General Strike

GENERAL STRIKE. The strike weapon (or stoppage of work, in the sense of withdrawal of labour) is usually employed for the purpose of securing an improvement in working condi tions; it is often used to resist reductions of wages or addition to working hours, though in such a dispute the stoppage is usually a "lock-out." Many strikes are confined to individual factories or workshops. Others extend to towns or areas ; and some to industries on a national scale, like coal mining or cotton manu facture. If all industries combined in stoppage that would form a national or general strike; but in practice no country has ever had, in the strictly comprehensive sense, a general strike. At best, stoppages have varied greatly in range and effect. And the broad experience of two centuries in Great Britain is roughly similar to that of practically all the industrial countries of the world.

It indicates that there is no easily identified body of theory or practice bearing on the general strike. In their History of Trades Unionism, Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb noted three different meth ods which during that period the trade unions had adopted for enforcing the common rules they wished to have adopted in the conditions of employment : (r) mutual insurance; (2) legal en actment; and (3) after 1824, collective bargaining. In the last 20 or 3o years, up to 1914, both the great strikes and the gradual changes of the period have been regarded as of less importance than the series of legal decisions of the House of Lords as final court of appeal.

Towards the end of the first quarter of last century there was considerable industrial strife ; it included an almost general lock out in Glasgow, a strong combination of seamen on the north-east coast, and the enforcement of many by-laws by the Dublin trades, then better organized than others in Great Britain. Joseph Hume and Francis Place pleaded for moderation. They warned the unions of the danger of reaction. But ship-owning interests, among others, at that time generally hostile to unionism, pressed for parliamentary inquiry into the conduct of workmen and the effect of recent legislation. Many of the employers suggested the com plete abolition of trade unionism; others would have made even friendly societies impossible.

A more definite form of strike action is traceable in the revo lutionary period or that of the new unionism between 1829 and 1842. Appreciating the weakness of isolated action, or effort on a purely craft basis, many trade union leaders attempted to form national societies of all trades ; they also urged that all manual workers should belong to one comprehensive organization. When a six months' strike at Hyde, near Manchester, failed, there was immediate support for the view that no local union could succeed against a combination of employers. Succeeding conferences advo cated central executives for different industries; and in the case of the cotton spinners a grand general council of the United King dom was established, although the records of its representative character as covering the three kingdoms are incomplete. From such projects emerged the greater ambition of the trades union; that is, a national association representative of all classes of wage earners whose large-scale organizations would be able to face considerable strain both in strike and lock-out. But such machin ery was at this point impressive only on paper; the employers were generally victorious ; and the admittedly prejudiced report of Nassau Senior supplied fresh material for the opponents of trade unionism, particularly in arguments regarding restraint of trade. Ultimately the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union see ROBERT OWEN) collapsed ; and not even an increas ing economic prosperity brought success to strikes promoted in the interests of better conditions of labour. In the summer of federal organizations were plainly in process of disintegration, later, the membership turned in part to consideration of Owenite social reform. Nor did the considerable industrial dislocation of 1842 merit the description of a general strike. Much of the activity of the period was bound up with Chartist agitation ; at one point the trade union movement was almost submerged in political effort. But many trade union leaders came to disapprove of this economic-political association, and when, in that year, the Chartist executive at Manchester called for a general strike to ob tain the charter, local trade union officials were active in persuad ing their members to avoid both the meetings and the resolutions.

Decline of the General Strike Idea.

In the next quarter of a century there was much gradual building up of large amal gamated societies of skilled artisans, with centralized administra tion, friendly society benefits, and substitution of industrial diplomacy for the cruder methods of class warfare. Between and 186o trade unions were regarded as largely successful in achieving their more limited aims; in any event, of the aggressive policy of 183r34 little remained. Strikes were deprecated; there was practically no trace of argument in favour of a general ces sation of work. At a national conference in 1845 trade unionists declared their support of a new method of trade union activity in conciliation or arbitration. So quickly, however, did circumstances change in the trade depression of 1845 that the next two years were remarkable for reduction of wages, strikes and lock-outs (or turn-outs) in many branches of industry. Generally speaking, these stoppages proved disastrous for the workers ; there was much complaint regarding the weakness of their central execu tives and committees. In the midst of this dislocation representa tive trade unionists were constantly urging the importance of timely words with the employers in the interest of pacific settle ment. The weapon of the strike, in the sense of declaring war on the employers, was during these years of crisis taken away from many of the local branches ; a local lodge had usually to submit its demand to a vote of the whole body of members throughout Great Britain, a procedure which involved delay and gave cen tral committees an opportunity to work for peace. But Mr. and Mrs. Webb emphasize the fact that although most of the executive committees were from 1845 always setting their faces against strikes, that did not imply the abandonment of an ener getic trade policy. This period, and succeeding periods, like their predecessors, included a bewildering variety of movements for organization on a national basis, usually ending in failure; minor or local stoppages; threats of general lock-out in the whole indus try, as in the case of the engineering trade ; and the growth and progress of large national trade societies like the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. From 1857 there was another period of strife. As before, the weakness of trade union organization was plain; in the 1859-6o strikes the masons alone of the building trades were regarded as effectively organized into a single society extending throughout England.

Most of the authorities regard the distinctive policy of the Junta, the committee which largely regulated union policy from 1860-70, as the combination of extreme caution in trade matters and energetic agitation for political reforms. About this period permanent trades councils appear in the leading industrial centres, an important step in the consolidation of the trade union move ment. In early times every important strike had been supported by committees of sympathizers in other trade societies; they col lected subscriptions and rendered other assistance. The London trades council began in a strike committee ; the earlier and purely emergency committee gave way by 186o to permanent councils in many of the large centres of population. In June i866 dele gates representing all the leading trade unions met at Sheffield to devise a method of defence against the constant use of the lock-out. The conference does not appear to have decided what constituted a lock-out as distinguished from a strike; there was certainly much friction among the individual organizations. The royal commission which investigated trade union problems at this period presented an inconclusive and inconsistent report. Suc ceeding years were full of similar sectional activity. The miners and cotton operatives achieved certain victories in legislation; trade unions had on occasion the support of several organs of the press; in some parts of the country stoppages for specific objects were successful ; but throughout all this effort important organiza tions were regularly emphasizing the futility of the strike weapon. That attitude is particularly true of the central executive of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. In tendering evidence to the royal commission in 1867 it remarked that all strikes were a complete waste of money, not only in relation to the workmen but also to the employers. The period 1873-74 is regarded as one of the high water marks in trade union history ; but the immediately succeeding years include strikes on a large scale. The conflict in the cotton industry in 1878 ended in failure for the workmen. Almost immediately a general collapse of trade union forces began; it proved to be impossible to resist reductions in wages and increases in hours. Conflicting policy within the unions led to considerable weakness; their general machinery was clearly inade quate; and attempts at federation achieved only limited success.

The General Strike of 1926.

Such ebb and flow, character istic of the remainder of the 19th century and of the first part of the present century until the outbreak of the World War, pro duced no definite theory or practice of the general strike. Certain stoppages were more comprehensive than others ; the measure of support accorded by trade unions to their colleagues in the industries affected varied very considerably ; and for the crisis of 1926 there was no effective preparation or precedent. That stoppage has been described by the general council of the trades union congress as a "national" rather than a "general" strike. Pending the report of a royal commission appointed to enquire into the condition of coal-mining the British Government in 1925 gave temporary subsidy, amounting to £23,000,000 in all, for the purpose of enabling the industry to tide over the intervening period. The detailed report of the general council of the congress summarizing events leading to the stoppage definitely suggests that the Miners' Federation of Great Britain, following the break down of negotiations, committed the future conduct of the dis pute to the general council. Of great importance, this point is clearly stated in a letter of May 1, 19a6 to the prime minister and signed by the acting secretary of the trades union congress. Early on May 3, 19a6, the Government intimated that in their belief no solution of the difficulties in the coal industry which was both practicable and honourable to all concerned could be reached except by acceptance of the report of the royal commission. Prior to the continuance of the negotiations the Government called for the repudiation of a certain strike action (in the Daily Mail build ings), together with immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the instructions for a general strike. The T.U.C. general council pleaded that the action on the part of the members of the Daily Mail staff had been taken entirely without their authority. The trade unions had made no preparations for a stoppage on a large scale, and at once protested against Government's suggestions.

It was urged that the Government were in this case less media tors than a directly interested party, even before the negotiations broke down. In the opinion of the general council the position adopted by the Government in their ultimatum left only two alternatives, (I) the capitulation of the Government or (2) the termination of the strike by a process of attrition. By the general council the first was regarded as unlikely, in view of the national resources over which the Government had control. The second was an alternative which the general council could not contem plate, on the ground that it would disorganize the trade union movement, completely establish reactionary elements in the coun try, and kill any possibility of getting fair consideration of the miners' case. By this time the national strike, as it afterwards was described by the T.U.C., or general strike as it was described by others, was in progress. Informal meetings with Sir Herbert Samuel, who had acted as chairman of the royal commission, pro duced a formula which was recommended by the trades union congress for the acceptance of the Miners' Federation. Its pro posals commended themselves to the council, but were rejected by the miners; and, finally appreciating that the deadlock was complete, the general council decided to issue notices terminating the strike. They pleaded that in view of all the facts known to them they felt it to be in accordance with the instructions they had received from the conference of trade union executives that the strike should be terminated with the maximum of advantage both to the miners and to the other trade unions; on that ground it was important that a decision should be reached while the unions remained strong and well disciplined. On the one hand, the miners rejected the Samuel memorandum, regarded by the general coun cil of the trades union congress as an equitable basis for settle ment; on the other, the general council pleaded its responsibility to trade unionism in general, contending that it could not follow the miners' executive in a policy of mere negation, that such a course would permit the splendid response of the sympathetic strike to disappear in process of attrition, bring the unions to bankruptcy, undermine the morale of their membership, destroy their capacity to resist attempts which might be made to impose adverse conditions, and to discriminate against the membership when the industries directly engaged in the strike resumed opera tions. This decision to end the strike was unanimous, and some months later the policy of the general council was approved by an overwhelming majority in a conference of trade union execu tives called to hold the "inquest" on the strike.

Why the 1926 Strike Failed.

Broadly speaking, the events of 1926 suggest that the difficulties of organizing a successful general strike are almost overwhelming. In Great Britain at least 15,000,00o people are definitely engaged in industrial and commercial pursuits. But trade union organization covered little more than 5,000,00o at the time of the strike ; of that 5,000,000, 1,500,000 are estimated to have taken part, plus rather more than 1,000,000 in the coal-mining industry not at work. The aggregate response was small, even among people to be regarded as sympa thetic. The direct cost to the State, placed in a supplementary estimate at £433,000, was far below what the maintenance of essential services was regarded as certain to involve ; the volume of voluntary assistance was remarkable. The indirect cost is more difficult to measure; but £50,000,000 or £60,000,00o has been suggested. For industry as a whole the loss was undoubtedly much more substantial. But such loss does not involve immediate pressure on the community; the advantage to the strikers for purely strike purposes is therefore much reduced. On the other hand, the resources of the unions are speedily exhausted. The general strike cost the National Union of Railwaymen at least £ I ,000,000. In addition to assistance rendered directly by other unions the trades union congress was able to allocate from sub scriptions more than £63,000 to the Miners' Federation. To a special fund promoted for the Miners' Federation, more than £93,000 was contributed. Impressive as these sums were, they were small in comparison with the need. At the end of 1925 the total membership of British trade unions was 4,447,818; the preliminary figures for 1926, the year of crisis, showed a loss of 300,000. Moreover, the general strike involved the heaviest ex penditure in dispute pay ever experienced by registered trade unions in any one year. In consequence, their funds were reduced from £12,750,000 to a little more than £8,500,000. Only in 1921, when they disbursed £7,000,000 in unemployment pay, have trade unions suffered such inroads on their resources.

Although the printing and allied trades ceased work, the Gov ernment and private effort were able to organize a press service which speedily reached a considerable section of the people ; com pared with the publications in the interests of the strike it had an undeniable advantage. Tens of thousands of volunteers facili tated food trains, lorries, and kindred provision ; the milk pool in Hyde Park covered the metropolitan area and actually showed a profit of £73,000 at the end of the stoppage. Special constabu lary were increased from 98,00o to 226,000; nearly half a million volunteers were enrolled ; and increasing transport provision was further augmented by Admiralty resources in the carriage of mails and other urgent traffic. Naval ratings secured the operation of electricity works in important centres, including 28 power stations in London. By May Io, more than 3,60o trains were running; considerable numbers of men had returned to work; a day later, Woolwich arsenal employees decided to return; and men engaged in the shipbuilding and engineering trades, who had been called out, made only partial response. British financial strength was fully maintained ; and there was no suggestion of panic. All the facts indicate that a strike on a national scale is now exceedingly difficult to maintain, chiefly because (I) there is no guarantee of more than very limited response to the strike call by the workers themselves; (2) the remarkable growth of motor and other trans port proves that alternative service, chiefly of voluntary character, can be readily mobilized; (3) essential services, such as gas, water and electricity, can be covered by Admiralty and War Office re sources, at all events in the larger centres of population; and (4) there is nowhere that complete paralysis of effort which, in all theory of the general strike, has always been regarded as essential to its speedy success. Economic alternatives are now such that even a much larger stoppage than that of 1926 could be worn down in comparatively short time, especially as the strain on the resources of the unions would be immediately much greater than that of those of the State. And since leading transport unions on the conclusion of the strike signed agreements undertaking not to call a stoppage in future before negotiation with the railway com panies and other employers, as well as the fact that the Trades Disputes Act of 1927 is now on the Statute Book, any large scale strike is apparently remote. (See DIRECT ACTION.) (W. GR.) BIBLIOGRAPHY.-For the theory of the general strike see A. D. Lewis Bibliography.-For the theory of the general strike see A. D. Lewis Syndicalism and the General Strike (1912) ; J. R. Commons and others, History of Labour in the U.S.A. (1918) ; Paul Brissenden, His tory of the I.W.W. (1919) ; G. D. H. Cole, The World of Labour (1913) ; and R. W. Postgate, The Bolshevik Theory (192o). For the general strike of 1926 see G. Glasgow, General Strikes and Road Trans port (1926) ; K. Martin, The British Public and the General Strike (1926) ; A. J. Cook, The Nine Days (1926) ; E. Burns and R. P. Arnot, The General Strike, 2 separate vols. (1926-27).

The General Strike in the United States and Canada.— The trade union movement in the United States and Canada has neither used nor advocated the general strike. Only the Industrial Workers of the World, arisen in 1905 as a protest by socialists and syndicalists against the conservatism of the established unions, preached but was too weak to practice the general strike.

Nevertheless during the war and immediately after, general strike propaganda penetrated deeply into western American unions. The Seattle general strike of 6o,000 workers called Feb. 6, 1919 by the city labour council, was ended Feb. II without ob taining its objective of helping shipyard workers on strike to gain wage increases. The Winnipeg strike called May 15, 1919 by the city central body in support of metal trades unionists striking for recognition and wage increases, lasted six weeks and involved 25,000 workers. Even civil servants joined the walkout and the police force was discharged for strike sympathies.

Since 1919 there have been three general strikes, one in San Francisco in July 1934, another in Terre Haute, Indiana, in July and a third in Pekin, Illinois, in Feb. 1936.

The San Francisco strike developed from a longshoremen's strike, when employers began to operate the docks by force, and the California National Guard was called out. The general strike lasted for four days during which time the General Strike commit tee lessened the severity of the strike by allowing restrictions to be removed from street railways, food trucks, restaurants, and the food, gasoline and fuel oil industries. The A. F. of L. disclaimed any connection with the strike. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis tics distinguishes the general strike from the "general industry strike." The latter describes a strike called by a national or inter national union for an entire industry, whereas the general strike is one called in unison by all the local unions of a community. The general industry strike has occurred more frequently than has the general strike. A recent large scale general industry strike was the general bituminous coal strike of 5939 involving over 500,000 miners. (See STRIKES AND LOCK-OUTS: United States.) (S. Pt.) BIBLIOGRAPHY.-Anna Louise Strong, Seattle General Strike (1919) ; Bibliography.-Anna Louise Strong, Seattle General Strike (1919) ; Ole Hanson, Americanism and Bolshevism (1920) ; Defense Committee, Winnipeg General Sympathetic Strike (1919) ; Committee of 1,000, Winnipeg General Strike 09'9).