IGNORANCE. In the law among the English-speaking peoples, as in Roman law, ignorance of the law is, in general, no ground for avoiding the consequences of an act. As regards criminal offences, the maxim as to ignorantia juris admits of no exception, even in the case of a foreigner temporarily in Eng land, who is likely to be ignorant of English law. In Roman law the harshness of the rule was mitigated in the case of women, soldiers and persons under the age of 25, unless they had good le gal advice within reach (Dig. xxii. 6. 9), while in England judges often inflict mitigated sentences when a criminal did not and could not reasonably be expected to know the law, especially if it be very recent. Ignorance of foreign law is ignorance of fact. A compromise of claims, doubtful in law, is good and cannot be upset by subsequent solving of the doubt (Stewart v. Stewart 6 Cl. and F. 911). Ignorance of a matter of fact may in general be alleged in avoidance of the consequences of acts and agree ments, but such ignorance cannot be pleaded where it is the duty of a person to know, or where, having the means of know ledge at his disposal, he wilfully or negligently fails to avail him self of it. (See CONTRACT.) In logic, ignorance is that state of mind which for want of evi dence is equally unable to affirm or deny one thing or another. Doubt, on the other hand, can neither affirm nor deny because the evidence seems equally strong for both. (For Ignoratio Elenchi [irrelevant conclusion] see FALLACY.)