GREY OF FALLODON, EDWARD GREY, 1sT VIS COUNT (1862-1933), English statesman, was educated at Win chester and at Balliol College, Oxford, and succeeded his grand father, the 2nd baronet, at the age of 20. Sir Edward Grey entered the House of Commons as Liberal member for Berwick on-Tweed in 1885, but he was best known as a country gentleman with a taste for sport, and as amateur champion tennis-player. His interest in politics was rather languid, but he was a disciple of Lord Rosebery, and in the 1892-95 Liberal ministry he was under-secretary for foreign affairs. In this position he earned a reputation as a politician of thorough straightforwardness and grit, and as one who would maintain British interests independ ently of party; and he shared with Asquith the reputation of being the ablest of the Imperialists who followed Lord•Rosebery. Though outside foreign affairs he played but a small part in the period of Liberal opposition between 1895 and 1905, he retained public confidence as one who was indispensable to a Liberal ad ministration. When Campbell-Bannerman's cabinet was formed in Dec. 1905 he became foreign minister.
Grey had previously announced that the Liberal Government would maintain Lord Lansdowne's policy of an entente with France and an alliance with Japan, and during the general election of Jan. 1906 he was asked by France, who was being pressed by Germany about Morocco, whether, in case of a Franco-German war, she could reckon on British assistance in arms. He replied that he could promise nothing which would not be fully endorsed by public opinion, but that, if war were forced on France through the entente respecting Morocco, he believed British public opinion would rally to her support. The French Government then sug gested conversations between military experts.
After consulting the prime minister, the chancellor of the ex chequer and the war minister, he agreed, on the understanding that such conversations should in no way bind the British Govern ment. The Algeciras conference on Morocco followed in the spring of 1906, and the constant support which, on his instruc tions, the British representatives accorded to the French, helped to produce a satisfactory result and to strengthen the Anglo French entente. In 1907 he came to an understanding with Russia. He concluded a convention with her about Persia, by which the integrity of that country was to be maintained, but Britain rec ognized that Russia had rights and interests in the northern zone and Russia recognized that Britain had rights and interests in the southern zone. In the same year he forwarded Anglo-American friendship by sending James Bryce to Washington as British ambassador; and concluded a convention with Spain binding the Powers to maintain the status quo in the Strait of Gibraltar and neighbouring waters.
In 1908—the year in which Asquith, an intimate friend of Grey, became Prime Minister—the European situation was considerably modified by the assertion in October by Prince Ferdinand of the independence of Bulgaria and his assumption of the title of king, and the simultaneous annexation by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and Hercegovina, which she had administered under the treaty of Berlin. These strokes of policy moved the indignation of both the Russian people and the Russian Government ; but the German Emperor announced that he would stand by his Austrian ally in "shining armour"; and Grey, though he protested against the in fraction of the public law of Europe, was naturally unable to promise Russia anything more than diplomatic support. The action of the Central Powers confirmed him in the view that it was they who might be the principal danger to European peace; but he was able to keep on friendly terms with them.
The labours of the foreign office, coupled with membership of the House of Commons, left him little leisure for forwarding the general policy of the Government. Nevertheless, as occasion arose, he defended all the principal controversial measures. His main preoccupation, however, was British relations with Germany, who gave dramatic notice of her dissatisfaction with the spread of French aims and influence in Morocco by dispatching, at the beginning of July 191I, the gunboat "Panther" to the north-west African coast at Agadir, to protect, it was alleged, German inter ests. In view of this further attempt to test, and if possible loosen, the entente, he issued a warning through the mouth of Lloyd George speaking at the Mansion House, that Britain in tended at all hazards to maintain her place among the Powers. The warning sufficed to make Germany lower her tone, and sub sequently Grey explained to Parliament that the foreign policy of the Government was a continuation of Lord Lansdowne's and had got rid of the constant trouble with France and Russia; that British friendship with these Powers, far from constituting a hostile encirclement of Germany, afforded a guarantee that neither would pursue an aggressive policy towards her; but that, when a nation had the biggest army and was increasing its already big navy, it was natural that other Powers should be apprehensive.
While a section of Radicals and Labour men were suspicious of Grey's policy, public opinion in general (including the Con servative opposition) supported him and was pleased when in the following year his able services were marked by the very unusual distinction, for a commoner, of the Order of the Garter. In the beginning of 1912 he was a party to sending Lord Haldane on an informal mission to Berlin to reassure the emperor and his Government as to the pacific intentions of Britain and to probe the intentions of Germany. The Cabinet formally notified the German Government that Britain would neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack on Germany. But nothing would con tent the German Government but an absolute pledge by Britain of neutrality if Germany were engaged in war—a pledge which Grey naturally could not give. Largely in consequence of this ominous rebuff, he exchanged letters on Nov. 22, 1912 with the French ambassador, agreeing that, if either Britain or France had grave reason to expect an attack by a third power or a menace to the general peace, both governments would consult whether they should co-operate and what measures they should take in common. Still he found himself able to work in general harmony with the German Government in the efforts of the Powers, in con ference in London, to preserve general peace, in spite of the Balkan wars of 1912-13, ending in the ill-omened Treaty of Bucharest.
In this matter the diplomacy of Germany had appeared so reasonable that he was taken aback by her unyielding attitude in the negotiations arising out of the Austro-Serbian dispute. As soon as he heard of the Austrian ultimatum delivered at Belgrade on July 23, 1914, he realized at once that Russia could not allow Serbia to be crushed, and exerted himself in the most strenuous fashion to save Europe from the threatened catastrophe. Acting generally in conjunction with France and Russia, one or both, but in face of a lukewarm or hostile Germany, he urged upon Austria the extension of the alarmingly short time-limit of 48 hours ; he proposed indefatigably various schemes for conciliation and conference ; he pressed upon Serbia the necessity of going as far as possible to meet Austria. In fact, Serbia accepted almost the whole of the Austrian demands; but Austria would be con tent with nothing less than complete submission, and on the expiry of the time-limit declared war on Serbia. On July 29 Germany, asserting that war was inevitable if Russia attacked Austria, endeavoured to purchase the neutrality of England by undertaking, if England remained neutral, to make no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France—an undertaking which did not extend to the French colonies—and by promising to respect Belgian integrity, after the War, if Belgium had not sided against Germany. Grey next day absolutely refused to make any bargain of the sort at the expense of France and Belgium. In view of the apparent threat to Belgium, he asked France and Germany whether they were prepared to respect Belgian neutrality provided it was not violated, and he asked Belgium whether she would remain neutral. France and Belgium both replied affirmatively, while Germany temporized. Hopeful negotiations which had been begun directly between Russia and Austria were wrecked by a German ultimatum to Russia to countermand her mobilization; and on Monday, Aug. 3, Germany declared war on France.
The moment for decision had come for Great Britain. Russia had asked her to declare herself against Germany and so give the German general staff pause ; France had asked her to co-operate as Germany was about to invade French territory. The cabinet had hitherto been divided, a strong section pressing for the pres ervation of neutrality, and so Grey had been unable to reply favourably to either Russia or France. But now Germany had declared war on France and was apparently about to disregard the neutrality of Belgium. The Opposition, through Bonar Law, tendered support for active measures to aid France and Russia; and Grey with a Cabinet rallying, with few exceptions, to his view, was able to make an appeal in the House of Commons on Aug. 3 f of public and parliamentary support to a policy of action. The speech finally decided a wavering public opinion; with the exception of some Radicals and extremist Labour men, all parties, including the Irish Nationalists, accepted the necessity of war. Grey demanded next day that Germany should respect the neutrality of Belgium, and, on the German refusal, England went to war.
One of Grey's first tasks was to turn the association of the Powers fighting Germany and Austria into an alliance, which bound its members to fight in common, and make peace in common. In the course of the negotiations for this purpose he did not hesitate to guarantee the support of Great Britain for the attainment of long-cherished national objects, provided that these did not conflict with the aims of liberation and self-develop ment common to the Allies : the most striking case being the promise, after Turkey entered the war on the side of the Central Powers, that Russia should have Constantinople. Much of his time and attention was occupied by difficult questions arising out of the blockade of Germany and the consequent interference with the trade of neutrals. Public opinion in Great Britain con stantly complained that the blockade was not enforced with suf ficient strictness; while the United States, as the principal neutral, harassed the British Government by repeated notes, denouncing the methods of the British navy as unnecessarily prejudicial to American trade and contrary to international law. He was per haps more successful in his answers to the Americans than in his justification to the British public ; and a large body of opinion in America accepted his explanations as reasonable.
The tenure of the Foreign Office by a statesman so high minded, sincere and experienced as Grey was everywhere re garded as such a valuable asset for Great Britain that it appeared only natural and fitting for Asquith, when contemplating the formation of a coalition government in May 1915, to lay down, as one of the essential conditions, that there should be no change in the office of Foreign Secretary. No one could refute with such authority the intermittent assertions of the German chancellor that it was England and not Germany that was responsible both for the origin and for the continuance of the war. When the pacifists called for negotiations in May 1916, he showed that when the Germans professed a readiness for peace it was only for a peace on the basis that Germany had won and the Allies were beaten; but the Allies were not beaten, and the first step towards peace would be taken when Germany began to recognize the fact. Credit must be given to Grey for facilitating, in the early sum mer of 1915, the entry of Italy—till May 3 a member of the Triple Alliance—into the War against the Central Powers. It was, however, a bitter disappointment to him that his grave warnings failed to prevent Bulgaria, in the autumn of the same year, from taking the field against the Allies. Allied troops were sent to Salonika, and he offered Cyprus to Greece in order to induce her to carry out her treaty obligations and go to Serbia's aid against Bulgaria. But on this issue King Constantine won the support of his people against Venezelos and Serbia was crushed before help could reach her.
In July 1916 an affection of the eyes, which had been giving him increasing trouble, made it advisable that he should have as much relief from work as possible, and he accepted a peerage. When a few months later, in December, his friend and chief, Asquith, was succeeded in the premiership by Lloyd George, fail ing eyesight and political comradeship both united to determine him to bring his 11 years' tenure of the Foreign Office to a close. He had served for a longer consecutive period than any prede cessor, and in his official methods he carried out his own precept —that foreign policy required not striking effects nor bold strokes but careful steering.
After his resignation Lord Grey took little or no part in public life for several years. Though he never regained normal vision, rest and quiet gradually worked a decided improvement in his eyesight. But, with the exception of a three months' mission in 1919 to the United States to deal with questions arising out of the peace, he did not definitely emerge from his retirement till 1922. It was the time of the decadence of the coalition government and Lord Grey urged that it was not trusted and should come to an end, which happened within a few months; he was also anxious to resuscitate the Liberal party. In foreign affairs he pressed for the re-establishment of good relations with France, and for the arrangement of an inclusive peace pact, beginning with France. When such a pact was concluded at Locarno in 1925 he welcomed it warmly. But the cause to which he devoted most of his energy was that of the League of Nations. He was especially anxious that Germany should be included as a member at the earliest possible date, and maintained that this should be the only business of the spring meeting of the League in 1926, which unfortunately separated without effecting it. In Aug. 1928 Lord Grey was elected Chancellor of Oxford University.
Much of his time in these years was taken up in the compila tion of a straightforward narrative and vindication of his course in foreign policy, which was published in 1925 under the title Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916. He had published in 1899 an other volume on Fly-Fishing, his favourite recreation. In 1885 he married Dorothy, daughter of Shallcross F. Widdrington, of Newton Hall, Northumberland. She was killed in a carriage acci dent in 1906, and in 1922 Lord Grey married, as his second wife, Pamela, sister of George Wyndham, and widow of the 1st Lord Glenconner, a woman of wide sympathies, who died on Oct. 19, 1928. Lord Grey died Sept. 7, (G. E. B.) See Viscount Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-5916, 2 vol. (1925) ; H. Lutz, Lord Grey and der Weltkrieg (1927. Eng. trans. by E. W. Dickes, 1928) .