IMMORTALITY, the condition or quality of being exempt from death or annihilation. The belief in human immortality in some form is almost universal ; even in early animistic cults the germ of the idea is present, and in all the higher religions it is an important feature. This article is confined to summarizing the philosophical or scientific arguments for and against the doc trine of the persistence of the human soul after death. For the Christian doctrine, see ESCHATOLOGY; and for other religions, see the separate articles.
The opinion of Socrates is uncertain. In the Apology he is represented as sure that "no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death," but as not sure of what man's future lot will be. In the Phaedo a confident expectation is ascribed to him. Only his body will be buried; he will go away to the happi ness of the blessed. The silence of the Memorabilia of Xenophon must be admitted as an argument to the contrary ; but the prob ability seems to be that Plato in the Phaedo did not altogether misrepresent the master. In Plato's own thought the belief held a prominent position. "It is noteworthy," says D. G. Ritchie, "that, in the various dialogues in which Plato speaks of immor tality, the arguments seem to be of different kinds, and most of them quite unconnected with one another." (Plato p. 146.) The estimate to be formed of his reasoning has been well stated by A. M. Fairbairn, "Plato's arguments for immortality, isolated, modernized, may be feeble, even valueless, but allowed to stand where and as he himself puts them, they have an altogether differ ent worth. The ratiocinative parts of the Phaedo thrown into syllogisms may be easily demolished by a hostile logician ; but in the dialogue as a whole there is a subtle spirit and cumulative force which logic can neither seize nor answer" (Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, p. 226 [1876]).
Aristotle held that only vows, or the active intellect, in man is immortal. His views are conditioned by his psychology, body and soul being a complete whole, in which the elements are inseparably united. Soul cannot exist disembodied. Yet he makes a reserva tion in favour of the highest element in man : this indeed is im mortal, but apparently not in an individual form. He seems not to have believed what could be called personal immortality. The Stoics were not agreed upon the question. Cleanthes is said to have held that all survive until the great conflagration which closes the cycle; Chrysippus that only the wise will do so. Marcus Aurelius teaches that even if the spirit survives for a time it is at last "absorbed in the generative principle of the universe." Epicureanism thought that "the wise man fears not death, before which most men tremble ; for, if we are, it is not ; if it is, we are not." Augustine adopts a Platonic thought when he teaches that the immortality of the soul follows from its participation in the eternal truths. The Apologists themselves welcomed, and corn mended to others, the Christian revelation as affording a cer tainty of immortality such as reason could not give. The Aris totelian school in Islam did not speak with one voice upon the question; Avicenna declared the soul immortal, but Averroes assumed only the eternity of the universal intellect. Albertus Magnus argued that the soul is immortal, as ex se ipsa causa, and as independent of the body. Pietro Pomponazzi, like Duns Scotus, maintained that the soul's immortality could be neither proved nor disproved by reason. Spinoza, consistently with his pantheism denying personal immortality, affirms that "the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal" (Et/i. v. prop. xxiii). The reason he gives is that, as this something "appertains to the essence of the mind," it is "conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence of God." Leibniz, in accord with the distinctive principle of his philos ophy, affirmed the absolute independence of mind and body as distinct monads, the parallelism of their functions in life being due to a pre-established harmony. For the soul, by its nature as a single monad indestructible and, therefore, immortal, death meant only the loss of the monads constituting the body, and the return of the soul to the pre-existent state. The argument of Ernst Platner (Philos. Aphor. i. 1174, 1178) is similar. He adds a reason that recalls one of Plato's: "As manifestly as the human soul is by means of the senses linked to the present life, so manifestly it attaches itself by reason, and the conceptions, conclusions, anticipations and efforts to which reason leads it, to God and eternity." Against the first kind of argument, as formulated by Moses Mendelssohn, Kant advances the objection that, although we may deny the soul extensive quantity and divisibility into parts, we cannot refuse to it intensive quantity, degrees of reality ; and consequently its existence may be terminated not by decomposi tion, but by gradual diminution of its powers. This denial of any reasonable ground for belief in immortality in the Critique of Pure Reason (Transcendental Dialectic, bk. ii. ch. i.) is, how ever, not his last word on the subject. In the Critique of the Practical Reason (Dialectic, ch. i. sec. iv.) the immortality of the soul is shown to be a postulate. Holiness, "the perfect ac cordance of the will with the moral law," demands an endless progress ; and "this endless progress is only possible on the suppo sition of an endless duration of the existence and personality of the same rational being (which is called the immortality of the soul)." Not demonstrable as a theoretical proposition, the im mortality of the soul "is an inseparable result of an unconditional a priori practical law." The moral interest, which is so decisive on this question in the case of Kant, dominates Bishop Butler also. A future life for him is important, because our happiness in it may depend on our present conduct ; and, therefore, our action here should take into account the reward or punishment that it may bring to us hereafter. As he maintains that prob ability may and ought to be our guide in life, he is content with proving in the first chapter of the Analogy that "a future life is probable from similar changes (as death) already undergone in ourselves and in others, and from our present powers, which are likely to continue unless death destroys them . . . but there is no proof that it will, either from the nature of death," of the effect of which on our powers we are altogether ignorant, "or from the analogy of nature, which shows only that the sensible proof of our powers (not the powers themselves) may be de stroyed." (Analysis of chapter I. in Angus's edition of The Analogy.) Butler recognizes that "reason did, as it well might, con clude that it should finally, and upon the whole, be well with the righteous and ill with the wicked," but only "revelation teaches us that the next state of things after the present is appointed for the execution of this justice" (ch. ii. note zo). He does not use this general anticipation of future judgment, as he might have done, as a positive argument for immortality.
Adam Ferguson (Institutes of Moral Philosophy, p. 119, . new ed., i800), argues that the desire for immortality itself as an instinct is an indication of the Creator's intention. From the standpoint of modern science John Fiske confirms the validity of such an argument ; for what he affirms in regard to belief in the divine is equally applicable to this belief in a future life. "If the relation thus established, in the morning twilight of man's existence, between the human soul and a world invisible and im material is a relation of which only the subjective term is real and the objective term is non-existent ; then I say it is something utterly without precedent in the whole history of creation" (Through Nature to God, 1899, p. 188, 189). Whatever may have been Hegel's belief in regard to personal immortality, the logical issue of his absolute idealism would seem to be a rejection of the continuance of finite personality. F. D. Schleiermacher applies the phrase "the immortality of religion" to the religious emotion of oneness, amid finitude, with the infinite and, amid time, with the eternal. He denies any necessary connection be tween the belief in the continuance of personal existence and the consciousness of God, and bases his faith in immortality on Christ's promise of living fellowship with His followers, as pre supposing their as well as His personal immortality. A. Schopen hauer assigns immortality to the universal will to live ; and Feuer bach declares spirit or consciousness, eternal, but not any indi vidual subject. R. H. Lotze lays down the broad principle, "All that has once come to be will eternally continue if it has an unchangeable value for the organic unity of the world, but it will obviously again cease to be, when that is not the case." (Gr. der Psych., p. 74.) Objections to the belief in immortality have been advanced from the standpoints of materialism, naturalism, pessimism and pantheism. Materialism argues that, as life depends on a ma terial organism, thought is a function of the brain, and the soul is but the sum of mental processes dependent upon physical changes ; therefore, the dissolution of the body carries with it necessarily the cessation of consciousness. That mind is correlated with brain and life with body must be conceded, but that they cease to be when their organs are destroyed has not been scien tifically demonstrated. Indeed the following considerations may be advanced: (I) Man does distinguish himself from his body (in the primitive philosophy of animism the soul is already distinguished from the body) ; (2) he is conscious of his personal identity throughout all the changes of his body, and the fuller his per sonal development the more independent is his inner life of the outer; (3) in the exercise of his will he thinks himself as not con trolled by but controlling his body, and the testimony of man's conscience to his liberty and responsibility is an ultimate datum of his consciousness. The theory of psychophysical parallelism has been subjected to a rigorous examination in James Ward's Naturalism and Agnosticism, part iii., and the argument that mind cannot be derived from matter convincingly presented. Sir Oliver Lodge in reply to E. Haeckel's Riddle of the Universe maintains that "life may be something not only ultra-terrestrial, but even immaterial, something outside our present categories of matter and energy ; as real as they are, but different, a,nd utilizing them for its own purpose" (Life and Matter, 1906, p. 198) . He rejects the attempt to explain human personality as "generated by the material molecular aggregate of its own unaided latent power," and affirms that the "universe where the human spirit is more at home than it is among these temporary collocations of matter" is "a universe capable of infinite development, of noble contemplation, and of lofty joy, long after this planet—nay the whole solar system—shall have fulfilled its present spire of des tiny, and retired cold and lifeless upon its endless way" (pp. 199-200).
In his lecture on Human Immortality (3rd ed., 1906), William James deals with "two supposed objections to the doctrine." The first is "the law that thought is a function of the brain." Accepting the law he distinguishes productive from permissive or transmissive function (p. 3 2) ; and, rejecting the view that brain produces thought, he recognizes that in our present condi tion brain transmits thought, thought needs brain for its organ of expression ; but this does not exclude the possibility of a con dition in which thought will be no longer so dependent on brain. Against materialism three general objections can be offered : (I) the categories and the methods of physiology cannot solve the problems of psychology; (2) if physical energy is being trans muted into mental without any recovery, then the principle of the transmutation of energy is not universally applicable ; (3 ) mind as the subject of knowledge cannot be derived from one of its objects, the very conception of which is a mental construc tion to account for some of the content of consciousness. Fur ther arguments in the same direction are derived from the modern school of psychical research (see especially F. W. H. Myers' Human Personality, 1903) .
Another objection is advanced from the standpoint of natural ism, which, whether it issues in materialism or not, seeks to ex plain man as but a product of the process of nature. The universe is so immeasurably vast in extension and duration, and man is so small, his home but a speck in space, and his history a span in time, that it seems an arrogant assumption for him to claim ex emption from the universal law of evolution and dissolution. This view overlooks the facts that man has ideals of absolute value, truth, beauty and goodness, that he consciously communes with the God who is in all, and through all, and over all, that his mind recognizes the vastness of the universe and its universal law, and that such a mind, which perceives and conceives, must be greater than the object of its thought.
Pessimism suggests a third objection. The present life is so little worth living that its continuance is not to be desired. We cannot, however, admit that the history of mankind justifies this conclusion; for the great majority of men life is a good, and its continuance an object of hope. This philosophy when sincere, is often due to natural disposition, or to unfortunate circum stances, and in some cases is even a mental pose, a disguise of personal failure or disappointment.
For pantheism personal immortality appears a lesser good than reabsorption into the universal life. But against this objection we may confidently maintain that worthier of God and more blessed for man is the hope of a conscious communion in an eternal life of the Father of all with His whole family. Why should the infinite reality differentiate itself in finite personality if there is no permanent result ; and why should finite personality be subjected to the often painful discipline of "self-knowledge, self-reverence and self-control," if no self-will be allowed to survive? Lastly positivism teaches a corporate instead of an individual immortality ; man should desire to live on as a beneficent influ ence in the race. But these possibilities are not mutually exclu sive. A man may live on in the world by his teaching and example as a power for good, and he may also be continuing and com pleting his course under conditions still more favourable to all most worthy in him. Consciously to participate as a person in the progress of the race is surely a worthier hope than uncon sciously to contribute to it as an influence ; ultimately to share the triumph as well as the struggle is a more inspiring anticipation.
In stating constructively the doctrine of immortality we must assign secondary importance to the metaphysical arguments from the nature of the soul. It is sufficient to show, as has already been done, that the soul is not so absolutely dependent on the body that the dissolution of the one necessarily involves the cessation of the other. Such arguments as the indivisibility of the soul and its persistence can at most indicate the possibility of immortality. The argument for personal immortality must be based on some rational, moral, social or spiritual value which would be discredited if death ended all.
The juridical argument has some force ; the present life does not show the harmony of condition and character which our sense of justice leads us to expect ; the wicked prosper and the righteous suffer; there is ground for the expectation that in the future life the anomalies of this life will be corrected. Although this argu ment has the support of such great names as Butler and Kant, yet it will repel many minds as an appeal to the motive of self interest.
The ethical argument has greater value. The more lofty man's aims, the more worthy his labours, the more incomplete his life appears to be. The man who lives for fame, wealth, power, may be satisfied now; but he who lives for the ideals of truth, beauty and goodness, lives not for time but for eternity, and his life cannot be fulfilled on this side of the grave. Unless these ideals are mocking visions, man has a right to expect the continuance of his life for its completion. This is the line of argument de veloped by Hugo Miinsterberg in his lecture on The Eternal Life More general in its appeal is the argument from the affections, which has been beautifully developed in Tennyson's In Me moriam. The heart protests against the severance of death, and claims the continuance of love's communion after death; and as man feels that love is what is most godlike in his nature, love's claim has supreme authority.
There is a religious argument for immortality. A difference of opinion exists among scholars regarding the indications of a hope of immortality based on the consciousness of fellowship with God in the Old Testament (see article on ESCHATOLOGY). The proof offered by Jesus Himself when He declares God to be the God of the living and not of the dead (Matt. xxii. 32) is this: God has entered into personal relations with man, and as He is the Eternal, He will preserve in life with Himself those who are thus in communion with Him. The infinite value of every in dividual soul (Luke, xv.) to God as Father is an assurance that He will not suffer the loss in death of any of His children. Josiah Royce in his lecture on The Conception of Immortality, I 900, (PP. combines this argument of the soul's union with God with the argument of the incompleteness of man's life. It must be pointed out, however, that these arguments, based on personal values, do not afford a proof of natural immortality, but of what has been called conditional. Those will survive who de serve to survive. As adaptation to environment is the condition of the survival of any organism, so human personality can at tain immortality only as it adapts itself to God, the eternal en vironment. This is the argument developed by J. G. Simpson in his two books, Man and the Attainment of Immortality (1922) and The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature (1912).
R. W. Emerson declares that "the impulse to seek proof of immortality is itself the strongest proof of all." We expect im mortality not merely because we desire it ; but because the desire itself arises from all that is best and truest and worthiest in ourselves. The desire is reasonable, moral, social, religious; it has the same worth as the loftiest ideals, and worthiest aspira tions of the soul of man. The loss of the belief casts a dark shadow over the present life, a potent moral influence is gone. "The day," says Ernest Renan, "in which the belief in an after life shall vanish from the earth will witness a terrific moral and spiritual decadence. Some of us perhaps might do without it, provided only that others held fast. But there is no lever capable of raising an entire people if once they have lost their faith in the immortality of the soul" (quoted by A. W. Momerie, Immortality, p. 9). To this belief, many and good as are the arguments which can be advanced for it, a confident assurance is given by Chris tian faith in the Risen Lord, and the life and immortality which He has brought to light in His Gospel.