Allied counterstroke on the Marne (see WORLD WAR and MARNE, SECOND BATTLE OF THE), inaugurated the unbroken tide of advance which culminated in the Armistice, on Nov. 11, 1918. After the German spring offen sive had been finally stopped in front of Amiens, this sector had an interval of comparative quiet, except for frequent small raids by the Australians holding it, while the struggle developed on other parts of the front.

Towards the end of June, the 4th Army commander, Gen. Raw linson, decided that an operation on rather a larger scale than the Australians had so far carried out had every chance of meeting with success. On July 4, six Australian battalions, working in close co-operation with some 6o tanks, together with four companies of the American 33rd division, which was attached to the 4th Army for training, attacked on a front of nearly three and a-half miles, and with consummate ease and only small losses captured the ridge running from Villers-Bretonneux down to the Somme at Hamel. This operation gave greater depth and valuable positions for observation to the British line, while at the same time it de nied to the enemy important observation over much of the Somme valley. It also showed that the German infantry was no longer the determined foe that it had been in 1916 and 1917, and that the enemy's defences were not formidable. The real significance of the operation was its evidence that on the 4th Army front a well organized attack, supported by tanks well trained beforehand to co-operate with infantry, would have every prospect of breaking through the enemy's defences, given the element of surprise. On July 17 Rawlinson submitted proposals to Haig for an at tack by the 4th Army on a front of approximately 16m. from Moreuil to Morlancourt. The plan was at once approved by Haig, who, in response to a request from Gen. Foch that the British should take the offensive on the Lys front with a view to recover ing the important position on Kemmel hill, recommended that the venue for the British offensive should be changed to the Amiens front. To this proposal Foch assented with the modification that the French ist Army (Debeney) should attack on the southern portion of the front between Moreuil and the River Luce (about three and a half miles) shoulder to shoulder with the British 4th Army, both armies operating under the direct orders of the Brit ish commander-in-chief.

On July 28 Foch issued his orders. "The object of the opera tion," he said, "is to disengage Amiens and the Amiens-Paris rail way, as well as to beat and push back the enemy between the Somme and the Avre. The offensive, covered on the north by the Somme, is to push forward as far as possible in the direction of Roye." The Amiens–Roye road was fixed as the dividing line be tween French and British, and Aug. i o was to be the day of at tack. This date was subsequently advanced to Aug. 8.

Preparations for Surprise Attack.

OnJuly 26 orders were received that the preparations, which Rawlinson had already be gun in anticipation of sanction being given to his proposed opera tion, were to be pressed forward with all speed. The essence of the whole plan was secrecy. Unless the existing conditions both as regards the state of the hostile defences and the absence of re serves could be maintained success could not be guaranteed, and in consequence it was not until July 31 that divisional command ers even were told the true story of the operations, a false but adequate reason having been given for the preparations.

On Aug. 1 the strength of the 4th Army was seven divisions, one cavalry division, three tank battalions (about iio tanks), squadrons R.A.F. and i,000 guns and howitzers. By zero hour on Aug. 8, this force had been increased to 13 divisions, three cavalry divisions, 12 tank battalions (about 456 tanks), 17 squadrons R.A.F., and over 2,000 guns and howitzers, of which 672 were "heavies." In addition, one division, retained in the hands of the commander-in-chief, was brought into the area, while two others arrived on the day of the battle. The cavalry, about 96 whippet tanks, and part of the artillery were moved by road, the remainder being brought up in some 290 special trains, 23o for personnel and guns and 6o for ammunition and materiel.

As the Canadian Corps, at the time in reserve near Arras, had not been involved in the desperate fighting earlier in the year, it was realized that wherever it was identified in the line by the enemy an early offensive would certainly be expected. The first problem, therefore, was to camouflage its move and to keep its presence secret up to the last possible moment. With this object a few Canadian units were moved into the line near Kemmel, whilst the remainder moved down to the Amiens front, though it was not allowed to take over its part of the front line until just before zero hour on Aug. 8. The task also of introducing and reg istering a very large number of guns without detection was no easy matter. All movements of artillery units and the formation of ammunition dumps had to be done at -night. A strictly limited number of guns only were allowed to fire daily, nothing above the normal number of rounds being permitted.

General Plan of Attack.

The British front of attack was divided between the Canadian Corps (Currie, four divisions) from the Amiens–Roye road to the Amiens–Chaulnes railway, 7,5ooyds.; the Australian Corps (Monash, five divisions) thence to the Somme, 7,Sooyds.; and the 3rd Corps (Butler, four divisions) thence to the River Ancre, S,000yds. ; while to each corps a pro portion of tanks was allotted. The task of the 3rd Corps was to form a defensive flank north of the Somme, whilst the French 1st Army would carry out a similar task on the right of the Ca nadians. Three successive objectives were assigned at distances respectively of two to two and a-half, three to five, and six to eight miles from the original starting line. With the ample pro vision of tanks it was possible to repeat and improve upon the Cambrai experiment (see CAMBRAI, BATTLE OF) of Nov. 1917, and thus to gain the full value of surprise; a preliminary bom bardment was omitted, the artillery, infantry and tank action commencing simultaneously at zero hour, up to which moment there was no divergence from the ordinary daily routine of trench warfare. With the French, however, the situation was different, as tanks were not available to assist them, and Debeney decided to bombard the enemy's defences for 4o minutes prior to the in fantry advance. The zero hour, 4.2o A.M., of the 4th Army advance synchronised with the opening of the French bombardment.

The hostile forces believed to be available to oppose the British were six divisions in first line with eight in reserve of the German end Army (Marwitz), while in front of the attacking corps of the French 1st Army were the two left divisions of the German 2nd Army and one division of the German 18th Army (Hutier) . By the morning of Aug. 8 all preparations for the battle were complete, and the Allied forces, all unsuspected by the enemy, were about to enter upon the first stage of their march to the Rhine.

The British Attack, Aug. 8.

At 4.20 A.M. (approximately one hour before sunrise) Rawlinson's 4th Army, under cover of a powerful barrage, debouched to the assault. Thick ground mist veiled the advance from the eyes of the Germans, who were com pletely surprised and overwhelmed with little resistance along nearly the whole front. The Canadian Corps attacked with three divisions in line, the 3rd, 1st and 2nd in order from the right. The Canadian 3rd Division, making light of the difficult task of de bouching from a narrow bridgehead on the south bank of the River Luce, captured Hangard and Demuin, and by noon had carried its front forward to the second objective, between Mezi eres and Cayeux. The 3rd Cavalry Division then went through, followed by the Canadian 4th Division, but, after taking Beau court, was held up by machine-gun fire. The infantry on coming up succeeded in pushing forward, though they were unable that day to capture Le Quesnel, the final objective.

The Canadian 1st Division in the centre reached the first ob jective by 6.2o A.M. ; but the Canadian 2nd Division on its left only attained it an hour and a half later, having met with strong opposition at Marcelcave. At 8.2o A.M. the advance was resumed, the German machine-gunners putting up considerable resistance against the Canadian 2nd Division. The 1st Cavalry Division now sent forward two brigades, one of which passed through the Ca nadian 2nd Division and drove far into hostile territory, attaining the final objective in conjunction with the infantry, which followed up, clearing the ground in rear of the cavalry. By the end of the day's fighting the Canadian Corps had, with the exception already noted on the extreme right, carried out its appointed task, and captured over 5,00o prisoners and 161 guns.

Progress in the Centre.

The Australian Corps in the centre of the British attack had their 2nd and 3rd Divisions in the front line with the 5th and 4th in support, the 1st Division being in re serve. The leading line, aided most effectively by the tanks, reached the first objective with little opposition. The 5th and 4th Divisions then continued the advance, pushing on beyond Bay onvillers and Morcourt, and occupied the second objective by about 10.30 A.M., when a brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division passed through towards Harbonnieres and armoured cars raced forward down the Brie road, penetrating far into the enemy's back areas. Behind them, the Australians, throwing back their left to face the enemy on the north bank of the Somme, pushed for ward their centre and right to the final objective just west of Vauvillers and Proyart, where they found the cavalry held up. During the day the Australians took nearly 8,000 prisoners and 173 guns.

North of the Somme the 3rd Corps had not met with the same measure of success. The plan had been disarranged by a local German attack near Morlancourt on Aug. 6, which forced back a part of the Allied line some Soo yards. In addition the terrain was not so suitable for tank manoeuvres as south of the river. The attack opened with the 58th, i 8th and 12th Divisions from right to left. After the first objective had been gained,\the fur ther advance broke down against the resistance of the enemy holding the Chipilly spur, while further north the enemy counter attacked and drove back the advanced attacking troops. Never theless the 3rd Corps captured during the day nearly 2,40o prison ers and 4o guns.

The results of this most successful day's battle were the com plete defeat and rout of 11 German divisions, a gain of ground to an average depth of six to seven miles on a front of eight miles, the capture of over 16,000 prisoners, 373 guns, several thousand machine-guns and quantities of ammunition and stores. Most im portant of all, the battle destroyed the last hope of German vic tory. "It was," said Ludendorff, "the black day of the German army in the war . . . To continue would be a gamble. The war would have to be ended." The French Attack, Aug. 8.—At 4.2o A.M., simultaneous with the British assault, the French bombardment of the enemy's position on the commanding ground in the angle between the riv ers Avre and Luce opened, and at 5.05 A.M. the French infantry in this sector debouched to the attack. For this operation Deb eney allotted three divisions of the 3 I st Corps, of which one divi sion was given the task of capturing Moreuil. Despite a stubborn defence, the enemy was gradually driven back and Moreuil wood taken. This feature was of great importance, as its capture se cured the flank of the British advance. At 8.20 A.M. the next corps to the south, the 9th Corps, crossed the Avre, south of Moreuil, and extended the front of attack, which by the end of the day's fighting reached the general line Plessier–Fresnoy (excl.). Although the French attack did not quite reach its final objective for the day, its main task of securing the British flank was carried out, while some 3,00o prisoners and many guns were captured. The other two corps of the French 1st Army did not take an .offensive role until next day. The result also enabled Gen. Fayolle, com manding the French reserve group of armies, to carry out his plan of extending the battle front farther to the south on Aug. 9.

Continuation of British Advance, Aug. 9-11.

It was de cided by Rawlinson that the 4th Army should on Aug. 9 continue its advance to the line Roye–Chaulnes–Bray–Dernancourt. The main attack was entrusted to the Canadian Corps, which was to push south-east to the line Roye–Hallu, whilst the Australian corps was to secure its left between the latter place and Meri court, and the 3rd Corps to advance to Etinehem and form a de fensive flank north of the Somme.

Early in the morning the Canadians captured the village of Le Quesnel, thus completing the capture of all the objectives al lotted to the main British attack for the 8th. During the day, assisted by cavalry, they advanced the line an average of five miles and halted for the night on a general line east of Rouvroy and Meharicourt. To the north the Australians reached Lihons hill and captured Framerville after stubborn fighting. The 3rd Corps, north of the Somme, cleared the Chipilly spur and occupied Mor lancourt. During the day six German divisions reinforced the front from neighbouring armies. On Aug. r o and 1 r the advance continued against ever-stiffening resistance and hostile counter attacks, eventually reaching the general line Le Quesnoy–Lihons Raincourt, whilst north of the river the Etinehem spur was com pletely cleared.

It was now clear that to push the offensive farther would lead to disproportionate loss with little corresponding gain. The enemy had reformed his front, shattered on the 8th, by fresh troops from other portions of the line, and had settled down on the edge of the area devastated in the Somme battles of 1916, where a maze of old trenches, wire and shell holes rendered defence easy and rapid advance impracticable. Rawlinson had engaged all his 13 divisions, units were tired and in need of a breathing-space. He therefore decided to allow his troops a few days' rest while preparing for a renewal of the attack on Aug. 15. Units in the line were relieved and tired infantry and cavalry withdrawn into reserve.

French Operations, Aug. 9-11.

On Aug. 9 Debeney made an encircling attack, south-east and north-east with his loth and 35th Corps, his objective being Montdidier. The former was checked, and thus the garrison of the town managed to slip out, but the town was occupied and the rearguard captured on the morning of Aug. 10. In the meantime the 31st Corps to the north reached the line Pierrepont–Arvillers. By the night of the r r th it gained the western outskirts of Roye. On Aug 10 Fayolle brought in the French 3rd Army (Humbert) on the right. Attacking on the front Courcelles–Gournay in the direction of Lassigny, it made an advance of an average depth of three to four miles. Next day the front was extended still farther southwards, but, owing to the enemy's resistance becoming stronger, progress was thencefor ward slow.

British Operations, Aug.

12-21.—Owing to the difficulty of reorganizing the front of attack and of bringing pp the guns, the attack arranged for Aug. 15 did not materialize, and up to the only local actions took place on the 4th Army front. British at tacks alternated with hostile counter-attacks, the line after hard fighting reaching Damery–Lihons–Proyart–Dernancourt. On Aug. 17 Haig decided to transfer temporarily the centre of gravity of the British offensive to the 3rd and 1st Army areas. The Cana dian Corps was taken out of the line and the French 1st Army took over the British front as far north as Lihons. During the period Aug. 8-21 the 4th Army had forced back the Germans to a depth of r 2m., had defeated or engaged with its own 13 divisions no less than 27 of the enemy's, had taken over 23,00o prisoners and 400 guns and had killed and wounded more than an equivalent num ber, at a cost to itself of some 27,000 casualties.

French Operations, Aug. 12-21.

During this period the French 1st Army, which remained under Haig's command until the r 6th, also came to a halt, but the French 3rd Army, whose ad vance was assisted by the French loth Army's attack east of the Oise, after a hard and determined defence succeeded in occupying Lassigny on Aug. 21. In the 12 days' fighting Humbert's army of seven divisions had driven eight hostile divisions from their strong vantage-ground and had taken 5,000 prisoners and loo guns.

General Results of the Battle.

The course and results of the fortnight's fighting may be summed up as follows : The three Al lied armies (British 4th, French 1st and 3rd), with 32 divisions, had attacked and defeated the German 2nd and r 8th Armies of 42 divisions. The Allies had advanced to a depth of 6-13m. on a front of 47m. taking 40,000 prisoners and 600 guns. Most impor tant of all, the Allied lateral communications between Paris and the north had been cleared, and a wide breach had been made in the German front, susceptible, as events were to show, of being rapidly widened to either flank by further Allied attacks. A shattering blow had been dealt to the morale of the German Army and their high command, from the effects of which neither was destined to recover. The battle of Amiens was the first page in the story of the Allied victory of 1918.