During and Since the World War Infantry Organization Before

INFANTRY ORGANIZATION BEFORE, DURING AND SINCE THE WORLD WAR Up to 1913 the British infantry was organized on a radically different plan from that of other armies, the battalion consisting of eight companies. Then, however, a school of reform' carried the day in spite of much opposition. The old "Eight Company" or ganisation was exchanged for that of battalions of four companies, each 200 strong. The battalion had also a machine-gun section of two guns. A company consisted of its headquarters and four platoons; a platoon of four sections. A section was commanded by a non-commissioned officer and was a normal fire unit. Four battalions, from various regiments, were grouped into a brigade. In the British Army the regiment is a unit of sentiment and the spring from which esprit de corps arises. It is based on a fixed regimental depot which is the common link of battalions scattered over the British Empire. The four-company battalion marked a stepping-stone in the history of the British infantry, because the platoon became the "tactical" unit instead of the company. As a logical consequence the first unit (section) decreased in size and became the command of a junior N.C.O.—a corporal or lance-corporal.

Other Armies, 1914.

In the German, French and U.S. armies the regiment consisted of three battalions, and was a tactical as well as an administrative unit. In Germany it was commanded by a colonel with a lieutenant-colonel as his second-in-command. The battalion commanded by a major was divided into four com panies, each commanded by a captain. The company was di vided into three sections (Ziige), each under a subaltern. Every infantry regiment and Jager battalion was provided with a ma chine-gun company of six guns, plus one spare.

The French company was organized into four sections, com manded in war by three subalterns and one adjutant (superior company sergeant-major). The sections were grouped in pairs to constitute pelotons (platoons) under the senior of the two section leaders. Machine-gun sections were allotted to battalions as in the British Army. In the United States the company was Sir Ivor (then Brigadier-General F. I.) Maxse was the chief advocate and pioneer of this reform.—Editor.

composed of three officers and 15o rifles, divided into two sections, each of three squads. In the World War, however, the U.S. in fantry regiment was remodelled on the continental model, having also a regimental machine-gun company, a headquarters com pany and a supply company.

Thus before the war the infantry battalion consisted in almost every country of about i,000 men and was divided into four com panies each commanded by a mounted officer. But the British battalion was the weakest in fighting strength, because its First Line Transport and other services were deducted from its i,000 rifles, whereas the regimental systems of continental infantry provided these services from a separate establishment. The sub alterns were dismounted officers whose commands varied as fol lows: British 5o men, German 8o men, French 5o men, United States 75 men. But in the British infantry a large proportion of the 5o men borne on the strength of the platoons were absent on other duties. They were signallers, machine-gunners, bands men, transport drivers or pioneers—and were in fact everything except fighting infantrymen, and they should never have been on the rolls of the fighting platoons. The British Treasury, however, ordained otherwise and thus made training and fighting difficult for every platoon commander.

Changes During 1914-18.

During the progress of the war the basic organization of the infantry of the belligerent powers was not materially altered. The changes were chiefly in the direc tion of additional weapons and a multiplication of kit, which re duced the infantry soldier to a beast of burden laden under a weight which destroyed his mobility. In 1915 the British in fantry as compared with the German suffered from a paucity of machine-guns and was slow to make good this defect. At first an increase was made (up to four per battalion), and when manu facturers raised their output these were formed into machine-gun companies. They were gradually divorced from the infantry and formed into a machine-gun corps, firstly as brigade machine-gun companies and finally as divisional battalions. By the time this had been accomplished the lighter Lewis gun had made its ap pearance and had been allotted to infantry units. The first issue (not long before the battle of Loos, 1915) was only four guns per battalion.

The tendency at first was to use this weapon like a heavy ma chine-gun, but when its characteristics were better understood it took its place as a company weapon in 1916, and as a platoon weapon in Feb. 1917. By March 1918, two sections of the four in the platoon were armed with one Lewis gun each. The allotment of an automatic weapon on such a scale marked an important step in the tactics of infantry. One of these new weapons handled by only two men could deliver a stream of bullets equal to what could formerly be projected by 25 soldiers with rifles. This led to a reduction in the strength of the section—to one leader and six men. Thus the British subaltern officer's command in battle became 28 fighting men, as compared with 5o in 1914—but the Lewis guns increased the fire-power of the platoon out of all proportion to the number of its men and had also increased the load they carried.

The Germans were faced with the man-power problem before any of the other belligerents, and they also appreciated the value of the light machine-gun. In March 1917 they issued three to every company and afterwards raised this allotment to six by giving two guns to each platoon. Finally each German battalion consisted of a heavy machine-gun company of 12 guns and three infantry companies armed with six light machine-guns each, without counting the special machine-gun companies allotted to divisions for every battle. This tremendous increase in automatic weapons had an inevitable effect on infantry formations. The costly attacks on narrow frontages were abandoned. The suc cessive lines or waves of men gave place to open formations. The four sections of a platoon were gradually separated from one another and compelled to manoeuvre and fight under their own leaders. The frontages allotted to the leading platoons were in creased, and in 1918 we find platoons attacking on frontages of 200-30o yd. with very small effectives. Fire-power was at last beginning to be understood.

Special Weapons.

In addition to the Lewis gun, rifle-grenade and hand-grenade the Stokes light mortar proved to be a useful infantry weapon. Although it did not form an integral part of battalion equipment, the brigade light-mortar batteries drew their personnel from the infantry and the mortars were allotted to bat talions during operations. The light mortar was the nearest ap proach to an infantry gun in the British Army and though not an ideal weapon rendered great help in reducing enemy machine guns and strong points. The German mortars in the summer of 1918 were distributed as follows : each regiment had a regimental "minenwer f er" company, organized in three sections, each with three light minenmoer f er, and in addition two or three medium minenwer f er.

Post-War Organization.

The British infantry battalion was first reorganized on a basis of a battalion headquarters wing, which included a machine-gun platoon of eight guns, and four com panies. Each company consisted of company headquarters and four platoons, each platoon of headquarters and four sections, two of which were armed with one Lewis gun each. In 1928, however, the British organization came into line with foreign armies, and to a slightly fuller recognition of the power of machine-guns, by replacing one of the four companies with a machine-gun company of and ultimately 16 guns. The light mortar has been abandoned as too immobile. The Lewis gun is also considered too heavy and its replacement by the Browning is under consideration. In order to increase the manoeuvring power of the platoon various experi ments have been tried, such as concentrating the Lewis guns of the company into one platoon and leaving the others as rifle platoons.

The French battalion comprises a headquarters group, three ordinary companies, a machine-gun company and a section of accompanying weapons (mortar or infantry gun). The company at war strength is composed of a headquarters section and four combat sections, and the section of three groups. The fighting group consisted at first of a team of riflemen and a team of auto matic riflemen, each team comprising a corporal and five men. These teams (equipes) have now been merged in the group. In peace or when the strength is lowered by casualties the number of sections in the company or groups in the section may be re duced, but the actual groups are maintained at full strength. The French place their reliance upon the light automatic rather than on the rifle, and their new organization is the outcome. Although their group is stronger than the British section, to which it corre sponds, the effort of all its ten men centres round the service and protection of the one f usil-mitrailleur, and the riflemen inevitably lose much of the value of their greater mobility. On the other hand the British organization though possessing somewhat greater freedom and power of manoeuvre, means that the platoon com mander has the difficult role of combining four sections of which two are radically dissimilar in arms and in action to the other two. The German battalion also consists of three companies and a machine-gun company. A company is organized in three sections; each section (Zug) is divided into four or five groups (Gruppe) of eight men each—two light machine groups and either two or three rifle groups.