HINDENBURG, PAUL VON German soldier and president of the German Reich. Paul Ludwig Hans von Beneckendorf and von Hindenburg was born in Posen Oct. 2, 1847, the son of a Prussian officer. His childhood was spent in his parents' house, and later in Pinne and Glogau. In 1858 he entered the cadet school at Wahlstatt in Silesia, afterwards join ing the chief cadet academy in Berlin. At an early age the severity of the training in the Prussian cadet corps lent a note of inflex ibility to his character, and developed in him strength of will, resolution and coolheadedness. Intellectually, he developed rela tively late, owing to early illnesses and to his too rapid physical growth. Ambition awoke in him slowly ; but as success crowned his efforts it grew unceasingly, and won him the reputation of a particularly gifted pupil. At the age of 18 he entered the 3rd Foot Guards at Danzig as a second-lieutenant in 1866, and soon after made his first appearance on the battlefield. At the battle of Koniggratz he stormed with his squadron an Austrian battery under fire. He took part in the war of 187o-71 as adjutant to a battalion, and of ter gaining distinction at St. Privat, became adjutant to the regiment.
After three years at the staff college in Berlin, he served with the general staff in 1877, and was soon promoted to the rank of captain. The next years were spent as company commander and chief of battalion and in various posts on the general staff. In 1883 he became an instructor at the Staff College in Berlin; and later, on the general staff under Count Schlieffen, he was the spiritual pupil and assistant of that strategist of genius. Several years' labour in the Prussian War Office developed his talent for organisation. After serving from 1893 to 1896 as commander of the 91st infantry regiment (Oldenburg), he was promoted major general, and for four years served as chief of the general staff of the VIII. Army Corps at Coblenz, subsequently commanding the 28th Div. at Karlsruhe for three years. In 1903 he became general in command of the IV. Army Corps at Magdeburg. In 1911, being 65 years old, he was placed on the retired list.
It must be recognised that the disposition of Ludendorff was the more active, that a daemonic spirit resided in him which was responsible for those decisive acts which changed the course of the world's history. His memoirs of the War and his demeanour in German politics after the War are instinct with the vehement passions of one who has been subjected to many attacks, just or unjust. During the War it was only the presence of the marshal's authority that prevented the vivid, sensitive and at times well nigh fanatical temperament of his colleague from losing self control. The character of Ludendorff was the harder, that of Hindenburg the greater. Their processes of thought ran upon separate lines, but each tested his own conclusions and com pleted them by reference to the other. Ludendorff bore the whole burden of the technical execution of the decisions, a task which he carried through with titanic strength. Hindenburg remained predominantly in the sphere of pure thought, supplying rather the static element in leadership, and leaving the dynamic side in the other's hands.
Hindenburg possessed a gift of inestimable value, and Luden dorff enabled him to develop it—that of economising his own mental energy and guarding it against strain and premature ex haustion. He was thus enabled to retain his nerve force until the end of the War, when he was then able to assume a heavier and more thankless task, that of saving his fellow-countrymen from the whirlpool of the revolution. In the political sphere, Gen. Ludendorff's vigorous intervention frequently involved the mar shal in spite of all his distaste for political activities, in ques tions which he would probably have otherwise avoided. Hinden burg as a soldier was hampered by mistrust of his own political ability. Ludendorff frequently had to convince the chief of the general staff of the necessity for taking political decisions. Only the constraint of conscience and the sense of moral responsibility caused Hindenburg and Ludendorff to intervene at all in political questions.
Hindenburg was unable to follow up his victories in East Prussia by advancing across the Lower Narew ; the Austro Hungarian allies had suffered a heavy defeat in Galicia, and the German commander was compelled to hasten to their immediate aid with the bulk of the German forces available in the East. This led to the combined offensive of the German IX. Army through Southern Poland towards the Vistula and of the Austri ans in Galicia across the San. The German advance met with little resistance, but the roads were mere morasses. On Oct. 8 the Vistula was reached between Jozefoff and Deblin (Iwangorod) after an advance along the Opatow-Radom line. The attempt to cross the river failed, and the Austrian allies, too, came to a standstill. Finally, the German offensive drew upon itself greatly superior Russian forces which, advancing past Warsaw, assailed its left flank. In this way the ally was relieved. Hindenburg himself succeeded in escaping the threatened envelopment from the north by a timely withdrawal upon Upper Silesia. With the vision of genius he grouped the great bulk of his forces about the railway line running to West Prussia, and at the beginning of Nov. advanced in a surprise attack from the Wrzesnia-Thorn line upon the right flank of the main Russian forces lying in southern Poland. He succeeded at the battle of Lodz in bringing the "Russian steamroller" to a standstill, and eventually com pelled the enemy to withdraw behind the Bzura and Rawka.
Falkenhayn, on the other hand, held that it was sufficient by means of a '"campaign with limited objectives" to keep the Russian Army at bay and to cripple its offensive power. Hinden burg's proposal was to take the offensive on his extreme left flank on the Niemen northwards past Kovno in the direction of Wilna and beyond, and thus to sever the northern arteries of the Russian Army—namely, the railways. This plan was rejected by Falkenhayn in favour of the advance across the lower Narew, which proved successful, for in conjunction with the successes of Mackensen and of the Austrians in southern Poland it caused the whole Russian front line to waver. Yet it was only gradually and in consequence of continual front-line engagements that the enemy allowed themselves to be driven back upon their rear guard communications towards the East. Several times during the operations Hindenburg brought up the question of his original project ; he also carried out unaided the attack upon the fortress of Kovno, which fell on Aug. 18. Eventually, early in Sept., Falkenhayn gave way ostensibly, without, however, placing at Hindenburg's disposal the strength requisite for carrying out his plans. The offensive upon Wilna, begun too late, encountered powerful Russian forces, and it was only possible to press back the Russian front line, no decisive encounter having taken place. .From the autumn of 1915 onwards Gen. von Falkenhayn treated the East as a merely subsidiary seat of war; for while he was striving to wear down the French forces at Verdun the Ger man eastern front was condemned to inactivity. This facilitated the great Russian successes in June and July against the Austro Hungarian front, which was broken through and almost shat tered at Luck. In Aug. when the danger was at its greatest, the whole of the eastern front from the Gulf of Riga to Galicia was united under Hindenburg. He brought order where chaos had reigned. On the upper Sereth, at Brody and on the Styr a new rampart arose, which, however, proved tenable only where Ger man troops stiffened their allies' resistance. Meanwhile the struggle for Verdun continued to rage, and the battle on the Somme reached its culminating point.
In the East every nerve had to be strained to force Russia to make a separate peace, while in the West the defensive cam paign continued. The end of 1917 found the Quadruple Alliance, despite. the tremendous demands made upon their strength— nay, despite the fact that they were almost exhausted—consider ably nearer to their objective. The U-boat warfare was slowly but surely producing its effect. The Italians had in a brief but powerful offensive been, not indeed annihilated, but decisively defeated. In the East the German hammerblows at Tarnopol, Riga and Osel (Saaremma) had broken the fighting spirit of the new Russian ruler Kerensky, and carried the Bolsheviks into power. Peace was negotiated with them and with Rumania at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest and, under military pressure, was finally attained in the winter of 1918. There remained the last and hardest task, the reckoning with France and England in the West, before America should be in a position to intervene as a military factor in the War on land.
In the spring of 1918 Hindenburg set himself to place the cornerstone upon the structure of his military achievements. All available effectives were utilised for this decisive conflict. The great offensive on both sides of St. Quentin was to break through the front line of the French and British on the southern flank of the latter, to roll them up towards the north and drive them towards the coast. From the tactical point of view the first blow in the direction of Amiens was a brilliant success. But it led to no practical advantage, and was supplemented by the attack upon the Lys front. But, here, too, the operations for a break-through miscarried, resulting only in a second massive con centration on the enemy front. Hindenburg, notwithstanding, clung to his resolve to deal the British a decisive blow in Flanders.
It was necessary, however, to effect a diversion in order to draw off the French reserves and to occupy them elsewhere. This led to loss of time, from which the enemy derived advantage. For the intervention of America loomed threateningly near. The first diversion at the Chemin des Dames gained considerable ground and drew in a large number of the French reserves, but not enough to pave the way for the decisive blow in Flanders. A new diverting attack on both sides of Rheims failed, where upon Marshal Foch seized the initiative and from Villers Cot terets attacked the German Marne position on the flank with strong forces. The Americans now appeared in the capacity of attacking troops. Hindenburg abandoned the Marne salient and held up the break-through on the Vesle. But from henceforth the initiative remained steadily in the hands of the French gen eralissimo, while the German reserves melted steadily away.
From a military standpoint the War was lost with the reverse of Aug. 8. Yet Hindenburg still hoped to cripple the fighting spirit of the enemy by a strategic defensive and to secure a peace compatible with the dignity of the German people. But Bul garia's defection caused the complete collapse of the Macedonian front, and Hindenburg realised that an immediate armistice was necessary to give the army breathing space. With a just appre ciation of their prospects of victory, the enemy took their time over granting an armistice, and summoning the full strength of their tremendous material superiority proceeded to force the German Army to throw in its last reserves. Meanwhile Turkey and Austria abandoned their roles as allies of Germany, who found herself flung entirely upon her own resources in the final struggle. Hindenburg and Ludendorff wished to rouse the people to a final heroic effort of exertion; but the Cabinet of Prince Max of Baden lacked the capacity to check the revolution, and Germany was handed over unconditionally to the dictates of the enemy.
The marshal, victor in countless battles, had to return home, therefore, not as supreme war-lord but as a beaten general. Yet even in misfortune and profound humiliation his spirit remained unbroken, and he succeeded in extricating his country from the disorder of the revolution.
After the war Hindenburg lived in retirement, taking no active part in political life, until the presidential elections following the death of President Ebert. The anti-socialist parties in Germany then combined, and induced him to stand for the presidency as a national figure, representing, indeed, conservative views, but standing to some extent above party. He was elected president on April 26, 1925.
Neither the fears of France, who saw in Hindenburg's election the first step towards a war of revenge, nor the hopes of the German monarchists, were realised. Although openly acknowledg ing his own monarchist sympathies, Hindenburg remained abso lutely loyal to the Republic of which he was president, nor did he in any sense encourage a provocative foreign policy. He in volved himself personally in few disputes, but on May 5, 1926, he issued, without consulting the Reichstag, a decree authorising diplomatic missions and consulates abroad to fly the German commercial flag beside the Republican flag—a move which brought the hostility between monarchists and republicans to a head and led to the fall of the chancellor; and a few days later (May 19) expressed himself strongly in a private letter, which was pub lished in the press, against the justice of the referendum for expropriating the former reigning houses. His few subsequent ex cursions into politics aroused far less controversy. His emphatic repudiation of Germany's war-guilt at a speech made at Tannen berg (Sept. 18, 1927), was echoed through nearly all Germany, and his appointment of General Groener as minister of defence (Jan. 19, 1928) was welcomed by the republicans. He was re elected president in 1932. He died on Aug. 2, 1934, having earned the veneration of his countrymen and the respect of all the world. In 1935 his body was moved to the Tannenberg Memorial.