THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION - THE WAR AT SEA The largely economic origin of the American Revolution took on a prominently maritime aspect in its early phases. Heavily in debt from recent wars, England was also faced with a constantly increasing demand for overseas markets and marine expansion, on account of the "industrial revolution" through which she was then passing. Beginning in 1764 a series of laws were passed by par liament having in view both the raising of revenue through taxing the sea-borne imports of the colonies, and the favouring of Eng lish maritime trade by discriminations against colonial shipping. Laws looking solely to the latter object had been in existence for many years, but custom had given them little attention, and a large prosperous colonial merchant marine had grown up on a technically illegal trade and had become an important element in the economic structure of the colonies. Consequently the enforce ment of these "Navigation Acts" was the cause of much hardship and resentment in America. As early as 1764 a British schooner so engaged was fired on in Rhode Island waters. In 1769 the sloop "Liberty," similarly employed, was seized and burnt at Newport. Such incidents became more common as British coer cive measures increased, and when war finally broke there was a popular uprising on the sea quite comparable to that on land.
The onset of the Revolution found the colonies with no naval forces whatever, but with a large maritime population, and many merchant vessels commonly employed as the principal means of transport for both domestic and foreign trade. This merchant service was familiar not only with the sea, but also with warfare. Colonial ships and seamen had taken a prominent part in the large naval expeditions against Cartagena and Louisburg, had engaged in privateering during the more recent French war, and even dur ing peace had habitually gone armed as a protection against pirates. In 1775 it was therefore natural that considerable num bers of colonial merchant vessels should turn to privateering; a general practice which was continued on a large scale until the close of the war, under legal authorization of individual colonies and of the Continental Congress. Records are incomplete but indicate that well over 2,000 private armed vessels were so em ployed during the course of the war, carrying upwards of 18,000 guns and 70,000 men. In addition, several of the colonies organ ized "State" navies which also engaged in preying upon hostile commerce. These operations were on such a scale that they must be regarded as a primary American military effort of the war. Together with the operations of a few "Continental" vessels they constituted the only sustained offensive pressure brought to bear by the Americans which materially affected the attitude of the British people towards peace. Such injury was done British com merce as to increase insurance rates to unprecedented figures, to seriously reduce available sources of revenue and to alarm the sea-coast population.
In its military-naval aspect the war followed two distinct phases ; the first ending when France allied herself with the colonies in 1778, until which time Britain had no foreign enemy, and was free to concentrate her whole strength against the Ameri cans. In the second phase England ultimately had to contend against the fleets of France, Spain and Holland, and her conse quent inability to meet the naval necessities in American waters was a major influence in the final and decisive campaign ending at Yorktown. With the large navy available during the first three years of the Revolution it was repeatedly urged by Viscount Barrington, the British secretary for war, that : "Conquest [of the colonies] by land is unnecessary when the country can be reduced first by distress, and then to obedience by our marine totally in terrupting all commerce and fishery, and even seizing all ships in the ports with very little expense and less bloodshed." Instead of adopting such strategy the British naval forces were used primarily in direct support of army operations and in the protec tion of their own maritime commerce.
The pressing want of munitions for the Colonial army was the chief impulse in the creation of regular American naval forces. This need caused Benedict Arnold, formerly a sea captain, to march from the siege of Boston, and in association with Ethan Allen to make a surprise capture of the well-stocked stronghold of Ft. Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain, so early as May 1 o, '775. The seemingly minor event had far-reaching results. Not only were munitions obtained, but the prompt seizure of all lake water craft also gave to the colonies control of the only practicable line of communications from the St. Lawrence river to the Hudson valley. At first provoked by. this overt act the Continental Con gress at Philadelphia, then debating ways of forming a constitu tional union with England, soon reversed its attitude, voted gen eral defensive measures, and appointed George Washington com mander-in-chief of the army. A few weeks after taking command of the Continental army besieging Boston, Washington organized a naval force to prey upon the British water communications of that port, and in this way essential munitions were obtained. In Oct. 1775 Congress voted funds for the first units of a small fleet of eight vessels which sailed from the Delaware on Feb. 17, 1776, under Commodore Esek Hopkins. The objective was Nassau in the Bahama islands, where a quantity of powder was known to be stored. This was captured on March 3, and the valuable munitions taken in to New London. Meantime the British army under Howe had evacuated Boston and gone by sea to Halifax. Correctly estimating the future probabilities, Washington marched to New York and also provided for the defence of Lake Cham plain. For the campaign of 1776 the British plan was to isolate New England by capturing and holding the line of the Hudson river. With this end in view, Howe, heavily reinforced, sailed in June for New York, while other forces undertook an advance via Lake Champlain. Here Arnold had retreated after an un successful attack on Quebec, and had actively begun the construc tion of a fleet to retain control of the lake.
During the summer a British army of nearly 13,00o men ad vanced from Quebec to the lake but was compelled to halt until a sufficient naval force could be constructed to cope with Arnold's rapidly growing fleet. This they were able to do after some months through the assistance of artizans from their ships in the St. Lawrence river, and by reassembling on the lake a large vessel whose dismantled parts had been transported in small boats from Quebec. In a series of naval actions on Oct. I 1, 12 and 13, Arnold's fleet of 15 vessels was destroyed. Meantime Howe had gained possession of the lower Hudson, but the season was now so late that the British command on Lake Champlain decided to abandon further operations until spring, and retreated into Can ada. When in June of the following year Burgoyne renewed the advance from the north, Howe had shifted his operations by sea to the vicinity of Philadelphia, and Burgoyne was forced to surrender at Saratoga (Oct. from lack of support. Thus had Arnold's fleet, by delaying the British army for nearly a year, contributed largely to the decisive battle of Saratoga which proved to be a turning point in the war.
Impressed by the evidence of American strength given at Sara toga, and wishing to recover her losses to England in previous wars, France entered into a treaty of alliance with the United States in Feb. 1778. The event marked the beginning of an en tirely new phase in the war. Henceforth naval power was to be employed on a great scale and to affect vitally military opera tions in America, as well as the course of European history, and the fate of valuable possessions from the West Indies to the East Indies. Herein can be considered at any length only those events which bore directly on the American Revolution.
A French fleet under d'Estaing sailed from Toulon in April 1778, bound for America. Advance news of its coming caused a hasty evacuation of the Delaware by the British fleet then acting in support of the army occupying Philadelphia. Fearing to risk the loss of the army in the event of meeting a superior French fleet at sea, the British command decided to march the troops, bereft of their line of supply, by land to New York, where a junction with the fleet was again made. D'Estaing appeared off the port a few days later, but having missed the opportunity of a decisive victory in the Delaware, he sailed for Newport in ac cordance with an understanding made with Washington. While preparations were in progress at Newport for a joint attack by Americans and French upon the British garrison of 6,000 troops, the British fleet approached, having been reinforced from Eng land. D'Estaing hastily abandoned the land operations and put to sea to meet them. A partial engagement ensued, followed by a gale which so damaged the ships as to persuade the French ad miral to go to Boston for extensive repairs (Aug. 1778). On this account the American army before Newport was withdrawn. Meantime a second and more powerful French fleet had been fitted out at Brest with the object of indirectly assisting their overseas naval forces by holding the main strength of the British navy to its home waters. In July 1778 a large but indecisive fleet action was fought off Ushant. Under cover of these major opera tions Captain John Paul Jones of the "Continental Navy" with a small squadron based on French ports, carried on a series of raids against British coastal shipping.
At this period of history considerations of weather during the winter season usually caused the transfer of naval operations from the Western Hemisphere to the West Indies, which held the further attraction of being the richest of the world's commercial regions in value of products. Therefore when d'Estaing sailed from Boston in Nov. 1778, his destination was the Caribbean sea, f or which locality most of the British fleet in America also ,,sailed on the same day. The latter took 5,00o troops with them, thus greatly reducing the land forces opposed to the Continental army. During the next four years the West Indies were the scene of a large-scale naval war, the forces on each side being often aug mented from home, and in the case of the French fleet, by Span ish reinforcements. D'Estaing was unsuccessful off St. Lucia in two attacks (Dec. 1778) upon the main British fleet, but, while the latter was guarding a trade convoy, during the following sum mer, he captured St. Vincent and then Grenada where an inde cisive naval action was fought upon the return of the British fleet (July 17 79) . Meantime in the autumn of 1778 the British had sent a small expedition from New York, under naval convoy, to Savannah, which place was taken. These operations were extended to the neighbourhood of Charleston during the following year, and attracted the attention of d'Estaing. Arriving off Savannah from the West Indies with his whole fleet in Aug. 1779, he failed in an attempt to retake the place. Nevertheless upon receiving news of the Savannah affair, the British Gen. Clinton at New York was so concerned over the safety of his diminished army in the north that he abandoned Newport in order to concentrate his forces against possible French attack.
The summer of 1779 also saw the ill-starred "Penobscot Expe dition." A British military-naval force having occupied what is now Castine, Me., the Massachusetts government undertook to dislodge it. A fleet of 4o vessels including three of the Con tinental navy and 20 transports, in all carrying 200 guns and 3,00o men sailed from Boston and began its attack on the Brit ish position on July 25. Fighting continued afloat and ashore until Aug. 13, when a superior British naval squadron arrived from New York and put the Americans to rout.
John Paul Jones, operating from French bases with a small squadron, made a cruise around the British Isles from Aug. to Oct. 1779. Many prizes were taken and the British frigate "Serapis" was captured after a memorable duel with the Ameri can flagship "Bon Homme Richard." The success of these opera tions was greatly aided by the fact of the absence in distant waters of practically the whole naval strength of Great Britain, and by the operations in the English channel of a large combined French and Spanish fleet in support of a threatened invasion of England from France.
On the American coast the year 178o saw the inception of the British policy of conquering the Carolinas which involved such a division of forces as to bring about the ultimate loss of the war. An army detachment escorted by naval forces was sent from New York and captured Charleston in May. These opera tions were placed in some jeopardy by the arrival of a French squadron with 6,000 troops at Newport in July, but this was off set by British naval reinforcements reaching New York a day later. The British operations in the Carolinas were also cov ered by the activity in the West Indies of a large naval force under Admiral Rodney, which had been recently sent out from England. Three indecisive actions were fought, near Martinique in April and May 178o, against the French fleet under Admiral Guichen, which was finally reinforced by a Spanish squadron. Not meeting with the success which had been anticipated, Cornwallis, commanding the southern British army in America decided upon a movement into Virginia where naval support could be utilized to better advantage. Meantime on the James river, Benedict Arnold (then under British allegiance) had been ravag ing the country, and at the request of Washington the French squadron at Newport had proceeded to the Chesapeake ; but after an indecisive action with a British squadron (March 1781), had returned to Newport. Cornwallis joined Arnold on March 20, at Petersburg, with the intention of undertaking vigorous offen sive operations in Virginia. But the commander-in-chief, Gen. Clinton, who was at New York, felt that the forces available were insufficient for such an undertaking, and ordered Cornwallis to intrench himself in a strong position which would control a fleet anchorage. Cornwallis complied by moving to Yorktown, where he arrived on Aug. 22 with 7,000 troops. It should be observed here that England's ability to support her forces in America at this stage was seriously impaired by Holland joining the alliance against her. In Aug. 1781 a severe naval action was fought in the North sea between the Dutch and British fleets. England's naval forces were further involved in the defence of Gibraltar, Minorca and India.
The joint military-naval combination which brought about the surrender of Cornwallis and the virtual end of the war in America, was very unusual. It involved the timely concentration at York town of widespread forces; a co-ordination of effort which was very difficult to accomplish with the means of communication and the slow mobility of that period. The most important element in the situation was naval control, since Cornwallis' supplies and reinforcements must come by sea and Washington's army near New York could not be moved with sufficient celerity to the critical area except by utilizing water transport on Chesapeake bay. The co-operation of the main French fleet, which for sev eral years had been operating against the British fleet in the West Indies, was essential, and its aid was requested by both Washing ton and Rochambeau. Admiral de Grasse concurred in the plan and sailed from Haiti on Aug. 25, 1781, with 28 ships of the line. Gaining advance information of this move through inter cepted messages, the British admiral also left the West Indies and was the first to reach the Chesapeake, but not being certain of de Grasse's destination, continued on to New York. Here it became evident from the southerly movements of the united armies of Washington and Rochambeau, that Yorktown was the main Franco-American objective, and Admiral Graves hastily sailed on Aug. 31 for that locality.
Meantime Admiral de Grasse had arrived in the Chesapeake and had stationed cruisers in the James river to prevent Corn wallis from escaping to the south. On Sept. 5 the British fleet of 19 ships of the line appeared off the Chesapeake entrance where it was partially defeated by 24 French ships present. Ad miral Graves remained in the vicinity for the next seven days, still hoping for an opportunity to reach Yorktown and assist in its defence, but the French fleet, increased to a total of 36 ships of the line by the arrival of the Newport squadron, took up an intervening position inside the bay. On Sept. 13 Graves there fore departed for New York. The control of the Chesapeake being then undisputed, the allied troops were transported by water from the north to Williamsburg whence they marched to the investment of Yorktown. Here, with his sea communications completely severed, Cornwallis surrendered on Oct. 19, 1781; virtually ending the war on the American continent.
The French admiral, having rendered this vital service to his ally, now returned to the West Indies, whither he was followed by Hood. In Jan. and Feb. 1782 he conquered St. Christopher, in spite of the most determined opposition of the British. The next purpose of the French was to combine with the Spaniards for an attack on Jamaica. Sir George Rodney, having returned to his command with reinforcements, baffled this plan by a series of operations which culminated in the battle of April 12, 1782. This, combined with the success of the British in withstanding repeated naval attacks against Gibraltar, took the heart out of the French and Spaniards and made them ready for peace. After preliminary articles had been signed in Nov. 1782, the naval campaign between British and French squadrons in India continued until June 1783.
In retrospect the American Revolution is seen to have de veloped from small beginnings into one of the greatest naval wars in history. During its progress the early issues of colonial maritime rights and independence became subordinated in Euro pean eyes to that of the control of the then commercially very valuable West Indies, and other objects. The fleet operations which in a few weeks decided the fate of Yorktown, and of the American cause, were merely incidental to the vast naval cam paign carried on over a period of five years in Caribbean, European and Indian waters.